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SUMMARY 
The issue of inclusive development in developing countries is at the heart of this thesis. The 
latter revolves around four chapters on fiscal policy issues and inclusive growth-related matters. 
Chapter 1 explores how government tax revenue components (value added tax, personal 
income tax, and corporate income tax) affect the inclusiveness of growth in developing 
countries. The study discusses also the role played by institutional variables qualities in the 
implementation of tax policy. Evidence is shown that tax policy affects significantly inclusive 
growth if and only if the countries have a strong institution quality like low corruption and a 
good bureaucratic policy. In addition, our result shows that there is an optimal tax beyond 
which, any increase in the personal income tax rate should have negative impact on inclusive 
growth. Regarding the VAT, the analysis of threshold effect shows that it is from a certain 
threshold that the VAT revenue positively affects inclusive growth. This highlight several 
problems in VAT such as numerous exonerations, and non-refunding of VAT credits making 
VAT little accountable. Furthermore, the analysis shows that governments tend to reduce the 
income tax rates in electoral periods, but not necessarily the consumption tax rates. The 
Chapter 2 examines the effects of government expenditure components on both equity and 
growth in sub-Saharan countries, especially whether it is possible to design public spending to 
promote a more equitable society without sacrificing economic growth. We find evidence that 
investment in infrastructure (quality and stock) contributed to more inclusive growth in Sub-
sub Saharan African economies than others government spending in long term. These results 
particularly suggest that temporary and well-targeted programs should be implemented to help 
those being left out by the growth process. The Chapter 3 investigates whether or not income 
inequality matters in the periods of fiscal adjustments in Côte d’Ivoire over the period 1980-
2014. More specifically, we observe an improvement in growth performance after fiscal 
consolidations episodes, but also income gap decreases in the periods ahead fiscal adjustments. 
 v 
 
Lastly, Chapter 4 assesses the credibility of fiscal forecasts and their social effects in CEMAC 
and WAEMU countries. We obtain evidence that the inefficiency of fiscal forecast occurs in 
most time because the forecast deviation is proportional to the forecast itself, but also because 
the past errors are repeated in the present. Furthermore, a part of revenue forecast errors can be 
explained by random shocks to the economy. Therefore, these errors in revenue forecast 
considered as fiscal policy shocks has a detrimental effect on inclusive growth. 
 
Keywords: Tax policy, government spending, inclusive growth, income inequality, fiscal 
adjustment, fiscal forecast errors, GMM, Panel VAR, Bayesian method averaging (BMA), 
developing countries, sub-Saharan Africa, WAEMU, CEMAC, Côte d’Ivoire. 
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RESUME 
La question du développement inclusif dans les pays en développement est au cœur de cette 
thèse. Ce dernier s'articule autour de quatre chapitres sur les questions de politique fiscale et les 
questions liées à la croissance inclusive. Le chapitre 1 explore comment les composantes des 
recettes fiscales du gouvernement (taxe sur la valeur ajoutée, impôt sur le revenu des 
particuliers et impôt sur les sociétés) affectent l'inclusivité de la croissance dans les pays en 
développement. L'étude aborde également le rôle joué par les variables institutionnelles dans la 
mise en œuvre de la politique fiscale. Nous observons que la politique fiscale affecte la 
croissance inclusive de manière significative si et seulement si les pays ont de fortes qualités 
institutionnelles telles qu’une faible corruption et une bonne politique bureaucratique. En outre, 
notre résultat montre qu'il existe un seuil optimal au-delà de laquelle toute augmentation du 
taux d'imposition des personnes physiques affecte négativement la croissance inclusive. En ce 
qui concerne la TVA, l'analyse de l'effet de seuil montre que c'est à partir d'un certain seuil que 
les recettes de la TVA ont une incidence positive sur la croissance inclusive. Cela met en 
lumière plusieurs problèmes liés à la TVA, tels que de nombreuses exonérations et le non-
remboursement des crédits de TVA reduisant ainsi la rédévabilitélié à la TVA. De plus, 
l'analyse montre que les gouvernements ont tendance à réduire les taux d'impôt sur le revenu 
en période électorale, mais pas nécessairement les taux d'imposition de la consommation. Le 
chapitre 2 examine les effets des composantes des dépenses publiques sur l'équité et la 
croissance dans les pays d’Afrique subsaharienne, notamment s'il est possible de concevoir des 
dépenses publiques en vue de promouvoir une société plus équitable sans sacrifier la croissance 
économique. Notre étude a permis de montrer que l'investissement dans l'infrastructure (qualité 
et stock) a contribué à une croissance plus inclusive dans les économies d'Afrique 
subsaharienne que d'autres dépenses gouvernementales à long terme. Ces résultats suggèrent en 
particulier que des programmes temporaires et bien ciblés devraient être mis en place pour aider 
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ceux qui sont laissés pour compte par le processus de croissance. Le chapitre 3 cherche à savoir 
si les problèmes d’inégalités de revenus se sont posés ou non dans les périodes d'ajustement 
budgétaire en Côte d'Ivoire au cours de la période 1980-2014. Plus spécifiquement, nous 
observons une amélioration de la performance de croissance après les épisodes de consolidation 
budgétaire, mais aussi des diminutions de l'écart de revenu dans les périodes suivantes les 
années d’ajustements budgétaires. Enfin, le chapitre 4 évalue la crédibilité des prévisions 
budgétaires et de leurs effets sur le bien-être social dans les pays de la CEMAC et de l'UEMOA. 
Nous sommes aboutis aux résultats que l'inefficacité des prévisions budgétaires se produit dans 
la plupart des cas parce que les erreurs de prévisions sont proportionnelles à la prévision elle-
même, mais aussi parce que les erreurs passées sont répétées dans le temps. En outre, une partie 
des erreurs de prévision des recettes peut s'expliquer par des chocs aléatoires survenus dans 
l'économie. Par conséquent, ces erreurs dans les prévisions de revenus considérées comme des 
chocs de politique budgétaire ont un effet négatif sur la croissance inclusive. 
 
Mots Clés : Politique fiscale, dépenses publiques, croissance inclusive, inégalité de revenus, 
ajustement budgétaire, erreurs de prévision budgétaire, GMM, panel VAR, bayesian method 
averaging (BMA), pays en développement, Afrique subsaharienne, UEMOA, CEMAC, Côte 
d'Ivoire. 
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Inequality has raised in different regions of the world both in advanced and developing 
economies in recent decades. According to the IMF (2014) report, a range of factors are at the 
root of this growing inequality. Specifically, these factors include technological change, 
increases in labor force participation by low-skilled workers, declining top marginal income tax 
rates, widening inter-regional inequality within economies and globalization and liberalization 
of factor and product markets. 
While some income inequalities are deemed necessary to provide incentives for investment and 
economic growth (Barro, 2000; Forbes, 2000), it is also proven that high income inequality can 
undermine macroeconomic stability and growth. Recent empirical work reveals that high levels 
of inequality impair the pace and sustainability of growth (Ostry et al., 2014). Inequality can 
slow down growth because it deteriorates the health status of poor and human capital (Galor 
and Moav, 2004); it generates political and economic instability that reduces investment 
(Alesina and Perotti, 1996); it hinders the social harmony needed to adapt to shocks and 
maintain resilience and growth (Rodrik, 1999). Others argued that growing inequality could be 
an important contributing factor in the global financial crisis  (Mah‐Hui and Khor, 2011; Goda, 
2017). Therefore, many decision-makers see a more equitable distribution of income as a 
desirable goal, although the underlying motivations may differ. Lower income inequality is 
often seen as important for achieving greater equal access to economic, social and political 
resources. Others view it as intrinsically desirable because existing income inequality is 
perceived as the result of unfair access to resources and thus detrimental to social cohesion. 
The issue is about which policy each country should implement to spur growth and helping to 
reduce both poverty level, and inequality in income distribution. This preoccupation leads us 
back to fiscal policy that is the key instrument for governments to allocate income and thus 
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achieve inclusive growth. Fiscal policy can affect the distribution of income both directly by its 
effect on current disposable incomes and indirectly through its effect on future earnings 
capacities - and thus on market income (i.e. pre-tax and transfer) of individuals. Its role is likely 
to vary from one economy to another, reflecting the differences between available tax 
instruments and social preferences regarding equity and the role of government. However, to 
address these major challenges due to uncertainties in obtaining external financing, it is 
essential for developing countries policy makers to carefully consider the fairness of fiscal 
policies as part of their development strategies. This would improve households’ living 
conditions and thus reduce poverty, and finance economic investments. Fiscal policy appears 
to be the best instrument for influencing income distribution. It includes taxation, social 
transfers, provision of free public services or at reduced prices (for e.g. schooling and health) 
and lastly direct intervention in the goods and services market and labor market (e.g. through 
the fixing of minimum wage). All of these instruments support the growth process in both 
developed and developing countries. 
What is inclusive growth? 
If growth is seen as an important factor of a country's capacity to improve the life of its citizens, 
we should know that growth by itself has no ability to reduce poverty and improve the well-
being of all. Much attention should be paid to the quality and sustainability of this growth, as 
well as how its profits are distributed among the different social strata. All this to reflect the 
equity considerations that underlie the growth process in recent years (Tandon et al., 2006; Ali, 
2007, Ali and Son, 2007; Rauniyar and Kanbur, 2010; Klasen, 2010; Ianchovichina and 
Lundström, 2009). According to the World Bank (2008), inclusive growth contain two 
important notions that are the pace as well as the pattern of growth; there is a relationship 
between these two elements, which must therefore be analyzed together. The assumption that 
the pace and pattern of growth is necessary for reaching sustainable growth as well as decrease 
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in poverty is in line with the conclusion of the Growth Report of the Commission on Growth 
and Development (2008). Thereby, the inclusiveness meaning at the same time equity, equality 
of opportunity and job creation is a key factor of a better growth strategy. 
Despite growing calls to make growth more inclusive, however, there is still no universal 
agreement about the definition of the notion of "inclusive growth". While growth is easier to 
define and measure, the specification of what makes it "inclusive" is much more controversial. 
There is some agreement that inclusive growth is growth for “the benefit of most and not just 
the poor", but ambiguities and disagreements abound beyond this general notion, and it seems 
that this approach has also met some of the conceptual and measurement challenges that the 
pro-poor-growth debates have faced before. In a more limited approach, inclusive growth can 
be described as "growth associated to falling disparities in incomes" (Rauniyar and Kanbur, 
2010). This specification highlights that inclusive growth is close to the concept relative pro-
poor growth. The difference could be that its equity aspects is quite encompassing and goes 
over simple definition of the poor. The non-income considerations is not account in such 
definition and then it is simple to measure (Klasen, 2010). On the other hand, inclusive growth 
can often mean "growth that benefits everyone". In this sense, the notion would indicate that 
growth should "benefit all segments of society, including the poor, near-poor, middle-income 
groups and even the wealthy"(Klasen, 2010). Such definition poses some problems and 
indicates not only the recipient of growth benefit, but the extent and distribution of these 
benefits.  
Other notions of inclusive growth have focused on the non-income components of growth and 
considered inclusive growth as a process and not just as an outcome. In this case, the concept 
refers to "growth associated with equal opportunities". As a result, inclusive growth is one in 
which the economic opportunities created by growth are accessible to all, especially the poor 
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(Ali and Son, 2007). The inclusiveness of growth will only be felt when the benefits accrue to 
poor groups, that is social groups disadvantaged. This would lead to greater social development 
and enable the weaker sectors of society to access assets and opportunities. Better asset and 
opportunity allocation lead to sustainable economic growth and thus reduces poverty and 
inequality. In the same line, Ianchovichina and Lundström (2009) believe that sustainable 
growth should be extended to all sectors and account the broad part of the country's workforce. 
This notion of growth underline productive employment as a means of rising poorest groups 
revenue rather than direct income distribution.  
For Ali and Zhuang (2007), inclusive growth should consist of strong and sustainable growth 
to create productive and decent jobs as well as social inclusion to ensure equal access to 
opportunities. from this perspective, inclusive growth is not based on a redistributive approach. 
In addition, the authors highlight that social inclusion can be achieved by investing in education, 
health and other social services to build human capacity, promote economic and social justice 
and provide social safety nets in order prevent acute deficiency. 
Why inclusive growth matters? 
The concept of inclusive growth means a better redistribution of the benefits and opportunities 
of economic growth. Sure, the pursuit of this goal depends primarily on country-specific 
conditions, but broadly linked to robust and generalize growth in all sectors, promotes 
productive employment in the labor market, provides equal opportunities for access markets 
and poor. Therefore, achieving inclusive growth should be a priority for policymakers, as the 
inclusiveness of growth is a key for sustainable growth and social cohesion. According to Ali 
and Son (2007), high and rising levels of income inequality can reduce the impact of growth on 
poverty reduction, with negative consequences for political stability and social cohesion, which 
is necessary for sustainable growth. In the same line, Alesina and Perotti (1996) and Keefer and 
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Knack (1997) state that inequality may generate socio-political instability. Political instability 
increases policy uncertainty, which has negative effects on the decisions of investment on 
human or physical capital. This indirectly harms the growth rate. Also, greater inequality may 
produce social unrest. Thereby, if inequality is accompanied by low rates of social mobility, 
individuals may have recourse of illegal sources of income, may be in their opinion, the regular 
labor market are low. Investment in human capital will therefore be deferred or substituted, 
which negatively affects economic growth. Stability-threatening activities therefore represent 
an unproductive waste of resources and reduce the overall productivity of an economy Barro 
(2000). Likewise, high inequalities can be harmful to the level and durability of growth itself 
(Ostry et al., 2014), weaken support for growth-enhancing reforms, and encourage governments 
to adopt populist policies, threatening economic and political stability (Rodrik, 1999). 
Inequality can also affect growth through its effect on resources distribution. From this point of 
view, high inequality can lead to less efficient allocation of resources. In the case of the 
imperfection of capital markets, the poor will not be able to exploit their abilities. The rich by 
against, invest furthermore in their projects so that the marginal returns are relatively low. Thus, 
wealth distribution should affect the average productivity of physical investment in the 
aggregate economy, while its quantity may be relatively unaffected (Banerjee, 2004). The 
weakness of financial access and investment in turn can also slow down social mobility, reduce 
work incentives and, in turn, contribute to lower growth.  
Another argument has been given by Galor and Zeira (1993) which relies on human capital 
investment. Poor households can stop education if they realize that they do not have sufficient 
means to cover the costs, even if the return is high. Thus, inequality reduces the number of 
households capable of investing in physical or human capital. The weakness of poor 
household’s investments implies that overall output would be lower than in the case of perfect 
financial markets. Then, it follows a negative correlation between inequality and growth. 
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Inequality and unemployment might also affect people's capability to face risk and thereby 
increase macroeconomic instability. In broad unequal societies, insurance mechanisms to 
contain the effects of shocks on consumption are very often limited to a few people, which 
generates significant social costs. In addition, fragile strata of the labor market - low-skilled and 
temporary workers - are more vulnerable to economic shocks, making them subject to work 
instability.  
Inequality can affect negatively growth through the channel of the fertility rate. The 
transmission channel is narrowly related to the human capital argument that decisions on 
investment in human capital and family size are linked, in accordance with the previous vision 
provided by Becker and Barro (1988). Households face a trade-off between the quality and 
quantity of their offsprings. Thus, lower-income household tend to have high fertility rates and 
low levels of education. For them, their best opportunity to increase family income is to have 
many children, which will expand the household size. Then, as the number of children per 
family increases, the average investment in education decreases.  According to Dahan and 
Tsiddon (1998), in the early stage of development, fertility and inequality increase together. 
But at the later phases of development, fertility decreases, investment in human capital 
increases, and inequality declines. Perotti (1996) supports that these models can be used to 
generate the prediction that decrease in inequality would cause a decrease in fertility and 
therefore an increase in investment in human capital and growth. Inequality 
The fiscal costs of poverty and inequality are enormous. Poverty is not just a cost to individuals; 
it is also a drain on public resources. Increasing the number of decent paying jobs reduces social 
assistance expenditures, increases tax revenues and reduces the demand for services. This can 
free up resources to invest in supporting growth rather than dealing with the consequences of 
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poverty. Reducing spending on preventative and proactive services that reduce poverty can be 
counterproductive in the long run, only increasing the fiscal cost of poverty. 
Fiscal policy and inclusive growth: what do the literature tell us? 
The increased income disparity has therefore given rise to greater attention to reconsidering the 
role of the fiscal policy components - tax and expenditure - in simultaneously achieving two 
countervailing goals: equity and economic growth. However, there is no consensus among 
economists on the signs and magnitude of the effects of fiscal policy on income inequality and 
economic growth. Therefore, the conventional wisdom of economic theory postulates that 
equity objectives can only be achieved at the cost of economic efficiency and hence the use of 
fiscal policy to meet this goal implies an inevitable trade-off between equity and efficiency. 
Among authors that investigated the distributional considerations of fiscal policy, Musgrave 
(1959) has shown that fiscal policy could be an important factor to achieve an equitable 
distribution of income among households. However, the extent of variation in income inequality 
across countries indicates that fiscal policy can affect income distribution (Feenberg and 
Poterba, 1993; Auten and Carroll, 1999; Benabou, 2000; Muinelo‐Gallo and Roca‐Sagales, 
2011).  
On the side of public expenditure, several works have proved that some kind of government 
spending tend to reduce income disparities in a numerous regions and countries of the world 
(e.g. Goñi et al. 2011; Lustig, 2011, 2016; Lustig et al., 2013; Martinez-Vazquez et al., 2012). 
Well-targeted public spending can improve income distribution by ensuring greater equality of 
access to education and health care and thus redistributing ownership of factors of production. 
For example, income inequality tends to be reduced by public expenditure on social transfers. 
Otherwise, the amplitude of the effect may change, and this is function the extent to which 
transfers are targeted to poor groups; In the case where a large part of the transfers are allocated 
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to the middle class because of the reasons of political economy, the impact on inequality can 
be very limited (Milanovic, 2000). However, it is also recognized that the relationship between 
public spending and inequality is complex, and uncertainties are growing about the efficiency 
of public spending as a redistributive instrument, particularly in low and middle-income 
countries. 
With regard to tax policy, tax policy design should play a key role in not only supporting growth 
but also in addressing distributional concerns. Taxes affect inequality through different 
channels. One can groups into two aspects. The first one is the direct way in which taxes 
redistribute income is by narrowing the distribution of disposable income (after tax). Taxes can 
also reduce market income inequality (before taxes) more indirectly, for example by 
encouraging participation in the labor market and by encouraging people to invest in their 
human capital and skills or by limiting the perpetuation of income inequality across generations. 
Specifically, taxes raise sufficient revenues to finance public projects such namely on social 
programs, and those often aim to reduce inequalities. Although taxation, especially the top 
bracket, is presented as an impediment to growth and an inefficient tool for tax redistribution 
(Bird and Zolt, 2005). Bastagli and al. (2012) show that direct taxes and cash transfers have 
reduced disparities in income distribution by about a third in OECD countries over the period 
1985-2005.  The second aspect by which taxes could affect equity is through the channel of 
targeted spending. In this case, taxes can generate income that will improve equity even if it is 
not progressive. Indeed, in some cases, an increase in regressive taxes might be the best solution 
if they are used to finance incremental expenditures and if the costs of effective redistribution 
through progressive taxes are high (IMF, 2014). 
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Source and discussions of income inequality database 
Interest in income inequality has increased in recent years for both researchers and the 
public. To make meaningful comparisons of levels and trends of income inequality across 
countries and over time, comparable data are needed. Although there is a lot of data on 
inequality available for cross-country analyzes and overtime, unfortunately, most of these 
data simply are not comparable because of differences in population covered, in terms of 
geography, age, and employment status; the definition of well-being used, such as market 
income or consumption; and the treatment of various other items, such as non-monetary 
income and imputed rents. The Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) 
was introduced in 2008 to provide researchers with data on income inequality that 
maximizes comparability for the widest possible sample of countries and years (Solt, 
2009). The SWIID database is an attempt to address the problem of data scarcity. The data 
are based on extended imputations where, for countries that do not have the required data 
for a given year, observations from the same country in other years and other countries of 
the same year are used to impute both gross and net inequality indices. However, others 
have been very critical of the widespread use of imputations in general and the particular 
type of imputations used by SWIID, and caution against the use of the dataset in 
econometric work (see Jenkins, 2015 and Ferreira et al., 2015). All costs arising from its 
implementation must be considered alongside the potential benefits arising from broader 
coverage. The value of SWIID depends on the plausibility of the assumptions underlying 
the imputation model (potential bias problems) and the correct use of the multiplied-
imputed data (precision problems). Even though the SWIID has some weaknesses, it is 
important to note that SWIID uses a transparent procedure to increase the comparability of 
available data on cross-national inequalities. Although it is not ideal for all research on 
economic inequality, its advantages over other transnational data sets will make it an 
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invaluable resource for those interested in ascertaining the causes and effects of income 
inequality cross-nationally and over time. Therefore, in this thesis, I would use the SWIID 
database that offers a variation of inequality between countries that no other database offers 
at the same level of quality. 
Inclusive growth is related to managing trade-offs between equity and efficiency. Growth-
enhancing fiscal reforms may have some costs in terms of meeting equity objectives, so that 
the fiscal design for inclusive growth requires taking into account the distributional implications 
of fiscal policies. In this thesis, fiscal design for inclusive growth is defined as a fiscal policy 
that reconciles considerations of efficiency and equity. In a clearer way, this thesis considers 
that inclusive growth is a growth whose benefits are equitably shared. A plausible way to know 
this benefit-sharing is to focus on the distribution of income across different social groups. 
Therefore, throughout the thesis, growth is considered as inclusive when it allows to reduce 
income inequality. This choice on the dimension of income distribution compared to other 
dimensions will allow us to be consistent in all analyzes. 
Overviews of thesis and contributions 
With the purposes of study, the thesis concentrates on investigating the relationship between 
components of fiscal policy and inclusive growth in developing countries using econometric 
models. The thesis has two parts and each part is composed of two chapters.  
Through chapters 1 and 2, the first part deals with the evaluation of government fiscal policy 
effects on growth inclusiveness in developing countries. Fiscal policy concerns the taxation and 
public spending, which in turn influences resource allocation and income distribution. The 
chapter 1 is about how tax policy could be used to achieve inclusive growth in developing 
countries by dealing the glaring disparities between the rich and poor. The distributional effect 
of spending is covered in Chapter 2.  
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Chapter 1 examines how public tax revenue components (value added tax, personal income 
tax, and corporate income tax) affect the inclusiveness of growth in developing countries. The 
link between tax policy and inclusive growth deserves attention, as income and consumption 
levels are the main indicators of household well-being. So, any change in tax policy necessarily 
implies a change in price structure which affects consumer preferences. This change can affect 
households indirectly through the change in production factors cost, and thereby their income. 
The inclusive growth index used refers to that developed by Anand et al. (2013), which 
integrates both the pace and distribution of economic growth. In fact, it integrates growth and 
income distribution into a single measure. Thereby, it provides a framework to study equity and 
efficiency together. The literature found that tax variables are likely to be endogenous, due to 
the inverse causality - from inclusive growth to selected tax policy instruments and vice versa. 
In particular, countries with a low level of inclusive growth may choose to rely relatively more 
on direct taxation and vice versa. As a result, these regressors can be correlated with the error 
term. In addition to this argument for potential reverse causality, endogeneity may also occur 
due to omitted variables and measurement error. Finally, the presence of the lagged dependent 
variable inclusive (t-1) is likely to give rise to autocorrelation. To address the endogeneity 
problem, one would usually choose an instrumental variables approach. However, finding good 
instruments for all observed types of taxation is a significant challenge. Using OLS is likely to 
yield biased and inconsistent estimated coefficients given the presence of heterogeneity among 
countries. To address this problem of endogeneity, the system GMM estimator developed by 
Blundell and Bond (1998, 2000) is used. Unlike most authors who have worked on this issue, 
we introduce to our model one external instrument for tax variable. This tax instrumental 
variable is that developed by Martinez-Vasquez et al.(2011). The method consists to instrument 
the tax variable with the weighted average of the tax variable for other countries in the 
corresponding year. The underlying intuition for using this particular instrument is that 
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inclusive growth in a country relative to others generally should not have an effect on the design 
of the tax structure of those other countries. Also, the design of the tax structure in a country 
should be affected by the design of the tax structure in the neighboring countries. In other words, 
countries are tempted to rely on what is happening in their neighbor. 
Using a database of 91 developing countries over the period 1990-2015, we show that, personal 
income tax (PIT) has been the best tool to affect the income distribution, leading to a more 
inclusive growth. The study discusses also the role played by institutional variables qualities in 
the implementation of tax policy. In the case of corporate income tax, the chapter provides 
evidence that this tax contributes to greater inclusive growth if and only if the countries have a 
strong institution quality like low corruption and a good bureaucratic policy. Moreover, we 
analyze the nonlinear effect of the taxation on inclusive growth. The specific objective is a 
determination of the threshold of taxation for developing countries beyond which the 
inclusiveness of growth declines. The result shows that there is an optimal tax beyond which, 
any increase in the PIT rate should have negative impact on inclusive growth. Regarding the 
VAT, the analysis of threshold effect shows that it is from a certain threshold that the VAT 
revenue positively affects inclusive growth. This highlight several problems in VAT such as 
numerous exonerations, and non-refunding of VAT credits making VAT little accountable. 
Furthermore, the chapter tried to see whether there is a politico-budgetary cycle in the effect of 
taxation. The analysis shows that governments tend to reduce the income tax rates in electoral 
periods, but not necessarily the consumption tax rates. This implies that the income tax rates 
have a bigger impact on voters’ choices compared to consumption taxes. Finally, we examine 
whether the impact of tax policy on inclusive growth has been affected by great financial crisis 
that took place during the year 2008. We found the improvement in the effect of tax policy on 
inclusive growth after the financial crisis. One explanation could be developing countries have 
reformed their tax system in the sense of taxation in favor of pro-poor growth. 
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Chapter 2 evaluates the effects of government expenditure components on both equity and 
growth, in sub-Saharan countries. Specifically, the chapter tries to analyze whether it is possible 
to design public spending in order to promote a more equitable society without sacrificing 
economic growth. The chapter is important for countries in sub-Saharan Africa at the time when 
governments face many political and economic challenges such as commodity price volatility, 
inflation, terrorism, and poor institutional quality (corruption, poor governance). Thus, the 
inclusion of the growth target could only be achieved through a quality institution and 
productive pro-poor government expenditures in the form of broad-based spending on 
education, health and infrastructure. To carry out the study, a panel-data vector autoregressive 
(panel VAR) approach is employed on annual data of 10 sub Saharan African countries over 
the period 1990-2015. The Panel VAR approach combines the traditional VAR approach, 
treating all the variables in the system as endogenous, and the panel-data approach, allowing 
for unobserved individual heterogeneity by introducing fixed effects, resulting in an improved 
consistency of the estimation (Love and Zicchino, 2006). The major advantage of this method 
is that it exploits individual time series and cross-sectional variations in data and avoids biases 
associated with cross-sectional regressions by taking into account the country-specific fixed 
effect. For Canova and Ciccarelli (2013), it captures static and dynamic interdependencies. It is 
undoubtedly a useful tool to give some good interpretation of inclusive impacts of government 
fiscal expenditure without modeling the global economy. As our panel exhibits a medium 
temporal dimension and a relatively small number of countries (10 countries), the panel with 
fixed effect specification (LSDV) is the most appropriated (Bun and Kiviet, 2006) and found 
to be consistent (Nickell, 1997). So, the estimation and drawing Impulse Response Functions 
(IRFs) of different shocks were done using the Stata code (XTVAR) of Cagala and Glogowsky 
(2014). XTVAR estimates a panel vector autoregression, using a least square dummy variable 
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estimator (LSDV). The estimator fits a multivariate panel regression of each dependent variable 
on lags of itself and on lags of all the other dependent variables.  
Our findings from impulsive response function give evidence that investment in infrastructure 
(quality and stock) contributed to more inclusive growth in Sub-sub Saharan African economies 
than others government spending in long term. This effect could be observed by an increased 
in GDP per capita growth and reducing in income inequality measured by Gini index. However, 
our results do not find evidence that public spending on education and health affect both equity 
and growth in Sub-Saharan Africa countries. In fact, among other reasons, these programs are 
in many countries located in urban areas thus not directly benefiting the rural poor or even those 
in the informal settlements in urban areas. Moreover, social spending in developing countries 
often benefits the rich and middle classes more than the poor. Therefore, a higher share of social 
spending on items such as health and education will not be reflected in higher incomes for the 
poor. These results are confirmed by the variance decomposition analysis (FEVD). 
The second part of this thesis presents two essays on fiscal adjustment, fiscal forecast, and 
inclusive development in African countries through Chapters 3 and 4. Public finances across 
west and central African countries has worsened considerably. There is an increasingly growing 
consensus for the necessity of restoring public finances as a prerequisite for sustainable and 
inclusive economic growth. Restoring sustainable public finances in these countries will require 
the implementation of credible medium-term fiscal adjustment strategies and also requires a 
credible budgetary projection. However, the question is whether these fiscal austerity measures 
will increase inequality or contribute to a more equitable distribution of income. Another 
concern is whether fiscal forecast errors affect inclusive growth. 
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Chapter 3 explores the effects of fiscal adjustment on inclusive growth in Côte d’Ivoire over 
the period 1980-2014. Addressing such issue seems necessary as poor income distribution could 
reduce the government's political support for implementing consolidation measures, but also 
because high levels of inequality could hurt long-term growth. In order to measure the impact 
of fiscal adjustments we use the cyclically adjusted primary balance (CAPB) as the measure of 
the government’s fiscal stance. The interest of this fiscal measure is that it isolates discretionary 
policy action from effects resulting from economic activity such as inflation or real interest rate 
changes. Especially, we use primary fiscal variables that exclude interest payments because the 
fluctuations in interest payments cannot be considered discretionary. To make the cyclical 
correction, we follow the method proposed by Alesina and Ardagna (2010) and Yang et al. 
(2015). According to authors, such fiscal variable is simpler and more transparent than more 
complicated official measures such as those of the OECD and the IMF that use estimates of 
potential output and fiscal multipliers. The underlying principle of this method, as mentioned 
Yang et al. (2015), is that since public expenditure is negatively dependent on GDP as a result 
of unemployment benefits, and because revenue responds positively to GDP as a result of tax 
revenues, changes in cyclically-adjusted fiscal variables can be calculated from the difference 
between the predicted current-year value (which would prevail if unemployment had not 
changed since the previous year) and the actual value of the previous year. However, contrary 
to Yang et al. (2015) that use a share price index as an additional variable determining the 
CAPB, we use the international price of cocoa. In fact, cocoa accounts for 15% of Côte 
d'Ivoire's GDP and more than 50% of its export earnings. When considering cocoa price as a 
business cycle factor, it would be ideal to include other types of commodity prices such as oil 
price and coffee price. But we use only the price of cocoa as a business cycle factor due to its 
particular relevance to tax revenues, and we believe this index is representative of the other 
commodity price movement. Therefore, a period of fiscal adjustment corresponds to a year in 
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which the cyclically adjusted primary balance (CAPB) improves by at least 1 per cent of GDP. 
The estimation of the inclusiveness effects of fiscal consolidation in Côte d’Ivoire is made using 
the Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) method developed by Magnus et al. (2010). According 
to the literature, there exist potentially several empirical growth models, each given by a 
different combination of explanatory variables and each with some probability of being the 
“true” model. Bayesian methods frame the problem of identifying the determinants of economic 
growth in terms of uncertainty about the true sets of explanatories. 
Our results show that fiscal consolidations are followed by an improved in growth performance, 
but also income gap decreases after periods of fiscal adjustments in Côte d’Ivoire. In other 
words, there is no trade-off between growth and income inequality when implementing fiscal 
consolidations in Côte d’Ivoire. This conclusion contrasts to the results of several works that 
analyze the impact of fiscal consolidations on inequality at the national level. Our findings also 
suggest that tax-based fiscal consolidations seem to increase economic growth. However, the 
results did not find evidence to the expansionary effect of spending-based fiscal adjustment. 
These results could be explained by the fact that in developing countries, tax based-adjustment 
are generally a base-broadening measures. Therefore, this will contribute to strong tax revenue 
collections and play an important role in achieving higher, sustainable economic growth. 
Moreover, we find that tax revenue increases in Côte d’Ivoire were not associated with 
increases in inequality. Interestingly, when fiscal consolidation is achieved via revenue side, 
income inequality seems to be reduced further. In addition, reductions in primary expenditures 
do not seem to reduce the income gap. 
The last chapter investigate the fiscal forecasts and their social effects in CEMAC and 
WAEMU countries. The objective of this chapter is threefold. First, it aims to assess the quality 
of fiscal forecasts (accuracy, rationality and unbiasedness) in these two-economics areas. 
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Second, it tries to analyze the determining factors of fiscal forecast deviation for CEMAC and 
WAEMU countries. Third, it analyzes the social effects of fiscal policy shocks through its 
impacts on the growth inclusiveness. Having in mind that forecasting is a complex task 
surrounded by huge uncertainty, we documented the statistical properties of forecast errors 
using data collected from national draft budgets that were made for the period 2004-2015. Three 
aspects are tested: accuracy, rationality and unbiasedness. Bias is a problem of direction: 
Forecasts are typically too low (downward bias) or typically too high (upward bias). The 
unbiasedness of forecasts can be analyzed through simple descriptive, the mean error (ME). 
Accuracy is an issue of magnitudes of deviation: Forecast errors can be too large (in either 
direction) using a particular forecasting technique. In practice, the accuracy of forecasts can be 
analyzed by either by econometric test either through simple descriptive: mean absolute error 
(MAE). The rationality (or efficiency) refers to how much a forecast fully exploits the 
information available at the time the forecast is made. The rationality can be examined 
regarding the information available at the time the forecast was elaborated (data, policy 
measures). This will allow to determine whether or not the predictions are optimal with regards 
to this particular information set (Wallis, 1989). Next, we performed a panel data analysis of 
the potential determinants of revenue forecasting errors, considering a wide set of economic, 
political and institutional variables. Assuming the presence of cross-sectional dependence in 
our model, that could be caused by the common factors which are unobserved, we resort to a 
Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors estimation method in order to have the unbiasedness 
estimators. 
The statistical analysis of the quality of fiscal forecast shows that only one country produces 
both relatively unbiased and accurate fiscal forecasts – Benin. The test of inefficiency shows 
that both in these two economic areas, the inefficiency of fiscal forecast occurs in most time 
because the forecast deviation is proportional to the forecast itself, but also because the past 
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errors are repeated in the present. Furthermore, the degree of cross-country heterogeneity is 
high in the sample. The investigation on potential determinants errors denote that a part of 
revenue forecast errors can be explained by random shocks to the economy like unexpected 
changes in the GDP growth, change, consumer price measured by inflation and the price 
volatility. Against our expectation, public debt/GDP ratio is associated with lower budget 
balance forecast error. Our study does not find evidence of the effect of election year on revenue 
forecasts. Finally, the good practice of PFM namely the publication by the government of a 
report or a chapter on fiscal risks seem relevant in reducing errors in revenue forecasting. 
Regarding the distributional effect of fiscal policy shocks, the results suggest that an error in 
revenue forecast considered as fiscal policy shocks has a detrimental effect on inclusive growth. 
These effects on employment and inequality are mitigated in a healthy economic environment 
accompanied by better institutional quality. 
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Abstract 
This chapter assesses the impact of tax policy on inclusive growth in a panel of 91 developing 
countries over the period 1990-2015. To achieve our goal, we focus on three categories taxes 
namely the value added tax (VAT), the personal income tax (PIT), and the corporate income 
tax (CIT). We use the system GMM estimator to address endogeneity issues. Using the 
inclusive growth index developed by Anand et al. (2013), the empirical results indicate that 
reliance on personal income tax in developing countries has been a source of inclusive growth, 
confirming the progressivity of PIT, so the best tool to affect the income distribution. In the 
case of corporate income tax, our empirical results suggest that this tax contribute to greater 
inclusive growth if and only if the countries have a strong institution quality like low corruption 
and a good bureaucratic policy. Regarding the VAT, the analysis of threshold effect shows that 
it is from a certain threshold that the VAT revenue positively affects inclusive growth. This 
highlight several problems in VAT such as numerous exonerations, and non-refunding of VAT 
credits making VAT little accountable. Moreover, we found that the effect of tax on inclusive 
growth is affected in electoral period. Furthermore, after 2008 financial crisis, PIT and VAT 
have been found to have positive effect on growth inclusiveness due to tax system reform in 
favor of pro-poor growth. 
 
Keywords: tax policy, inclusive growth, income inequality. 
JEL code: H20, D31, I31 
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1.1. Introduction 
The reduction of poverty and inequality has always been at the center of both policy and 
academic debates all over the World. Over time, government involvement has increased in 
absolute and relative terms, especially in developing countries due to insufficient and 
ineffective market force mechanism in achieving macroeconomic objectives. The efficiency in 
the allocation of resources was expected to benefit the aggregate economy. While advanced 
economies have a long history of actively using fiscal policy for redistribution, in developing 
countries fiscal policy has put greater emphasis on achieving growth rather than on promoting 
equity. The critical issue facing developing countries is how to use fiscal policy to achieve a 
fairer society without undermining fiscal sustainability. 
The concern is what adequate policies each country should implement to spur growth and 
helping to reduce both poverty level, and inequality in income distribution. Kakwani and Pernia, 
(2000) focus in favor of direct pro-poor policies and recommend policies deliberately distorted 
in favor of the poor. Dollar and Kraay (2002) claim that implementing policies oriented on 
property rights, macroeconomic stability, fiscal discipline and international trade would be 
beneficial for poor much than direct pro-poor policies. In the theoretical and empirical 
literature, most studies emphasis the role of fiscal policy such as taxation and spending policies 
as main tool for enhancing economic growth, but also achieve income redistribution and 
poverty reduction (Canavire-bacarreza et all., 2013; Claus et all., 2012; Martinez-Vazquez et 
al., 2012). However, no simple answer exists concerning the relationship of fiscal policy and 
inclusive growth (reduction in inequality and poverty) especially in developing countries. It is 
noted that few researches have been conducted on how changes in fiscal policy such taxation 
and public spending have actually impacted income distribution, especially in less advanced 
economies. In developed countries, fiscal policy contributes significantly to reducing income 
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inequality, according to a comprehensive review by Bastagli et al. (2012). The result is 
mitigating in developing countries. This is due to the weakness of taxes and transfers that 
greatly limit the redistributive impact of developing countries fiscal policy. In the same vein, 
other authors have found that there is low correlation between changes in public expenditure 
and income inequality (Schuknecht and Tanzi, 2005), and have showed that tax policy was 
generally ineffective to affect the distribution of income (Harberger, 2006). However, some 
evidence indicates the distributional effects of tax policy in developing countries, such in the 
cases of Indonesia (Keuning and Thorbecke, 1989) or Latin America (Ocampo, 1998). 
The impact of tax policy on inclusive growth merits attention due to the fact that when analyzing 
households’ welfare, their income and level of consumption are the main indicators of their 
standard of living. Moreover, any change in tax policy necessarily implies a change in price 
structure which affects consumer preferences (Essama-Nssah, 2000). This change can affect 
households indirectly through the change in production factors cost, and thereby their income. 
Furthermore, the tax system could have a direct effect through households’ disposable income 
or the price of goods and services i.e. the level of consumption. Therefore, the role of fiscal 
policy in developing countries should be to foster economic growth by providing 
macroeconomic stability, but also ensure equity. Then, if governments are to play an active role 
in fostering inclusive growth, fiscal policy should be put forward. The challenge is to know 
which aspect of fiscal policy policymakers should focus to ensure more inclusive growth 
leading to improve living conditions of the population through a reduction of income inequality 
and poverty and improving employment. 
The fundamental objective of this study is to examine the relationship between tax policy and 
inclusive growth by highlighting in 91 developing countries by using a dynamic panel data. We 
consider policies that have been proven in the literature to make growth patterns more inclusive. 
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These policies can be grouped into various groups. As in most developing countries data is 
unavailable, we use two kinds of taxation (income taxes and added value tax). We organize the 
rest of the article as follows: the next section presents trends in income inequality while section 
3 deals with the content of inclusive growth. Section 4 discusses the role of institutional variable 
quality on inclusive growth. Section 5 reviews the literature. In the section 6, we develop the 
empirical approach while section 7 displays the results of estimation. Finally, section 8 
concludes the chapter. 
1.2. Trends in income inequality  
Income disparities are increasing in many countries, and until recently, between regions. Table 
(1) presents trends in the Gini coefficient for disposable income (i.e., market incomes minus 
direct taxes plus cash transfers) across regions over recent decades. Between 1990 and 2011, 
average inequality in each region changed by less than 5 percentage points. Sub-Saharan Africa 
and Latin America are the two most unequal regions with average inequality exceed a Gini of 
44 % every year. Even though there is a slight decline in Gini coefficient in both two regions 
over the second sub period, the level of income inequality remains high in these two regions. 
In contract, Europe and Central Asia was the most equal region, and the average inequality in 
that region was less than 31 %, a difference of 13 percentage points. 
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Table 1: Gini Index by Region, 1990-2011 
Region 1990 2000 2011 
Change in Gini 
1990-2000 
Change in Gini 
2000-2011 
Change in Gini 
1990-2011 
East Asia & Pacific 35.7 38.7 39.7 2.9 1.0 3.9 
Europe & Central Asia 25.8 30.5 30.5 4.7 -0.02 4.6 
Latin America & Caribbean 45.2 47.9 44.2 2.6 -3.7 -1.1 
Mddle East & Nrth Africa 36.6 38.0 33.9 1.3 -4.06 -2.6 
North America 30.4 34.1 34.3 3.6 0.2 3.8 
South Asia 36.7 41.5 37.7 4.8 -3.8 1.0 
Sub-Saharan Africa 46.5 46.2 43.2 -0.2 -3.0 -3.2 
Sources: Net Gini from SWIID Version 5.0; and Authors calculations. 
 
In terms of change in Gini index, Europe and Central Asia as well as East Asia and Pacific 
ranked as the worst performers on average, having increased their Gini index by almost 4.7 and 
4 respectively between 1990 and 2011. In the same line, we can note an increase in Gini index 
by about 3.9 for North America region. These results are due to the fact that these regions have 
previously recorded a high level of inequality over the period 1990-2000. So, they also appear 
as the worst performers in the short term, with increases in their Gini coefficient of 3.6 for North 
America, 4.7 for Europe and Central Asia, and about 3 for East Asia & Pacific. Sub-Saharan 
Africa, on the other hand, has made the greatest progress towards greater equality by reducing 
its Gini index by about 5 points on average, between 1990 and 2011. Sub-Saharan Africa is also 
among the best-performing nation in the short term, as its regional Gini index has fallen by 
some 3 between 2000 and 2011, while Middle East and North Africa as well as Latin America 
and the Caribbean are following it closely, having dropped their index by about 2.7 and 1.1 
points on average, respectively.  
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1.3. Content of inclusive growth 
Economic growth is an important factor in the fight against poverty. However, in many areas, 
the current economic growth is not generating equity. Since then, it is recognized that growth 
alone cannot lead to a reduction in poverty or a desired enhancement in the welfare of all. Thus, 
the quality of growth, its sustainability and the extent to which it benefits to broader sections of 
society have more and more become of interest. It’s in this context that the concept of inclusive 
growth has been developed in the recent years as a way of addressing equity considerations 
underlying the process of growing. In a 2008 report, the World Bank introduced the inclusive 
growth concept as “growth that allows people to contribute to and benefit from”. Despite the 
growing calls to make growth more inclusive, however, there is still no universal agreement 
about the definition of the notion of "inclusive growth". While growth is easier to define and 
measure, the specification of what makes it "inclusive" is much more controversial. There is 
some agreement that inclusive growth is growth for “the benefit of most and not just the poor", 
but ambiguities and disagreements abound beyond this general notion, and it seems that this 
approach has also met some of the conceptual and measurement challenges that the pro-poor-
growth debates have faced before. In a more limited approach, inclusive growth can be 
described as "growth associated to falling disparities in incomes" (Rauniyar and Kanbur, 2010). 
The specification highlights that inclusive growth is close to the concept of relative pro-poor 
growth. The difference may be that its outlook of equity is more comprehensive and goes 
beyond the restricted definition of poor. The non-income considerations is not account in such 
definition and then it is simple to measure (Klasen, 2010). On the other hand, inclusive growth 
can often mean "growth that benefits everyone". In this sense, the notion would indicate that 
growth should "benefit all segments of society, including the poor, near-poor, middle-income 
groups and even the wealthy"(Klasen, 2010). Such definition indicates not only the recipient of 
growth benefit, but the extent and distribution of these benefits. 
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Other notions of inclusive growth have focused on the non-income components of growth and 
considered inclusive growth as a process and not just as an outcome. In this case, the concept 
refers to "growth associated with equal opportunities". As a result, inclusive growth is one in 
which the economic opportunities created by growth are accessible to all, especially the poor 
(Ali and Son, 2007). The inclusiveness of growth will only be felt when the benefits accrue to 
poor groups, that is social groups disadvantaged. This would lead to greater social development 
and enable the weaker sectors of society to access assets and opportunities. Better asset and 
opportunity allocation lead to sustainable economic growth and thus reduces poverty and 
inequality. In the same line, Ianchovichina and Lundström (2009) believe that sustainable 
growth should be extended to all sectors and account the broad part of the country's workforce. 
This notion of growth underline productive employment as means of rising poorest groups 
revenue rather than direct income distribution. For Ali and Zhuang (2007), inclusive growth 
should consist in strong and sustainable growth in order to create productive and decent jobs as 
well as social inclusion to ensure equal access to opportunities. From this perspective, inclusive 
growth is not based on a redistributive approach. In addition, social inclusion can be achieved 
by investing in education, health and other social services to build human capacity, promote 
economic and social justice and provide social safety nets to prevent acute deficiency. Fernando 
(2008) noted that the economic dimension includes both capacity and opportunities for the poor 
and low-income rural households to benefit from economic growth. For others, however, social 
and institutional aspects of growth and development are also important elements of inclusive 
growth package. Ali and Son (2007) used the concepts of “social inclusion” and 
“empowerment” to denote this dimension. Thereby, social inclusion refers to removing the 
institutional and policy barriers that limit economic growth. Empowerment imply the access to 
productive assets, capacities, and resources that will allow every person to take part in the 
growth process. 
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In short, there is no consensus strictly speaking on a universal definition that can help to 
implement and monitor policy for inclusive growth. Various approaches have been developed 
and focus on different items of concept. The close concepts highlight outcomes. In this case, 
inclusive growth equal to “growth plus equity”. Thereby, there is better income and/or access 
to social goods and safety net. 
1.4. The role of institutional quality 
There is relevant work in the literature that address the relationship between institutional quality 
and inclusive growth. Two aspects – economic growth and income distribution – are key to 
understanding this relationship. In this section, the analysis is focused especially on corruption. 
Some studies show that corruption is systematically correlated with levels of human 
development and lower growth rates (Rothstein and Holberg, 2011). The effects of corruption 
on economic growth are numerous and can take various forms. Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) report 
four of them: higher public investment, lower quality of public infrastructure, lower public 
spending on education and health. Many studies have also found that corruption affects the 
quantity and quality of investments and reduces profitability (Mauro, 1998). Specifically, 
corruption reduces foreign direct investment (Zurawicki and Habib, 2010), including in the host 
country (Wei, 1999). Thus, a decline in the foreign direct investment affects the economic 
growth. Another way that corruption harms economic growth is that it undermines country's 
tax system and its ability to collect revenue (Nawaz, 2010). Let us add that corruption not only 
reduces the tax to GDP ratio, but also it increases the underground economy and weakens the 
tax morality of taxpayers, thus damaging the economy in the long-run (Attila, 2008; Nawaz, 
2010). Corruption introduces uncertainty, introduces reputational risks and vulnerability to 
extortion, which is costly for companies (Chêne, 2014). According to Transparency 
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International (2009), corruption also undermines fair competition because it makes access to 
capital more expensive. 
Corruption does not only affect the level of economic growth but also on how the benefits of 
such growth are distributed in the society. In fact, poor institutional quality has a detrimental 
effect on income inequality. Corruption affects negatively the distribution of income through 
diverse channel, namely by biased tax system, and lower levels and effectiveness of public 
spending. Corruption biased tax system in favor of rich people, thus creating unequal wealth 
distribution (Gupta et al. 2002). Corruption eases tax evasion and this have greater effect on the 
capability of government to mobilize high tax revenue and to fairly distribute the wealth. In 
addition, corruptible tax system creates a pressure on the system making the future taxation 
more progressive in order to offset the inequalities caused by corruption. However, such 
compensatory measures could encourage further influence groups to intensify their behaviors 
of tax evasion through political corruption and buying influences, thus creating a vicious cycle. 
Such situation makes the poorer more vulnerable to corruption and cannot demand 
accountability (Chêne, 2014). Furthermore, inequality caused by corruption impacts the 
position of disadvantaged groups of society by reducing the resources intended to social 
spending, such as education and health services. By reducing the quality of education and health 
care, corruption decreased human capital. Regarding the public health services, corruption 
could contribute to delay the provision of treatments, increasing the waiting times for patients 
and discouraging the use of clinics (Azfar and Gurgur, 2008). 
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1.5. The impact of tax policy on inclusive growth: literature review 
We divided the literature into two groups, based on the definition of inclusive growth as growth 
that reduces inequality and poverty. Firstly, we are looking to see if tax policy leads to economic 
growth and secondly whether that growth reduces inequality and poverty, leading thereby to 
the improvement of the standard of living. 
The question of whether tax policy can affect growth has been widely debated in the literature.  
On the link between taxation and growth, in a general way, there is considerable agreement in 
the literature about what are the important tax policy issues and appropriate tax policy directions 
for developing countries. For Fjeldstad (2013), an effective tax system plays a central role in 
sustainable development because it can mobilize the stable domestic revenue allowing 
developing countries to reduce the amount of aid or their dependency on natural resource. In 
order to analyze the efficiency of tax system, it is imperative to have knowledge to how tax 
policy undermines or promotes economic growth. 
From a theoretical point of view, the literature suggests that tax structure is negatively 
interlinked to growth. According to Gordon and Li (2009), developing countries tax policy is 
disconcerting on divers dimensions, due to the opposition between these policies and those 
observed in developed countries and those foreseen in the optimal taxation literature. Therefore, 
high tax rates lower economic growth. One explanation is that higher tax rates may be 
distortionary and hence is correlated negatively to growth while lower tax rates can increase 
revenue mobilization that will be used productively. However, empirical studies on taxation 
that promotes economic growth gave mixed results. Generally speaking, empirical studies 
found that different type of tax instruments affect economic growth significantly. Some studies 
on developing countries found non-consensual clear relationships, namely those by Skinner 
(1988); Easterly and Rebelo (1993); Agell et al. (2006); Padda and Akram (2009); Ocran 
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(2011); Worlu and Nkoro (2012); Bujang et al. (2013); Canavire-bacarreza et al. (2013). Other 
investigations including Li and Sarte (2004); Arnold et al. (2011); Gemmell et al. (2011); 
Martinez-Vasquez et al. (2011), found strong association between tax structure and growth. 
Using data from African countries, Skinner (1988) shows that PIT and CIT have negative direct 
effect on output growth, while trade taxes have little direct effect. The study also shows that 
sales and excise taxes have neutral effect on both output growth and investment. Easterly and 
Rebelo (1993) studies the effect of tax system on growth by using cross-section data for 100 
countries and a panel of annual data for 28 countries. They applied different approaches to 
measure tax rates. Their results show that the effect of taxation is not easy to isolate empirically. 
Autors predict that taxes on income and investment have unfavorable impact on economic 
growth. Indeed, these taxes have a simple and direct effect on growth rate: they reduce private 
returns to accumulation. However, not all taxes affect the rate of growth. In the models with 
exogenous labor supply, the growth rate is not affected by the level of consumption taxes; thus, 
these taxes do not distort the relative price of consumption today compared to tomorrow, 
leaving unchanged the incentive to accumulate capital. Likewise, Padda and Akram (2009) 
investigate whether the Pakistan, India and Sri Lanka tax policies have transitory or permanent 
effect on economic growth over the period 1973-2008. They found that in short terms, change 
in tax rate has transitory and negative effects in Pakistan and India. But for Sri Lanka, the effect 
is positive for first year and remains negative afterwards. Li and Sarte (2004); and Martinez-
Vasquez et al. (2011) found the same effect in respect of income tax. Unlike Skinner, authors 
found that increased use of consumer taxation has significant positive effects on economic 
growth. In the same line, Acosta-Ormaechea et al. (2012) found that raising consumption taxes 
(VAT and sales taxes) and decreasing taxes on income may be beneficial to growth. Moreover,  
Canavire-bacarreza et al. (2013) analyze the effect of different tax instruments of Latin 
American countries (such as PIT and CIT, general taxes on goods and services, including VAT 
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and other sales taxes, and revenues from natural resource) on economic growth. Authors found 
that PIT does not have the expected negative impact on growth in Latin America. They also 
found small negative effects of CIT on growth for individual countries, especially Argentina, 
Chile, and Mexico. Also, their results suggest that, in Latin America, greater reliance on 
consumption taxes affect significatively and positively growth. Similarly, Arnold (2008) used 
OCDE countries sample to show that both PIT and CIT are associated with lower economic 
growth relative to using consumption and property taxes. The study reveal that CIT worsen 
more growth than PIT. Therefore, the effect of both taxes remains the same in developing 
countries as well as developed countries. Bird and Zolt (2005), and Tanzi et al. (2008), argue 
that the restrict effects of PIT on economic growth are caused by its limited role played in 
developing countries tax system. 
To assess the effect of tax policy on inclusive growth, it is also necessary to study its effect on 
income redistribution and poverty reduction. 
Meltzer and Richard's (1981) are among the first to take an interest in the impact of tax structure 
on income redistribution. They argue that when mean income rises relative to the median 
income in the income distribution, a majority of low-income people will tend to support higher 
taxes, probably more as direct and progressive taxes rather than indirect taxes. Several studies 
have been done on the incidence of taxation and the allowance of tax burdens between different 
income groups, according to a set of conventional assumptions about the transfer of tax. Clearly, 
the study of incidence is relevant because the impact of taxes on income distribution and 
poverty is a long-term process and general impression of impact may be completely wrong. 
Regarding poverty reduction, Thompson and Smeeding (2013) explored trends in inequality 
and poverty in the US between 2008 and 2010 using both market income, and after-tax and 
transfer income. The results show that the effect of fiscal policy is different according to income 
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groups. Poverty turn down between old people while among children it decreased slightly. 
However, its effect increased sharply among the working-age population. Authors found that 
inequality declined in the whole sample, but no change was observed in households of working 
age. 
The CIT is ultimately "paid" by individuals either as follows: workers with lower wages; 
Consumers by higher prices; and/or owners of companies (shareholders) through lower profits 
and returns of investment. Although the objective of groups pushing for a higher CIT is to 
increase the tax burden on capital owners, taxes shifted to consumers or workers are clearly not 
paid by "corporations". Therefore, if capital owners bear a part of the burden of CIT, the 
reduction in the CIT rate is likely to exacerbate income inequality by increasing the income of 
capital holders (Ebrahimi and Vaillancourt, 2016). 
Depth analyzes generally give fairly moderate conclusions about the effects of redistribution of 
VAT, but more can be done to identify specific spending measures to mitigate the problems 
that this tax may raise. To assess the redistributive effects of tax, it must be compared to other 
potentially applicable solutions. One possibility is that it replaces other revenue sources. Bird 
and Zolt (2005) showed that VAT is undoubtedly less regressive than trade taxes and excise 
taxes that it replaces. Furthermore, in some developing countries, it can be as progressive as the 
income tax. Also, if VAT is used to finance increased spending, its redistributive effects may 
ultimately be progressive even it has a broad base and a single rate. Indeed, preferential rates 
and exemptions benefit the upper classes (since they spend more on all products). Therefore, 
the elimination of these taxes can benefit the poor and government could use such additional 
tax revenue to finance targeted spending measures. 
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1.6. Empirical Estimation Approach 
To examine the inclusiveness of economic growth in developing countries, we derive estimates 
based on regression of the effect of taxation on inclusive growth. This section discusses the 
methodology and data. 
1.6.1. Empirical model 
In investigating the impact of tax policy on inclusive growth, we focus on the evolution of the 
index build by Anand et al. (2013), which is computed on the basis of Gini coefficient and the 
GDP per capita growth. We want to estimate how the tax structure affects countries inclusive 
growth. There is no doubt that inequality and growth in a current year depend on their levels in 
previous years and a set of variables that is commonly used in the literature to explain income 
inequality and growth (see Gupta et al., 2002; Martinez-Vazquez et al., 2012). Starting from 
this assumption, inclusive growth is a dynamic process. Thereby, we test the overall hypothesis 
that tax structure is an important determinant of inclusive growth. Therefore, the model to be 
estimated is the following: 
?̅?𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼?̅?𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑇𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜗𝑖𝑡 ,          𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛;  𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇                         (1) 
Where ?̅?𝑖𝑡 represents the inclusive growth index in country 𝑖 in year 𝑡, 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛;  𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇, 
while ?̅?𝑖𝑡−1 its value in year 𝑡 − 1. 𝐹𝑖𝑡 stands for a vector of tax variables representing tax 
instruments in country 𝑖 in year 𝑡 that can have significant differential impacts on income 
distribution and poverty reduction. These variables are PIT, CIT, and VAT. The vector 𝑋𝑖𝑡 
denotes the set of control variables that play a significant role in explaining inclusive growth in 
the literature. The error term 𝑢𝑖 is individual country specific effect and the remaining 
disturbance, 𝜗𝑖𝑡. Note that we use a 5-years panel between the years 1990-2015. Hence, each 
of time index of length 5 represents a 5 years period. 
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We must solve several econometric problems that may occur in estimating the equation (1). 
First, the variables representing tax instruments are likely to be endogenous, due to the inverse 
causality - from inclusive growth to selected tax policy instruments and vice versa. In particular, 
countries with low level of inclusive growth may decide to focus on direct taxation and vice 
versa. As a result, these regressors can be correlated with the error term. In addition to this 
argument for potential reverse causality, endogeneity may also occur due to omitted variables 
and measurement error. Finally, the presence of lagged dependent variable inclusive (t-1) is 
likely to give rise to autocorrelation. To solve endogeneity issue, one generally chooses an 
instrumental variable approach. However, finding good instruments for all types of taxes is 
challenging. The use of OLS is likely to produce biased and inconsistent estimates, given the 
heterogeneity between countries. 
To address this problem of endogeneity, we resort to system GMM estimator developed by 
Blundell and Bond (1998, 2000). The Blundell and Bond estimator combines two equations, 
one in levels and one in first-differences. The equation in levels uses lagged first-differences as 
instruments for the endogenous variables (lagged Gini coefficients and tax variables), whereas 
the equation in first-differences uses lagged levels as instruments. The validity of these 
instruments is tested using the standard Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions. The system 
GMM works for unbalanced panels and for small samples (few periods and many countries), 
using the Windmeijer (2005) correction (two-step estimation). The estimator is consistent if the 
instruments are valid and there is no second order autocorrelation. In large T panels, country-
specific fixed effect shock that arise in the error term decreases over time. In the same way, the 
correlation between lagged dependent variable and the error term is insignificant (Roodman, 
2006). On the other hand, if there are few observations, the cluster-robust standard errors and 
the Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test may be unreliable. In these cases, it is not essential to 
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use the Arellano-bond estimator. The GMM estimator uses first differences to transform 
equation (1) into: 
∆?̅?𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼∆?̅?𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾∆𝑇𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽∆𝑋𝑖𝑡 + ∆𝜇𝑖 + ∆𝜗𝑖𝑡 ,        𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛;  𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇             (2) 
The autocorrelation issue is treated by instrumenting the first-differenced lagged dependent 
variable with its past levels. 
We introduce to the model one external instrument of tax variable as developed by Martinez-
Vasquez et al. (2011). In this method, we instrument the tax variable with the weighted average 
of tax variable for other countries in the corresponding year. The underlying intuition for using 
this particular instrument is that inclusive growth in a country relative to others generally should 
not have an effect on the design of tax structure of those other countries. Therefore, the 
dependent variable should not be correlated with the instrument. Also, the design of tax 
structure in a country should be affected by the design of tax structure in the neighboring 
countries. In fact, countries are tempted to rely on what is happening in their neighbor, and this 
effect is especially strong in the case of small countries. The weights are the inverse of the 
distance between the two countries. The value of the tax instrumental variable for country i  in 
year t  is calculated as follow: 
 
    i j      (3) 
 
Where 
jd  is the distance between the largest cities in country i  and country j  and jttax  is the 
tax variable of country j  in year t . 
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1.6.2. Variables and Data 
As previously mentioned, the chapter investigates how tax policy can better serve the goal of 
inclusive growth in developing countries. For that purpose, the analysis is based on annual data 
spanning 1990-2015, covering a panel of 91 developing countries. We use the measure of 
inclusive growth developed by Anand et al. (2013), which integrates both the pace and 
distribution of economic growth. Regarding for the pace of growth, we use the GDP per capita 
growth from World Development Indicator database; and for benefit sharing, the Gini 
coefficient is used. The Gini coefficient is from the Standardized World Income Database 
(SWIID) and measured the net Gini i.e. the Gini after tax and transfer.  
Dependent variable: Inclusive growth index  
The index of inclusive growth integrates growth and income distribution into one single 
measure. Therefore, it provides a framework to study equity and efficiency together. The 
methodology is based on social welfare function which is also known as the concentration 
curve. In the social welfare function, inclusive growth depends on two factors: average per 
capita income and distribution of income among the population.1 Therefore, efficiency requires 
the overall improvement of income in a country; and equity requires this improvement in 
country’s income should be equally distributed across various segments of the population. 
Growth is considered inclusive if the index if positive. The higher the index, the more growth 
is inclusive. Figure 1 shows the graphical representation of inclusive growth index. The graph 
also shows the correlation between the inclusive growth index and other indicators found in the 
literature that approximate the concept of inclusive growth (for instance, the quality of growth 
indicator (QGI)2, the Human Development Index (HDI) from United Nations.  
                                                          
1 See Annex for more detail about the construction of index. 
2 The index is developed by Mlachilaet al. (2014). The quality of growth index (QGI) encompasses both the 
intrinsic nature of growth and its social dimensions. According to authors, the QGI goes beyond the well-known 
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The analysis of different charts shows that sub-Saharan Africa is the region with a low level of 
inclusive growth compared to other regions such as Latin America and MENA over the period 
1990 to 2015. However, outside the period 1990-1994 when the sign of inclusive growth index 
was negative meaning a lack of inclusive growth, efforts are being made to improve the 
inclusiveness of growth. However, its level is still lower than in other regions. Latin America 
is the region that performs well in terms of the indicator of growth inclusiveness but also 
regarding the HDI and QGI. Figure 1 also shows the correlation between our inclusive growth 
index and HDI and QGI that can be considered as an indicator of inclusive growth. Over the 
period 1990 to 2011, our indicator seems to be positively correlated with HDI and QGI. By 
cons, over the period 2012-2015, the index of inclusive growth is negatively linked to the two 
others. 
                                                          
Human Development Index (HDI) developed by the United Nations by concentrating not just on the levels of 
incomes, but the very nature of growth. 
 40 
 
Figure 1: Trends of inclusive growth index 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author calculation using data from WDI, HDI, and SWIID. 
 
Variables of Interest: Taxes  
To evaluate tax policy impact on inclusive growth in the study, we consider the following tax 
variables: PIT, CIT and VAT, all measured as a percentage of GDP. These tax variables are 
from the IMF Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD). 
In general, PIT is considered progressive. The purpose of progressive taxation is to redistribute 
wealth from the richest to the poorest in order to reduce poverty and inequality. PIT has long 
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been considered as one of the most effective tax instruments. In addition to being used as a 
means of equalizing income, it has the advantage of countercyclical flexibility, and it is easy to 
be adjusted to account family size and other considerations related to taxable capacity. 
However, the top PIT rate needs to be addressed with caution. If it is too high, taxpayers will 
find ways to avoid or evade the tax and a higher rate can no longer generate additional revenue. 
Thus, to achieve both goals of equity and growth, it would be ideal that PIT keep a significant 
average rate, which increases tax revenue, but also a low marginal rate to avoid wrong economic 
decisions which has an excessive cost. Several works found the significant and positive effect 
of PIT on reducing income inequality (Martinez-Vazquez et al., 2012).  
The reduction of tax on corporate might encourage governments to redirect tax burdens on less 
mobile tax bases (i.e. labor) and consumption to cover the deficits of tax revenue from corporate 
and maintain the level of public expenditure. Low-income households in developing countries 
allocate a large share of their income on goods. Therefore, any raising of taxes in consumption 
associated with an increase in labor taxes would exacerbate poverty and inequality. In general, 
there is agreement that the burden of taxes on corporate profits is transfert to workers' wages, 
especially in open economies where capital is mobile and tax-sensitive. This may be due on the 
one hand to short-term adjustments or, more likely, the rate of increase in wages at the time 
wages are fixed. On the other hand, long-term adjustments that reduce labor productivity and 
therefore wages when capital (investment) declines in high-tax regions or sectors. This wage 
differentiation hampers the inclusiveness of growth. 
Since VAT is applied on all goods and services, it could not be considered as a fair tax; it is 
different from income tax which is progressive. When VAT is fixed on certain goods, the price 
will increase, and the quantity of goods bought and sold by the consumer will fall. On the other 
hand, the VAT assessment will affect the distribution of the consumer's household income, 
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which means that the VAT assessment will reduce the consumer's income, as it will affect the 
consumption pattern. However, the application of reduced VAT rates to goods that account 
larger share of total expenditure of poorer households than the richest makes VAT more 
progressive than it would be in the case of uniform rate. The recent studies of the incidence of 
taxes on consumption suggest that they are significantly less regressive than those examined in 
previous works. The transition from import taxes to sales taxes largely caused by trade 
liberalization has probably made the tax effect slightly more progressive in most developing 
countries (Gemmell and Morrissey, 2003). In the same vein, Shah and Whalley (1991) argue 
that VAT may sometimes be almost as progressive as the income tax. Thus, taxes on 
consumption allow economic growth couple with reduction of income inequality thereby 
leading to inclusive growth. 
Control Variables 
Education is measured by the index of Human Capital per Person from the Penn World Table 
(PWT) 8.0 Dataset. The variable is based on the average years of schooling, linearly 
interpolated from Barro and Lee (2013), and an assumed rate of return for primary, secondary 
and tertiary education. Education is a major component of well-being and is usually used in the 
measure of the economic development and quality of life. A higher level of education is 
expected to increase the income of households and individuals and should reduce income 
inequality.  
Financial Development Index measures and analyses the factors enabling the development of 
financial systems among different economies. It provides a comprehensive means for 
economies to compare various aspects of their financial systems. This wide-ranging index takes 
into account the quality of each country's financial laws and regulations, the business 
environment, and the likelihood of a financial crisis, among other things. Financial development 
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can improve access of credit to the poor, alleviated extreme inequality and consequently 
improved welfare without distorting economic efficiency (Meyer Bittencourt, 2006). For 
instance, as the share of the income held by the poor grows, they may increase their demands 
for financial services, which may drive the positive association between finance and growth. 
On the other hand, by increasing growth, finance may contribute to increasing the incomes of 
the poor. 
The personal remittances database is from the World Bank Indicator and are expressed as 
percentage of GDP. It includes personal transfers and compensation of employees.3 
Remittances can increase household spending power. But also, their effects go beyond simply 
increasing purchasing power: they can alter behaviour in other social spheres as well, for 
example, by changing attitudes to gender, education or participation in the labour market. These 
changes can also potentially contribute to reduction in poverty and income inequality, whence 
fostering inclusive growth. The Real GDP per capita is included to the analysis to control the 
effect of economic growth. In fact, the previous works found that income distribution is strongly 
connected to economic development. The coefficient on GDP per capita is expected to be 
positive, because lower inequality and poverty are associated with a higher income level, so 
higher inclusive growth. 
To assess the effect of trade liberalization, we include trade open and stock of FDI, and terms 
of trade that are considered as globalization variable. According to Stolper-Samuelson theorem, 
in a two-factor framework of two countries, increased trade openness (through tariff reduction) 
in a developing country with low skilled labor would increase wages for low-skilled workers 
                                                          
3 Personal transfers consist of all current transfers in cash or in kind made or received by resident households to or 
from nonresident households. Personal transfers thus include all current transfers between resident and nonresident 
individuals. Compensation of employees refers to the income of border, seasonal, and other short-term workers 
who are employed in an economy where they are not resident and of residents employed by nonresident entities. 
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and reduce compensation of high-level skill workers, resulting in reduced income inequality 
(see Stolper and Samuelson, 1941).  
There is a debate about the effect of FDI on the distribution of income. Pan-Long (1995) shows 
that the expansion of FDI leads to a more uneven distribution of income in Asian developing 
countries. Mah (2002) found the same result that increase of FDI deteriorates income 
distribution. Indeed, FDI, as measure of globalization is a factor that affect negatively labor 
income, thus becoming an important factor that worse income distribution. 
In the recipient countries having good institutions, foreign Aid can promote growth and reduce 
inequality. Aid could have direct impact in reducing inequality in three ways by focusing: on 
the most vulnerable groups (by providing grants or microcredit); on the poorest areas of the 
recipient country; on sectors that strongly impact the social field such as water, sanitation, 
education and health (Feeny, 2003). In this line, Gomanee et al. (2005) showed that when aid 
is channeled through public spending and directed towards the social sectors (education, health 
and sanitation), it is likely to have a positive impact on development indicators such as the index 
of Human Development and infant mortality rates. Thereby, the positive effect of Aid on 
inclusive growth is expected. 
It is important to note that the quality of institution is notably substantial in our analysis because 
it influences resource redistribution. It is widely believed that poor institutional quality has a 
detrimental effect on income inequality. For example, corruption can alter the composition of 
social spending in favor of the rich at the expense of the poor, leading to higher inequality. 
Similarly, corruption fuels biased tax system for rich and lobby groups, thus making the 
effective tax system regressive (Hindriks et al., 1999). In this case, tax system burden drops 
disproportionately on the poor. Thus, it is not profitable for low income groups. We measured 
corruption with the International Country Risk Guide’s (ICRG) valuation of corruption within 
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the political system. This variable takes values from 0 to 6, with a higher value indicating low 
risk of corruption. 
Before proceeding with the estimations, it is important to analyze the quality of our data. 
Therefore, the next section presents the descriptive statistics. 
Descriptive statistics 
Table (2) suggests while the maximum of government revenue generated from VAT during the 
period from 1990 to 2015 was 13.23% of GDP, its minimum revenue is close to zero. Thereby 
the average VAT revenue was 5.03 % of GDP. This shows as there was a huge fluctuation with 
the VAT revenue among different countries and years. Furthermore, the advanced analysis 
reveals that Moldova was the country which recorded the highest income from VAT during the 
period 2005-2011, while Swaziland register the minimum revenue between 2005 and 2011. 
This analysis looks identical to that of CIT and PIT. However, China and Paraguay remain 
those that mobilize lowest income from PIT and CIT respectively, whereas South Africa has 
had a maximum PIT revenue and Algeria a maximum revenue from CIT.  
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Table 2: Descriptive statistic 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Inclusive growth index 397 2.141 3.702 -23.970 14.218 
GDP pc growth 419 2.270 4.555 -24.214 51.466 
Education 384 .479 .168 .083 .8766 
Trade open 412 72.76 39.29 14.38 440.74 
Remittance 411 4.402 7.465 .001 63.294 
Terme of trade (log) 238 13.790 9.460 2.995 32.559 
FDI 358 3.263 4.906 -4.172 62.263 
Aid (log) 406 19.82 1.12 15.78 22.16 
Fiancial Development Index 417 .190 .132 0 .684 
Corruption 295 20.57 222.83 0 3192.5 
Education spending 320 4.032 2.143 .271 17.65 
Health spending 307 2.404 1.461 .185 7.530 
Personal Income Tax (PIT) 291 2.062 1.851 .001 10.00 
Corporate Income Tax (CIT) 318 2.692 2.065 .01 17.279 
Value Add Tax (VAT) 297 5.038 2.437 1.64e-07 13.253 
Source: Author calculation using data from IMF, WDI, PWT, and ICRG. 
 
1.7. Empirical results 
This section discusses the estimation results obtained by using the system GMM.  
1.7.1. Taxation and inclusive growth 
Columns (2) to (4) of Table (3) report the estimated impact of taxation on inclusive growth by 
including each tax instrument.  
As the results in column (2) suggest, PIT is positively and significantly correlated on inclusive 
growth index. This result suggests that increase in collection of PIT increases the inclusiveness 
of growth. A one-point increase in PIT increase inclusive growth by around 0.005 points. This 
finding confirms the progressivity of PIT, suggesting that PIT might be the best tool to affect 
income distribution. However, our finding is opposed to that of Bird and Zolt (2005) which 
reported that PIT has had a very limited, and even insignificant effect in reducing income 
inequality in developing countries. They argue that tax system is less progressive, and the costs 
are excessive and the gains too low. 
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Column (3) presents the results obtained by focusing on the effect of CIT on inclusive growth. 
Taking account CIT revenue in the estimation suggests that taxing corporate income hampers 
the inclusiveness of growth in the sample. A one percentage point increase in CIT reduces 
inclusive growth by around 0.002 percentage points. 
As the results in the column (4) of Table (3) suggest, VAT is negatively correlated to the index 
of inclusive growth suggesting that VAT makes the growth less inclusive. For example, one-
point increase in the share of VAT in GDP results in a 0.004 percentage points reducing in 
inclusive growth. Poorest households spend a greater share of their income on consumption. 
Therefore, they are likely to pay higher average tax relative to higher income groups. However, 
there is a litlle empirical works that have tested this general conjecture. 
Assessing the impact of control variables on inclusive growth 
Column (1) presents the basic results obtained by including only control variables. Most of 
control variables are statistically significant and have the predicted sign as discussed in the 
literature. The results suggest that several macroeconomic fundamentals and structural factors 
are drivers of inclusive growth. The results support the hypothesis that education affect 
inclusiveness of growth. The positive and significant coefficient of education means that better 
educated workforce plays a positive role in fostering inclusive growth. The GDP per capita is 
found associated to higher inclusive growth. In fact, economic growth is often interlinked 
positively with higher investment, higher job-creation processes, resulting in greater access to 
jobs and income for more people. Greater open countries, as expected, seem to experience 
larger inclusive growth, which corresponds to the findings in the literature. However, the 
analysis does not focus solely on the effect of open trade, but also to other aspects of trade 
dynamics. Specifically, it examines the effect of globalization measured by FDI and terms of 
trade and support the hypothesis that these two components have the opposite effect on 
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inclusive growth. As expected, the improvement of the terms of trade increase inclusive growth 
while FDI stock reduce inclusive growth by increasing income inequality. In addition, higher 
aid level implies higher economic growth and more equal income distribution so greater 
inclusive growth. Against the expectation, financial development and personal remittances 
were found to harm growth inclusiveness in the sample. 
Although remittances are expected to reduce the severity of poverty, there are some 
shortcomings, such as increased pressure on shippers, a growing culture of dependency in 
developing countries that undermines the motivation of recipients at work, an increase in the 
beneficiaries' consumption expenditure and an increase in inequality (between recipients and 
non-recipients, rural and urban areas). Also, the economic behavior of the beneficiary 
households tends to increase the prices of goods and services in the local domestic market, 
which could affect the entire community, including non-beneficiary households. The results are 
consistent with those found by Mishra (2007) who point out that migration and remittances 
deepen inequalities within countries of origin and between peripheral and central regions. Thus, 
remittances do not necessarily imply a financial benefit for all the poorest people. 
Regarding the financial development, its negative effect on inclusive growth could be explained 
by the fact that in the initial steps of financial development, poorer segments of the population 
may find it difficult to access credit from financial institutions due to the lack of collateral and 
financial literacy (Beck et al., 2004). These results are also in line with those of Claessens and 
Perotti (2007) who have shown that thanks to the low education level of poor, their can not 
obtain loans from the formal financial sector. Also, there is a dualism in the provision of 
financial services by financial sector. In such situations, the poor are unable to break the cycle 
of income inequality and, at the end, income inequality increases more in transition countries 
than in developed countries. Furthermore, Tan and Law (2012) provide support to the existence 
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of a U-shaped relationship between financial deepening and income distribution for developing 
economies. This further implies that financial markets are inefficient in improving income 
distribution in these countries. 
Including the initial level of inclusive growth index at the beginning of the observation period 
as one of the explanatory variables allows to capture country’s initial conditions. The result 
suggests that the initial level of inclusive growth which captures the conditional convergence 
has a strong negative effect on observed inclusive growth. 
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Table 3: Empirical results 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
      
Inclusive (t-1) -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.007*** -0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
GDP pc growth 0.992*** 0.994*** 0.993*** 0.994*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Education 0.304*** 0.302*** 0.358*** 0.283*** 
 (0.049) (0.040) (0.039) (0.030) 
Trade open 0.022 0.019 0.026*** 0.035*** 
 (0.017) (0.012) (0.008) (0.011) 
Remittances -0.002** -0.002** -0.002*** -0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Terms of trade 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FDI -0.004** -0.001 -0.0002 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Aid 0.030*** 0.027*** 0.041*** 0.025*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) 
Fiancial Development -0.113*** -0.120*** -0.106*** -0.145*** 
 (0.027) (0.030) (0.023) (0.019) 
PIT  0.005**   
  (0.002)   
CIT   -0.002***  
   (0.001)  
VAT    -0.004*** 
    (0.001) 
Constant -0.800*** -0.731*** -1.052*** -0.732*** 
 (0.120) (0.122) (0.140) (0.128) 
     
Observations 136 100 103 105 
Number of Countries 74 61 63 64 
AR(2): P-value 0.123 0.294 0.358 0.260 
Hansen test, p-value 0.590 0.763 0.775 0.817 
Nb instruments 29 35 35 35 
Dependent variable is inclusive growth index 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
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1.7.2. The role of institutional quality in the implementation of tax policy for 
achieving inclusive growth 
We now examine the inclusive growth effects of tax policy according to the institutional quality 
of the countries. Inclusive economic growth also depends on governance in terms of quality of 
the control of corruption. Table (4) presents the results obtained by including corruption in each 
tax specification. 
Regarding the role of institutions in the effect of tax policy on inclusive growth, equation 2 to 
4 in Table (4) show the positive sign of corruption index, which correspond to a good control 
of corruption. The result implies that less corrupt governments are more able to efficiently 
collect tax and better redistribute it through financing pro-poor spending. Thereby, good 
institution quality helps government to control corruption, and sequentially eliminates tax 
evasion. As a result, governments with more proficient institutions certainly have better policies 
on rebalancing the incomes of the richest and most deprived citizens, which obviously can 
improve inclusive growth. 
In economic system with control of corruption, we note an improvement in the effect of the PIT 
on inclusive growth. Thus, one percentage point increase in PIT increase growth inclusiveness 
by 0.009 percentage points and against 0.005 percentage points in absence institution. A major 
observation is on the effect of the CIT, which becomes positive with the consideration of control 
of corruption. In the presence of strong institution, national authorities may mobilize high 
revenue from corporate taxation by reducing exemptions, tax evasion (mainly due to 
informality), and generally low tax rates. 
VAT remains significant and negatively correlated to inclusive growth in the sample. VAT is 
generally considered to be regressive. It put more pressure on the low-income groups in society 
and create unequal distribution conditions. The results obtained in column (4) of Table 4 
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provide support to that hypothesis. An increase of one percentage point in the share of VAT in 
GDP reduces inclusive growth by around 0.012 percentage points. However, it could be less 
regressive in the case of good institution.  Otherwise, there is a lack in VAT policy in developing 
countries. Among them, it may be noted the incorrect design and implementation that 
undermine the effectiveness of VAT in many developing countries. Common challenges 
include: low thresholds; extensive exemptions and zero rating (creating classification conflicts 
and increasing compliance costs); inadequate preparations and public sensitization (making 
resistance more likely). The significant delays in the reimbursement of credits of VAT are 
commonplace in developing countries and an important business complaint. All these factors 
affect VAT revenues, which account for a large share of the income of developing countries.  
To sum up, good institutional quality is therefore potentially an important factor allowing to 
improve inclusive growth through tax policy. It allows a principle of impartiality in maintaining 
the liability of democratic procedures and prevents bureaucrats more effectively to pursue their 
private interests, and this in turn leads to a downward pressure of income inequality. 
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Table 4: Effects of institutional variables 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Inclusive (t-1) -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.006*** -0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP pc growth 0.993*** 1.000*** 1.001*** 0.996*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Education 0.243*** 0.132*** 0.162*** 0.267*** 
 (0.042) (0.031) (0.015) (0.031) 
Trade open 0.046** 0.000 0.016** 0.008 
 (0.019) (0.010) (0.007) (0.013) 
Remittances -0.001 0.0002 -0.0001 0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Terms of trade 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FDI -0.006*** 0.001 -0.003** -0.002** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Aid 0.025*** 0.015*** 0.021*** 0.016*** 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) 
Fiancial Development -0.120*** -0.161*** -0.183*** -0.128*** 
 (0.031) (0.022) (0.023) (0.020) 
Corruption 0.006 0.036*** 0.049*** 0.015 
 (0.012) (0.007) (0.005) (0.009) 
PIT  0.009***   
  (0.002)   
CIT   0.005***  
   (0.001)  
VAT    -0.012*** 
    (0.002) 
Constant -0.768*** -0.404*** -0.588*** -0.399** 
 (0.128) (0.0765) (0.0855) (0.159) 
     
Observations 113 87 90 92 
Number of Countries 61 52 54 53 
AR(2): P-value 0.265 0.314 0.306 0.349 
Hansen test, p-value 0.510 0.416 0.573 0.660 
Nb instruments 27 37 37 34 
Dependent variable is inclusive growth index 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
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1.7.3. Does the effect of taxation influence by the level of pro-poor government 
spending (health and education)? 
We now look to the results obtained on the effect of public spending on inclusive growth. The 
main goal of this analysis is to look whether the effect of taxation is influenced by the level of 
pro-poor government spending. We focus on two types of social spending; namely, public 
expenditures on education and health. We first estimate the model (2) by introducing separately 
the different categories of expenditures, and then we estimate the model by including all two 
expenditure together. The results are reported in Table (5). As shown column 2 of Table (5), 
the estimates suggest that a one percentage point increase in education spending raises inclusive 
growth by 0.008 percentage points. The effect of PIT remains almost the same as in the case 
when government spending is not considered. We estimate the similar effect for expenditures 
on education in column 3. Estimated effects of expenditure on health are higher compared to 
that of educational spending. Therefore, one-point increase in health expenditure result in rising 
inclusive growth by 0.167 percentage point. Such expenditure leads to an increase in the effect 
of the PIT on inclusive growth from 0.009 to 0.010 percentage points. Finally, when all two 
expenditure components are included in the model (column 4), all two keep their expected sign, 
with only spending on health remaining statistically significant. The results from column 4 
provide further support to the finding that PIT may have positive impact on inclusive growth. 
Furthermore, the effect of PIT with considering expenditure is about 1.6 times higher than in 
the exclusion of expenses. This result allows us to confirm that the effect of PIT on inclusive 
growth seems to be influenced by the level of pro-poor government spending in education and 
health. 
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Table 5: Effects of pro-poor government spending 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Inclusive (t-1) -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
GDP pc growth 0.996*** 0.992*** 0.996*** 0.998*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Education 0.221*** 0.180*** 0.109** 0.033 
 (0.039) (0.048) (0.049) (0.057) 
Trade open 0.003 -0.010 -0.010 -0.011 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.017) (0.021) 
Remittances -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Terms of trade 0.003*** 0.001 0.003*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
FDI 0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Aid 0.021*** 0.027*** 0.024*** 0.008** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) 
Fiancial Development -0.152*** -0.166*** -0.227*** -0.223*** 
 (0.038) (0.045) (0.040) (0.061) 
Corruption 0.011 0.020* 0.027** 0.037** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.016) 
PIT 0.009** 0.008** 0.010** 0.015*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
Education Spending  0.090**  0.062 
  (0.044)  (0.052) 
Health Spending   0.167*** 0.134* 
   (0.050) (0.072) 
     
Constant -0.533*** -0.614*** -0.628*** -0.527*** 
 (0.139) (0.128) (0.138) (0.119) 
     
Observations 90 90 90 90 
Number of Countries 54 54 54 54 
AR(2): P-value 0.266 0.304 0.218 0.285 
Hansen test, p-value 0.757 0.785 0.675 0.640 
Nb instruments 35 32 32 30 
Dependent variable is inclusive growth index 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
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1.7.4. A threshold effect of taxation 
Here, we will assess the nonlinear effects of the three components of taxation on inclusive 
growth. The specific objective is the determination of the threshold of taxation for developing 
countries beyond which the inclusiveness of growth declines. The reason for this is that a high 
tax threshold could be distorted and thus affecting negatively inclusive growth while weak 
taxation rate can generate returns that are invested in the production. Therefore, we include in 
the model, each tax variable in level and its corresponding tax square. The result from Table 
(6) suggests a non-linear impact of PIT as well as VAT on inclusive growth. While there is 
evidence of a positive effect of PIT variable, the square of this variable has a negative effect on 
inclusive growth. Both variables are significant at all conventional levels of significance. This 
result means that there is an optimal tax beyond which, any increase in PIT rate should have 
negative impact on inclusive growth. The finding is in line with Laffer (2004) optimal taxation 
hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, the higher the income taxes, the more people lose 
their incentives to gain more taxable income, which results in a lower tax base. This in turn 
leads to lower tax revenue because even though taxes are higher, there are fewer people paying 
these taxes. 
Concerning VAT, results show again the presence of nonlinear relationship between VAT and 
inclusive growth in the sample. However, the relationship is opposed to that of PIT. VAT is 
found to have negative sign while VAT square have positive effect on inclusive growth. We 
can see that it is from a certain threshold that the VAT revenue positively affects inclusive 
growth. This result can be explained by the fact that in many developing countries, VAT does 
not meet the criteria of a normal VAT. Governments in these countries grant numerous 
exonerations, and there is non-refunding of VAT credits. Therefore, VAT is little accountable 
and thus can affect the quality of public expenditure contrary to the income tax. But once 
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countries improve their tax efforts by increasing tax revenues, this promotes the funding of 
inclusive growth.  
Regarding the CIT, based on the resulting model, the study found that when CIT and CIT square 
are introduced in the model, such variable both in level and square has a negative and 
insignificant effect on growth inclusiveness. This means that the study does not find evidence 
of non-linear effect of CIT on inclusive growth. The non-linearity allows us to see whether the 
effect of the CIT on inclusive growth changes with different levels of the variable CIT. Thus, 
the finding shows that whatever the level of CIT revenues, this tax is not conducive to inclusive 
growth. 
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Table 6: Threshold effect of taxation 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
          
Inclusive (t-1) -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.004*** -0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
GDP pc growth 0.996*** 0.996*** 0.996*** 0.997*** 0.995*** 0.993*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Education 0.221*** 0.196*** 0.276*** 0.233*** 0.266*** 0.289*** 
 (0.039) (0.047) (0.045) (0.051) (0.030) (0.035) 
Trade open 0.003 -0.002 0.028*** 0.032*** 0.016 0.011 
 (0.014) (0.019) (0.007) (0.009) (0.012) (0.015) 
Remittances -0.001 -0.0008 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Terms of trade 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FDI 0.001 0.001 0.0008 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Aid 0.021*** 0.026*** 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.017*** 0.018*** 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Fiancial Development -0.152*** -0.175*** -0.137*** -0.070** -0.129*** -0.055*** 
 (0.038) (0.044) (0.029) (0.030) (0.016) (0.020) 
Corruption 0.011 0.019 0.023** 0.039*** -0.013 0.005 
 (0.011) (0.015) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) 
PIT 0.009** 0.027***     
 (0.003) (0.006)     
PIT square  -0.015***     
  (0.004)     
CIT   -0.0002 0.002   
   (0.001) (0.002)   
CIT square    -0.003   
    (0.003)   
VAT     -0.011*** -0.030*** 
     (0.002) (0.005) 
VAT square      0.035*** 
      (0.012) 
Constant -0.533*** -0.624*** -0.890*** -0.941*** -0.443*** -0.495*** 
 (0.139) (0.204) (0.143) (0.127) (0.161) (0.167) 
       
Observations 90 90 93 93 95 95 
Number of Countries 54 54 56 56 56 56 
AR(2): P-value 0.266 0.354 0.466 0.345 0.356 0.284 
Hansen test, p-value 0.757 0.737 0.865 0.724 0.878 0.869 
Nb instruments 35 33 35 39 35 35 
Dependent variable is inclusive growth index 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
 
 59 
 
1.7.5. Existence of a politico-budgetary cycle in the effect of taxation 
This section examines whether the electoral cycle affects the impact of tax policy on inclusive 
growth. The question is whether the government mobilizes a significant tax resource during the 
election period, enabling it to finance growth. The literature has documented a negative effect 
of electoral periods on taxation (see e.g. Kneebone and McKenzie, 2001) which is coherent 
with the implications of the theoretical literature on political economic cycles, i.e. that 
policymakers try to reduce tax burden before the elections in order to increase their likelihood 
of being re-elected at top of the state (see e.g. Lindbeck, 1976 and Rogoff, 1990). Therefore, it 
is useful to examine whether PIT, CIT or VAT affect more inclusive growth in electoral periods. 
Table (7) presents results using election variable. In order to capture the effect of electoral 
periods in the analysis, we introduce into the model the cross-product of the election variable 
and the tax variable. 
Column 1 shows that PIT contributes to inclusive growth and the coefficient of the cross-
product of election variable and PIT is positive. This means that in electoral periods, PIT 
remains a direct tax instrument promoting inclusive growth. A major finding concerns the result 
of CIT. In fact, the coefficient of CIT is negative while that of (Election * CIT) is positive. The 
result suggests that in electoral periods, CIT contributes to inclusive growth. In fact, 
governments tend to reduce the tax burden on corporates in electoral periods. High level of tax 
raises the production cost, which means higher costs for goods and services. This reduces the 
amount of goods that firms are ready to provide. By reducing taxes, firms have more capital to 
invest in project that will generate additional growth. This causes a positive spiral upward 
demand, and in turn new jobs. From the point of view of consumer spending, by lowering taxes, 
individuals will keep more of their net salary. This boosts their disposable income and increase 
income distribution, which improve the inclusiveness of growth in the economy. As far as VAT 
is concerned, there is no evidence that the effect such tax on inclusive growth is affected during 
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the electoral periods. To sum up this subsection, the governments tend to decrease the income 
tax rates in electoral periods, but not necessarily the consumption tax rates. This implies that 
income tax rates have bigger impact on voters’ choices compared to consumption taxes. 
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Table 7: Politico-budgetary cycle in the effect of taxation 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Inclusive (t-1) -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.007*** -0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
GDP pc growth 0.991*** 0.995*** 0.996*** 0.995*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Education 0.252*** 0.252*** 0.229*** 0.362*** 
 (0.046) (0.052) (0.079) (0.055) 
Trade open 0.045** 0.002 0.019 0.017 
 (0.018) (0.016) (0.012) (0.018) 
Remittances -0.001 -0.0007 -0.0002 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Terms of trade 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
FDI -0.006*** -0.003 -0.001 -0.006*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Aid 0.026*** 0.014*** 0.030*** 0.019*** 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) 
Fiancial Development -0.123*** -0.191*** -0.098** -0.145*** 
 (0.025) (0.049) (0.040) (0.025) 
Corruption 0.031 0.019* 0.027* 0.016 
 (0.023) (0.011) (0.014) (0.020) 
PIT  0.005**   
  (0.002)   
Election* PIT  0.031**   
  (0.014)   
CIT   -0.004***  
   (0.001)  
Election * CIT   0.031**  
   (0.015)  
VAT    -0.017*** 
    (0.004) 
Election * VAT    -0.009 
    (0.00969) 
Constant -0.815*** -0.397*** -0.792*** -0.501*** 
 (0.146) (0.137) (0.148) (0.187) 
     
Observations 117 90 93 95 
Number of Countries 63 54 56 56 
AR(2): P-value 0.288 0.288 0.364 0.385 
Hansen test, p-value 0.753 0.857 0.829 0.879 
Nb instruments 29 31 31 35 
Dependent variable is inclusive growth index 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
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1.7.6. Effect of taxation before / after the recent financial crisis4 (1990-2008 
versus 2008-2015) 
In this part, we examine the impact of 2008 financial crises on inclusive growth in the sample. 
Thus, we analyze the effect of tax policy before and after the great financial crisis which took 
place during the year 2008. The results from Table (8) show that before the financial crisis, that 
is over the period 1990-2008, tax policy was an obstacle to inclusive growth. Indeed, all three 
tax variables are negatively associated to the index of inclusive growth. Contrariwise, after the 
financial crisis, the finding approved an improvement in the effect of tax policy on inclusive 
growth. Therefore, it can be seen that PIT and VAT have positive effects on inclusive growth. 
However, only the effect of PIT remains statistically significant. As for CIT, its effect remains 
negative but not significant. This result could be explained by the fact that the States reformed 
their tax system in the sense of taxation in favor of pro-poor growth. Most post-crisis public aid 
is allocated to public finance reform, particularly tax system reform. With an efficient tax 
regime, developing countries would have increased capacity to mobilize their own resources to 
finance public tasks. At the same time, this would increase the accountability of governments 
to their citizens, as well as their commitment to good governance, to finance education and 
health spending to improve the lives of the poorest. 
 
                                                          
4 The financial crisis of 2007–2008, also known as the global financial crisis and the 2008 financial crisis, is 
considered by many economists to have been the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. It 
began in 2007 with a crisis in the subprime mortgage market in the US and developed into a full-blown 
international banking crisis with the collapse of the investment bank Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008. 
Excessive risk-taking by banks such as Lehman Brothers helped to magnify the financial impact globally. Massive 
bail-outs of financial institutions and other palliative monetary and fiscal policies were employed to prevent a 
possible collapse of the world financial system. The crisis was nonetheless followed by a global economic 
downturn, the Great Recession. 
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Table 8: Effects of crisis  
VARIABLES Before 2008 financial crisis After 2008 financial crisis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Inclusive (t-1) -0.004*** -0.007*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
GDP pc growth 0.996*** 0.996*** 0.994*** 0.995*** 0.997*** 0.997*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Education 0.251*** 0.270*** 0.298*** 0.276*** 0.257*** 0.226*** 
 (0.045) (0.055) (0.032) (0.049) (0.057) (0.035) 
Trade open 0.014 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.032*** 0.034** 0.022** 
 (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.015) (0.010) 
Remittances -0.001 -0.001 -0.001* -0.002 -0.001 -0.002** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Terms of trade 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
FDI 0.002 -0.004 -0.006*** -0.006* -0.0004 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) 
Aid 0.028*** 0.031*** 0.028*** 0.024*** 0.031*** 0.020*** 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) 
Fiancial Development -0.135*** -0.134*** -0.160*** -0.177*** -0.125*** -0.144*** 
 (0.036) (0.034) (0.023) (0.037) (0.033) (0.032) 
Corruption 0.009 0.030** 0.004 0.031** 0.016 -0.024 
 (0.017) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) 
PIT 0.002   0.019***   
 (0.003)   (0.005)   
CIT  -0.003**   0.001  
  (0.001)   (0.002)  
VAT   -0.006***   0.002 
   (0.001)   (0.002) 
       
Constant -0.741*** -0.926*** -0.856*** -0.749*** -0.888*** -0.572*** 
 (0.133) (0.183) (0.117) (0.140) (0.184) (0.127) 
       
Observations 90 93 95 90 93 95 
Number of Countries 54 56 56 54 56 56 
AR(2): P-value 0.217 0.272 0.372 0.256 0.395 0.417 
Hansen test, p-value 0.672 0.707 0.771 0.806 0.690 0.895 
Nb instruments 31 31 31 31 30 31 
Dependent variable is inclusive growth index 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
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1.7.7. Using alternative growth inclusiveness index: The quality of growth index 
(QGI) 
Here we use an alternative index of inclusive growth namely the quality of growth index (QGI) 
developed by Mlachila et al. (2017). The index is a composite (arithmetic mean) index capturing 
the “growth nature” aspect and the “desirable social outcomes” aspect. In other words, the index 
encompasses both the intrinsic nature and social dimensions of growth. The approach is based 
on the fact that growth is not always the same in terms of social outcomes and how to reaches 
an income level is important for various theoretical and empirical reasons. Thus, we test 
whether the results are robust to alternative measure of inclusive growth. The estimation results 
are reported in Table (9). Regarding the interest variables (tax variables), PIT and CIT keep 
their sign and remain significant. In other words, here also, PIT contributed to greater inclusive 
growth while CIT lower the inclusiveness of growth. The major change is in the effect of VAT. 
The results using the quality of growth index show that VAT is a source of inclusive growth in 
developing countries. Observing the controls variables shows that most of these variables keep 
the right signs and remain significant. The changes can be observed at the level of the 
globalization variables and the delayed variables of the dependent variables. We can conclude 
that our findings are qualitatively the same confirming the robustness of our results. 
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Table 9: Alternative measure of inclusive growth 
VARIABLES (1) (3) (4) (5) 
          
QGI (t-1) 0.729*** 0.911*** 0.948*** 0.865*** 
 (0.065) (0.110) (0.041) (0.047) 
GDP pc growth 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.002** 0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Education 0.126*** 0.017 0.014 -0.040 
 (0.039) (0.073) (0.030) (0.026) 
Trade open -0.0002 -0.033*** -0.009** -0.006 
 (0.004) (0.010) (0.005) (0.006) 
Remittances -0.0002 0.0001 -0.001** -0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Terms of trade -0.0003 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.0004*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FDI 0.0002 -0.004*** 0.001 0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Aid 0.005** -0.004 0.007*** 0.004*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) 
Fiancial Development 0.036 -0.046 -0.023 -0.015 
 (0.025) (0.040) (0.017) (0.023) 
Corruption 0.015** -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 
 (0.006) (0.013) (0.005) (0.006) 
PIT  0.011***   
  (0.004)   
CIT   -0.002*  
   (0.001)  
VAT    0.008*** 
    (0.002) 
Constant 0.020 0.301*** -0.023 0.054 
 (0.053) (0.093) (0.055) (0.043) 
     
Observations 126 93 96 98 
Number of Countries 67 56 58 58 
AR(2): P-value 0.326 0.166 0.176 0.458 
Hansen test, p-value 0.130 0.871 0.734 0.491 
Nb instruments 28 31 34 34 
Dependent variable is inclusive growth index 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
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1.8. Conclusion and policy implication 
This chapter investigates the effect of tax policy on inclusive growth in developing countries. 
To achieve our goal, we focus on three categories of taxes namely VAT, PIT, and CIT. We use 
the system GMM estimator to address endogeneity issues. Using the inclusive growth index 
developed by Anand et al. (2013) the empirical results indicate that reliance on PIT in 
developing countries has been a source of inclusive growth, confirming the progressivity of 
such tax, so the best tool to affect the income distribution. In the case of CIT, the empirical 
results suggest that this tax contribute to greater inclusive growth if and only if the countries 
have a strong institution quality like good control of corruption. Regarding the VAT, the 
analysis of threshold effect shows that it is from a certain threshold that the VAT revenue 
positively affects inclusive growth. This highlight several problems in VAT such as numerous 
exonerations, and non-refunding of VAT credits making VAT little accountable. 
The analysis of politico-budgetary cycle shows that in electoral periods, income tax both PIT 
and CIT tend to promote inclusive growth. In fact, during electoral period, governments tend 
to reduce the tax burden on individuals and corporates. This implies that the income tax rates 
have a bigger impact on voters’ choices compared to consumption taxes. Moreover, we found 
evidence that the effect of PIT and VAT on growth inclusiveness have been improved after the 
2008 financial crisis. This result could be explained by the fact that the States reformed their 
tax system in the sense of taxation in favor of pro-poor growth. 
For policy makers and government practitioners, the results stress that tax policy can be used 
to conduct inclusive growth in developing countries. Even though greater reliance on indirect 
taxation has been found to have adverse effect on income redistribution and poverty reduction 
in some studies based on developed countries, this tax has an important place in developing 
countries tax system. Several works found that developing economies should rely on indirect 
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taxation for achieve their goal of redistribution and poverty reduction. We invite for adoption 
of inclusive growth strategies in developing countries that focus on the effective management 
of revenues from indirect taxes including VAT given its dominance in their tax system.  
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1.9. Appendices 
Inclusive growth index 
we use the measure of inclusive growth developed by Anand et al. (2013), which integrates 
both the pace and distribution of economic growth. Their idea of inclusiveness measurement is 
based on generalized concentration curves, which is constructed from social mobility curves5.  
A social mobility curve is defined as: 
                       𝑆 ≡ {𝑦𝑖}𝑖=1
𝑛  
Where numbers 1 to n represent poorest to the richest people in the population. The measure of 
inclusiveness developed by Anand et al. (2013) is based on a generalized concentrations curve, 
which is defined as cumulative distribution of social mobility curve as follows:  
                     𝑆𝑐 ≡ {?̅?𝑖}𝑖=1
𝑛  
With             ?̅?𝑖 ≡ ∑ 𝑦𝑘
𝑖
𝑘=1 /𝑖 
The arguments (?̅?𝑖) of generalized concentration curve (𝑆
𝑐) denote the average income of the 
bottom 𝑖 percent of population, therefore ?̅?𝑛 represents average income in the population, where 
the index “𝑖” represents quintiles.  
Figure 4 shows various generalized concentration curves that can be considered as the shift of 
the social mobility curve. Let’s assume that curve AB represents a social mobility curve 
discussed above, and denote the area under the curve as: 
 
          ?̅?∗ = ∫ ?̅?𝑖
100
0
 
                                                          
5 See Kakwani (1980), Ali and Son (2007) for details of concentration curves, and Anand et al. (2013) for social 
mobility curves 
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Note that the greater the ?̅?∗, the greater is the income. If everybody in the population have the 
same income (i.e. in the case of completely equitable distribution of income) then ?̅?∗ will be 
equal to ?̅?. However, if ?̅?∗ is lower than ?̅?, the income is concentrated in the higher income 
groups. Hence, the distribution of income is inequitable. Thereby, the deviation of ?̅?∗ from ?̅? is 
an indication of inequality in income distribution. Ali and Son (2007) propose an income equity 
index (IEI) from the feature of ?̅?∗ : 
                  𝜔 =
?̅?∗
?̅?
 
One can rearrange and differentiate the above equation as follows:                                
                  ?̅?∗ = 𝜔 ∗ ?̅?                         (1) 
                  𝑑?̅?∗ = 𝜔 ∗ 𝑑?̅? + 𝑑𝜔 ∗ ?̅?    (2)    
                 𝑑?̅?∗/?̅?∗ = 𝑑?̅?/?̅? + 𝑑𝜔/𝜔    (3)      
This is the fundamental relation integrating growth and equity into one measure of inclusive 
growth. The formulation allows the decomposition of inclusive growth in terms of efficiency 
(per capita GDP, ?̅?) and percentage change in equity (distribution, 𝜔). The link between the 
value of changes in  ?̅? and 𝜔, and inclusiveness can be summarized as follows: first, if change 
in both  ?̅? and  𝜔 are positive, then the movement is certainly inclusive. If  ?̅? increases and 𝜔 
decreases, higher per capita income is reached at the cost of higher inequality. Whether it is an 
inclusive movement or not depends on the relative change in two dimensions. If 𝜔 increases 
and  ?̅? decreases, higher equality is reached at the cost of lower per capita income. Inclusiveness 
of this type of movement again depends on the relative change in the two dimensions. If both  
?̅? and 𝜔 decrease, then the movement is certainly non-inclusive. See Figure 4 for illustration of 
each case with examples.  
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Figure 4: Concentration Curve and Inclusiveness   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Anand and al. (2013) 
Intuitively, the index is a weighted average of growth in average income and of the change in 
an index which takes into account income distribution. The equity index measures the extent to 
which the distribution of income (or, in some cases, consumption expenditure) between 
households or individuals within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. Thus, 
this index ranges between zero and one, with zero representing perfectly equitable income 
distribution and one representing perfect inequality. This measure of inclusive correspond to 
the average income growth in the hypothetical case of growth which leaves unchanged the 
distribution of income but deviates the increase (decrease) from growth in average income, 
when growth is achieving by giving back the distribution of income more equal (uneven). In 
other words, the inclusive growth index that we use in this chapter can be interpreted as a 
measure of growth in average income “corrected” for the equity incidence (Aoyagi and al., 
2015). 
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CHAPTER 2: GOVERNMENT SPENDING AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH IN 
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: A PANEL VAR ANALYSIS 
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Abstract 
This chapter assesses the effects of government expenditure components on both equity and 
growth, especially whether it is possible to design public spending to promote a more equitable 
society without sacrificing economic growth. We employ a panel VAR technique to use a large 
annual dataset on 10 sub-Saharan African countries over the period 1990-2015. The VAR 
approach addresses the problem of endogeneity by allowing endogenous interaction between 
system variables. As our panel exhibits a medium temporal dimension and a relatively small 
number of countries, the panel with fixed effect specification (LSDV) is the most appropriated. 
The estimation and drawing Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) of different shocks were done 
using the Stata code (XTVAR). Our findings from impulsive response function give evidence 
that investment in infrastructure (quality and stock) contributed to more inclusive growth in 
sub-Saharan African economies than others government spending in long term. Moreover, 
social spending in developing countries often benefits the rich and middle classes more than 
the poor. Therefore, a higher share of social spending on items such as health and education 
will not be reflected in higher incomes for the poor. These results are confirmed by the variance 
decomposition analysis (FEVD). 
 
Keywords: Government spending, income inequality, growth, inclusive growth, panel VAR. 
JEL Classification Numbers: H50, D31, O47, I31, C23 
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2.1. Introduction  
Achieving inclusive growth has become the most significant long-term strategic challenge for 
many policymakers for decades. Development policymakers are interested not only in 
economic growth per se, but also in how the gain from that growth is distributed. As pointed 
out by García-Peñalosa (2008), understanding economic growth and inequality is both 
important and controversial; it is important because policy makers need to understand the way 
in which the increase in output will be shared among heterogeneous agents within an economy, 
and the constraints that this sharing may put on future growth. Its controversy stems from the 
fact that it was difficult to reconcile different theories, especially since the empirical evidence 
has been largely inconclusive. Beginning with Arrow and Kurz (1970) and Barro (1990), the 
relationship between public investment and growth has been widely studied, and most results 
have shown that public spending on infrastructure, education, and health can generate 
productivity and growth benefits. At the same time, by influencing the factors productivity and 
thus the relative return of factors, public spending also plays a key role in the evolution of 
wealth and income distribution as the economy grows with time. This brings us to the question 
of the potential relationship between growth and inequality generated by public spending, 
although the nature of this relationship is not “a priori” clear. 
The economy of sub-Saharan Africa has grown at an exceptional pace over the last decade. 
However, growth has been concentrated in particular sectors of the economy and specific 
geographical areas within countries. The benefits of this growth have not been widely shared 
and have left out large segments of the population. Poverty has not fallen as much as expected 
and economic inequalities have remained high. The percentage of those living in poverty rose 
from 36% of the population in 1970 to 50% in 2010. There are, of course, significant differences 
between the countries in the region and their trends of inequality. The World Bank (2016) report 
on poverty in Africa shows for example that seven out of the world’s 10 most unequal countries 
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are African, their Gini indexes ranging from 0.31 (Niger) to 0.63 (South Africa) (with zero 
implying perfect equality and one, perfect inequality).  
In Sub-Saharan Africa, there have been fewer attempts to understand the causes of high levels 
of inequality measured in many African societies. On the other hand, there is much less 
agreement on the extent to which efforts to address inequalities need or should be part of 
strategies to reduce poverty in the region. 
Since the early 2000s, while efforts have been made to reduce income gaps, some countries in 
the region have experienced growing income disparities, which explains their low record of 
equitable growth, especially in sub-Saharan African countries (Figure 1 & 2). Over the two sub-
periods, several countries recorded a decline in their level of inequality, which is designated by 
a negative change in Gini coefficient. Countries that outstandingly achieved such achievements 
are Mali, Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe. However, some countries have seen their level of 
inequality increased over the two sub-periods considered. Thereby, Togo and Ethiopia are those 
that register accentuate deterioration in the repartition of income. Countries such as Tanzania 
and South Africa have also made efforts to reduce income inequality. This justifies the shift 
from a positive change (increase in inequality) that can be observed in Chart 1 to a negative 
change (decrease in inequalities) in the Gini coefficient as shown the Chart 2. 
Nevertheless, the level of inequality observed remains high in the region. This disparity in 
income distribution certainly has consequences and therefore is worrying for two reasons. First, 
recent literature has revealed that high levels of inequality are detrimental to the pace and 
sustainability of growth (Ostry et al., 2014). In particular, they can lead to sub-optimal 
investments in health and education, which hamper growth. Also, the growing inequality can 
also undermine growth-enhancing reforms and encourage governments to adopt populist 
policies and intensify instability in politic. Second, in sub-Saharan Africa, the impact of growth 
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on poverty reduction has been limited due to high level of income inequality in the region. In 
addition to income inequality, Sub-Saharan Africa, in line with other regions, faces a 
considerable inequality in opportunities. 
 
6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The widening of the income gap in sub-Saharan Africa reinforces the arguments for a 
government response. Therefore, a several countries have placed the issue of inclusive growth 
at the center of their national objectives and in a number of cases explicitly in their development 
plans. Governments can, in principle, play an important role in creating a more equitable society 
that offers opportunities for all and distributes more widely the fruits of growth. Fiscal policy 
is one of the most appropriate instruments for direct government intervention to fight against 
inequality and poverty. In fact, there is now great interest in taking advantage of tax policy to 
promote inclusive growth in sub-Saharan Africa. However, unlike advanced economies with 
long histories of using fiscal policy to redistribute income, sub-Saharan Africa has limited 
experience in this area. To some extent, this is due to the large gap between the two regions 
and, consequently, the difference in the relative importance of growth over redistribution. 
                                                          
6 Change in Gini coefficient for Togo is calculated between 2005 and 2008 
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Figure 1: Selected Sub-Saharan Africa: 
change in income inequality, 2000-2008 
Figure 2: Selected Sub-Saharan Africa: 
change in income inequality, 2008-Latest 
Sources: Net Gini from SWIID Version 5.0; and Authors 
calculations. 
Sources: Net Gini from SWIID Version 5.0; and Authors 
calculations. 
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Public expenditures are likely to be endogenous, due to reverse causality. Countries with higher 
income inequality may choose to rely relatively more on public expenditures, and vice versa. 
As a result, these regressors may be correlated with the error term. Some empirical articles 
solve this endogeneity issue using Instrumental Variables. However, finding good instruments 
for all observed types of public expenditures is a significant challenge. For example, Martinez-
Vasquez et al. (2011) address the endogeneity of their fiscal measure by using an instrumental 
variable corresponding to the fiscal measures from neighboring countries weighted by the 
distance between the two countries. The use of MCO is likely to generate bias and inconsistent 
estimate coefficients due to the presence of heterogeneity among countries. However, using a 
fixed effect estimate to account for this heterogeneity is questionable given the small variation 
in Gini coefficients for a large part of the sample. This chapter is linked to the vast literature on 
growth inclusiveness impact of fiscal policy. Specifically, the work is in line with previous 
studies on the endogenous interaction between government expenditure and inclusive growth 
in developing countries. The chapter contributes to the existing literature on the effect of 
government spending on growth and income inequality by using a panel vector autoregression 
(panel VAR) approach. This method addresses the endogeneity problem by enabling the 
variable in system to interact endogenously between them. In other words, the VAR approach 
takes into account the fact that public spending can have an impact on the growth inclusiveness; 
at the same time, public spending can be influenced by the inclusive growth. Our work is 
relatively close to that of Hur (2014) that employs this methodology to examine the effect of 
government spending and inclusive growth in Asian developing countries. 
The main objective of the study is to analyze the impact of public expenditure in the social 
sectors (infrastructure, health and education) on inclusive growth in the context of the sub-
Saharan African economy. The results of this chapter should better indicate targets for which 
the quality of public spending should be improved to ensure sustainable and inclusive growth.  
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The study of this chapter is important for countries in sub-Saharan Africa at the time when 
governments face many political and economic challenges such as commodity price volatility, 
inflation, terrorism, and poor institutional quality (corruption, poor governance). Thus, the 
inclusion of the growth target could only be achieved through a quality institution and 
productive pro-poor government expenditures in the form of broad-based spending on 
education, health and infrastructure. As a result, this study provides relevant policy 
recommendations that would rise awareness of policymakers about the need to address some 
of the issues that are detrimental to inclusive growth in sub-Saharan Africa. 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. In section two we take a preliminary look at the 
data on the share of government expenditure to GDP over the 1994 -2016 period. Section three 
reviews the empirical literature. In section four we develop our empirical approach. Section 
five describes the data that are used in the empirical investigation. Section six details the 
empirical results and their interpretation. Finally, Section seven concludes. 
2.2. Public spending for inclusive growth 
Public spending is one of the central instruments through which governments influence 
economic trends. Though some spending’s do not have a significant effect on the economic 
situation, increasing the right type affects long term growth. In the developing countries, the 
variation in public expenditure is not only to ensure economic stability but also to generate and 
accelerate economic growth and to promote employment opportunities. Public expenditure can 
also be used to improve income distribution, to alleviate mass poverty, to direct the allocation 
of resources in desired lined, and to influence the composition of national product. 
Figure (3) plots the average public expenditure expressed as percentage of GDP across different 
regions. In average, government spending in sub-Saharan Africa are substantially less than 
those in the Middle East or North Africa or East Asia and Pacific over the period 1995-2016. 
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However, they are almost similar to those in the Latin American region. In a certain way, this 
result reflects the implementation of austerity measures by the institutions, which is causing 
fiscal prudence in developing countries. In other words, the governments of sub-Saharan 
African countries should avoid spending largely beyond their public resources. 
Figure 3: Ratio of government expenditures to GDP by region over the period 1994-2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author estimates based on data from IMF World Economic Outlook database 
              NB: Countries classification by income according to World Bank in 2016 are used 
 
In modern times, the government is changing the free functioning of the market mechanism 
with respect to income distribution, not only through the development of an appropriate tax 
structure but also through various forms of public expenditure. However, the appropriate role 
of government spending in fostering economic growth and equity remains an element of policy 
debate in the literature. Beyond their macroeconomic impact, expenditure policies can affect 
growth through several channels, including their effects on the development of physical and 
human capital. Thereby, a more efficient public spending on human capital and infrastructure 
is crucial to promote growth and equity in sub-Saharan Africa. The region faces significant 
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has increased; and progress in achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 
education and health is under threat. There is evidence that gaps in the provision of basic 
education, health and infrastructure have adversely affected education and health outcomes and 
as well as investment and competitiveness. In addition, human capital and infrastructure must 
be provided efficiently and effectively to address the current global financial crisis, protect the 
poor, and lay the foundation for a return to vigorous growth. 
Figure (4) plots the share of government expenditure on education and health in GDP over the 
period 2010-2016. Public spending on education averages 4.2% of GDP in East Asia and Pacific 
and 4.9% in Latin America while it is 4.4% in sub-Saharan Africa (Figure 4). The gap is large 
enough for public spending on health care which stands at only 2.9% of GDP in sub-Saharan 
Africa compared with 3.7% in Latin America and 5% for East Asia and Pacific. It is clear that 
sub-Saharan Africa governments must do more to promote inclusive growth by directing 
expenditure policy towards the promotion of greater equity.  
Although government fiscal policy can reduce poverty and income inequality from spending or 
revenue side, evidence suggest that social indicators including health and education have gained 
large interest in the literature of inclusive growth. According to Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997) 
and Pritchett and Summers (1996), there exists positive relationship between health care and 
economic growth. Whereas Barro and Lee (1997) stressed the positive impact of education on 
the latter growth. In particular, it improves social mobility, productivity, the distribution of 
benefits and enhances social participation in decision-making. Brenneman and Kerf (2002) 
emphasized on the development of infrastructures that lead to access to high quality of 
education and health and also improves people's general living conditions. Studies conducted 
by Claus et al. (2012) for Asian developing countries confirmed that public expenditures, rather 
than taxation, offer the most effective tools for reducing inequalities and that education and 
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health are best able to reach this goal. Their analysis shows that despite progressive tax systems, 
public spending was more effective in reducing inequality. The government's social spending 
policies have distributional implications not only because they can offer immediate benefits (eg 
health and education), but also because they affect the distribution of the earning capacities of 
individuals and households and thus allowing the distribution of market incomes over time. 
Some social expenditures like expenditure on primary schooling can affect income distribution 
with a long-time lag. 
 
F igure 4: Share of government expenditure on education and health in GDP (2010-2016) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author estimates based on data from IMF World Economic Outlook database 
              NB: Countries classification by income according to World Bank in 2016 are used 
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Current studies have shown that, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, school enrollment is low, 
mediocre and combines with the increasing level of child labor; often at the expense of 
inadequate health, education and good nutrition; although the government spends a lot on the 
human capital development programs (education and health) in these countries. 
Infrastructure status 
Infrastructure spendings, by their nature, affect the economy of each country differently and 
can be used to facilitate the infrastructure that is best suited to growth. 
For inclusive growth, infrastructure is the key to delivering a number of essential services. It 
provides a basis for much of the vision of SDGs for inclusive growth. The infrastructure is 
directly addressed in SDG, which require resilient infrastructure and sustainable 
industrialization. Several other objectives, for example, on clean water, sanitation, and on 
affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all, are essential. These core 
components, in turn, enable to achieve sustainable and inclusive economic growth, full and 
productive employment and decent work for all. On the growth side, increasing investments in 
sustainable infrastructure can boost demand at a time when many economies are in trouble. The 
IMF (2014) estimates that for advanced economies, investing 1% of additional GDP in 
infrastructure will result in, on average, 1.5% increase in GDP in four years. According to the 
same study, for emerging and developing economies, where infrastructure is often inadequate, 
there is a need for structural reform. Therefore, the benefits of productivity and growth in these 
countries can be even greater, especially if investments are accompanied by reforms that 
strengthen the institutional capacity for better planning and budget processes and more rigorous 
rules to guide public spending. Above the immediate boom in growth, investments in 
sustainable infrastructure can drive innovation and efficiency in key systems such as logistics, 
and mobility. 
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Figure 5 describes the evolution of indicators for the provision of infrastructure such as energy, 
water and transport. The graph shows that electricity production (measure by electric power 
consumption) in sub-Saharan Africa remains very low compared to that of other economic 
zones over the period 1990-2013. In sub-Saharan Africa, the average annual consumption is 
about 488 kWh per capita, equivalent to about 5% of U.S. per capita consumption (World Bank, 
2014)7. This average is driven by high rates of access to electricity in South Africa. When South 
Africa is excluded, annual electricity consumption is only 150 kWh per capita. However, these 
estimates may be conservative due to the latent demand that remains unsatisfied with the lack 
of access to the network in rural areas and unreliable networks and epileptic power supply in 
areas linked to the urban network. In addition to this low output, sub-Saharan Africa is 
experiencing a large loss in the distribution of electricity between sources of supply and 
distribution points and in the distribution to consumers. This is due to poor infrastructure 
network. The relatively low transmission costs (which do not reflect the market) and high 
amount of maintenance costs (at least to secure existing capacity) do not support new 
investments in transmission lines infrastructure. 
Although access to water and sanitation in sub-Saharan Africa has improved steadily over the 
past two decades, the region is still lagging behind all other developing regions. Access to 
improved water supply has increased from 56% in 1990 to 72% in 2013. However, sub-Saharan 
Africa is unlikely to achieve the Millennium Development Goals of halving the proportion of 
people without access to safe drinking water and sanitation between 1990 and 2015. Indeed, 
there are still large disparities between countries and between urban and rural areas. Africa lags 
far behind the rest of the world in all aspects of infrastructure (quantity, quality, cost and 
                                                          
7 World Bank. (2014). Electric power consumption (kWh per capita). 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.USE.ELEC.KH.PC 
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access). While the construction efforts on trans-African highways are going on, the quality of 
existing roads is deteriorating. In some countries, the parts of the network are currently not 
operational, either due to war damage, natural disasters, general negligence or lack of funds. In 
many countries, the roads are concentrated in urban areas or around sea ports (they were built 
during the colonial era to ship agricultural products abroad). Roads linking neighboring 
countries within a regional road network are much smaller. Due to insufficient infrastructure, 
the freight transport costs in Africa are among the highest in the world. African products are 
therefore less competitive than those in other regions. 
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Figure 5: Evolution of infrastructure indicators8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author estimates based on data from World Bank database 
 
                                                          
8 Electric power transmission and distribution losses include losses in transmission between sources of supply 
and points of distribution and in the distribution to consumers, including pilferage. 
Electric power consumption measures the production of power plants and combined heat and power plants less 
transmission, distribution, and transformation losses and own use by heat and power plants. 
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2.3. A survey of the literature 
Several previous studies have shown that some types of government spending tend to reduce 
income inequality in many countries and regions of the world (Goñi et al., 2011; Lustig, 2016 ; 
Lustig et al., 2013 ; Martinez-Vazquez et al., 2012). However, it is also recognized that the 
relationship between public expenditure and inequality is complex and many doubts have been 
raised about the effectiveness of public spending as a policy instrument for redistribution, 
particularly in low and middle-income countries. In this literature survey we focus on three 
types of public expenditure: education, health and infrastructure. 
Public education spending and income inequality 
Policymakers usually emphasize education as one of the major factors affecting the degree of 
income inequality. However, some theoretical studies suggest that the relationship between 
education and income redistribution is not always clear. For example, the human capital model 
of income distribution, derived from the work of Mincer (1958), Schultz (1961) and Becker 
(1962) implies that the distribution of income is determined by the level and distribution of 
schooling across the population. While the model predicts an unambiguous positive association 
between educational inequality and income inequality, the effect of increasing average 
schooling on income inequality may be positive or negative depending on changes in rates of 
return to education. According to Knight and Sabot (1990), the impact of educational level on 
income inequality depends on the balance between the "composition" and the "wage 
compression" effect. Regarding the "composition" effect, an increase in tertiary education 
tends, at least initially, to increase income inequality. With regard to the "wage compression" 
effect, over time education leads to a decrease in income inequality.  
Contrariwise, for several authors, education must be considered as a determining factor in the 
fight against poverty. Referring to the particular case of education Musgrave and Musgrave 
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(1973) stated that the public sector had technical reasons for participating in education, if not 
through a direct offer, at least through a procurement subsidy of the private sector.  With regard 
to income and wealth distribution, education policy could reduce inequalities in their 
distribution since they are strongly correlated with inequalities in education spending.  
Although education is not seen as a typical public good but is valued as a mixed asset, education 
spending generates positive social gains and market failures may occur, as in the case of credit 
markets, which can lead to under-investment in human capital by the private sector and the 
informal sector. A more even distribution of education can reduce private earnings differentials. 
In terms of stabilization and growth, public spending on education will generate tangible social 
and economic benefits such as the ability to add new knowledge, generate and disseminate 
technological change and innovations in general, to promote economic structural changes, to 
induce productivity gains, more diffuse and intangible gains concerning the extra-economic 
environmental aspects. For Tinbergen (1977), an increase in tertiary education reduces the 
wages of highly skilled workers, and simultaneously enhances the wages of less educated 
workers. As a result, more educated labor is likely to increase competition for positions 
requiring advanced degrees and should therefore narrow the income gap between the highly 
educated and the less educated. 
Studies suggest that the allocation of public investment for human capital development in many 
developing countries is often inefficient and inequitable. There is consensus that expanding 
knowledge in the skills and capabilities of individuals, increasing human capital is essential to 
economic growth and poverty reduction. Education with formal education systems and health 
care plays a key role in the creation of human capital. The human capital theory predicts that 
more educated individuals are more productive, and a good childhood education improves 
cognitive functions and reduces future poverty. As a result, children with better education can 
be expected to be more productive in the future and to get higher income. In addition, educated 
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people would have more incentives to invest in their children's future education and training 
and to contribute to society as a whole Suhrcke et al. (2005). A notable feature of the role of 
education in reducing poverty is the direct linear relationship between education and earnings. 
Education does not only increase the likelihood of being employed. Once in employment, better 
educated individuals earn much more than the less educated. From an economic point of view, 
this result is not surprising and has been supported by numerous studies. Njong (2010) 
investigated the impact of different levels of education upon poverty in Cameroon. The results 
showed that educational level affect negatively poverty. Another interesting result is that 
individuals tend to move away from poverty as education levels progress. This means that the 
higher the educational attainment, the lower the probability of a person becoming poor. 
Achieving education improves the income potential of individuals and, therefore, will help them 
out of poverty. According to Krueger (2009), the economic growth is seen as the main policy 
to significantly reduce poverty. However, to emphasize the effect of growth on poverty 
reduction, the poor need to have access to social and economic services that enable them to 
become more productive. Furthermore, it also involves concentration on policies that will allow 
most of the society's citizens to become more productive (pro growth). Pro-growth policies are 
implemented with particular attention to poverty alleviation through education, health care and 
provision of means to increase productivity. 
Public health spending and poverty  
Regarding at the health level, economists have argued that poor health leads to poverty and 
have shown that ill health has a negative impact on household income and economic growth 
rate (Barro, 1996, Mayer et al, 2001, Bhargava et al., 2001). Poor health would reduce a 
household's ability to earn income and accumulate wealth by limiting work, increasing medical 
costs and reducing savings. In addition, economists, especially those working in the theory of 
sustainable economic growth, have increasingly recognized health as a form of human capital. 
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Thus, better health increases the productivity of other forms of capital and contributes to 
economic growth. Healthier children have higher enrollment ratios and better cognitive 
development, resulting in a higher rate of return to education and making investment in 
education more attractive. The thought of retirement planning occurs only when individuals 
expect to live long enough for retirement to be a realistic prospect. Increasing longevity 
motivates the current generation to save - an incentive that has dramatic effects on national 
saving and subsequent economic growth (Bloom et al., 2004). It is estimated that a 10% increase 
in life expectancy at birth leads to a 0.35% increase in the annual growth rate of per capita 
income (Arora, 2001). The impact of such a rate of economic growth as a result of better health 
over time is quite significant. 
It is recognized that the primary goal of a country with respect to its citizens concerning the 
delivery of health services is to provide better security for the poor through easy access to health 
care, to ensure good and regulate health systems. Low income households are subject to serious 
impoverishment and when they are victims of serious illness, these poor households have no 
safety net. To do this, public health spending should be primarily and firstly directed towards 
interventions with public goods characteristics. The strong positive externalities should be 
directed towards the poor (Roberts, 2003). Gupta et al. (2003) found that the poor have a 
significantly worse health status in developing and transition economies; and if the poor are 
more heavily affected by public spending than the non-poor, increasing public spending will 
not guarantee improved health. The consensus is that the increase in public spending alone is 
insufficient to improve the health status of the poor. Health services depend on a variety of 
variables or factors and some of these factors include; environmental, cultural, social, 
economic, geographical, as well as interventions in the sector. In the same line, Kristjanson et 
al. (2010) found that more households fall into poverty because of poor health than those ones 
who escaped from it through employment due to formal education. Specifically, 40 percent of 
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households sampled across Kenya fell into poverty due to poor health and debilitating health 
care expenses. Drought, political instability, economic shocks like high inflation and health 
related shocks considerably affect incomes of the poor and may not have enough or no means 
to smooth their consumption. Odior (2015) shows that the re-allocation of public spending to 
the health sector appears to have contributed significantly to the reduction of poverty. The 
implication of the result is that allocating more public fund towards improving basic health 
services will reduce the level of poverty in Nigeria. Although, there will be a decrease in poverty 
level in terms of good health services, the base scenario results show that Nigeria will not 
achieve its Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of improving health service by 2015. The 
findings recommend that for Nigeria to achieve this goal in terms of reduction in poverty by 
2015, the government should double its spending on health care and equally ready to maintain 
the existing public health services in the future. These will drastically reduce poverty at the 
national, urban and rural level. 
While most studies have shown that public spending on health can reduce poverty, others, on 
the contrary, lead to the conclusion that rising public spending on health care increases or has 
no effect on poverty. Asghar et al. (2012) studied the long run impact of government spending 
in various sectors on poverty reduction in Pakistan for the period of 1972-2008 applying 
cointegration and Error Correction Mechanism (ECM). The study found that the coefficient for 
government spending on health was insignificant. A similar study conducted for Lao PDR by 
Sourya et al. (2014) using panel regression analysis found domestic health funding to have a 
positive and significant coefficient meaning that poverty increased with spending on health 
sector. 
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Infrastructure and inclusive growth 
The recent literature examination indicated that infrastructure development can have a positive 
effect on the income and welfare of the poor. Taking into account the impact of both quantity 
and quality of infrastructure on income distribution, Calderón and Chong (2004) provide 
evidence of a negative and statistically significant link between those from 1960 to 1997. That 
is, infrastructure development is associated with an improvement in the distribution of income. 
This result is due to the use of a purely cross-country or a panel approach. In his seminal paper, 
Lopez (2004) uses telephone density as a proxy of infrastructure while Calderón and Servén 
(2008) use synthetic index of infrastructure quantity and quality. In both cases, the result shows 
that infrastructure reduces income inequality. Therefore, this finding combined with the idea 
that infrastructure enhances economic growth can be a powerful tool for poverty reduction. 
Khandker et al. (2006) sought to determine if the infrastructure development fostered economic 
growth and poverty reduction in the context of Bangladesh. From an analysis of household 
panel data and using quantile regression techniques, their results suggest that growth in overall 
income indeed led to a significant reduction in poverty and had a significantly higher impact 
on the households at the poorest end of the distribution. While those pure growth effects on 
household poverty incidence were not very large, authors found that income growth through 
certain policies (that is proximity to roads, electrification, and commercial bank penetration) 
could lead to substantial reductions in overall poverty in the sample. Therefore, investment in 
specific infrastructure can improve welfare and enhance distributional effect compared to pure 
growth. 
Seneviratne and Sun (2013) investigated the relationships between infrastructure and income 
distribution in ASEAN-5 countries. They based on regressions covering 76 advanced and 
emerging market economies for the time period between 1980 and 2010 and using a set of 
pooled ordinary least squares (OLS). They conclude that better infrastructure, both quality wise 
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and quantity wise, promote income equality, but it is not the same for investment. In fact, they 
found the weak link between investment and income distribution. For them, if not supported by 
enhancement in efficiency and institutions, an increase in infrastructure investment may lead to 
large waste that has little impact on equitable growth. The study suggests that infrastructure 
development can have double effects on poverty reduction and inclusive growth. For the 
ASEAN-5 countries, removing infrastructure gaps could raise potential growth, and also shared 
the benefits of growth more evenly. Zheng and Kuroda (2013) emphasize the role of two public 
infrastructure, transportation and knowledge infrastructure, on industrial geography, regional 
income disparities, and growth across 286 cities in China. The study found that an improvement 
in transportation infrastructure reduced trade costs, increased growth, and decreased the income 
gap but at the expense of increasing industrial agglomeration between cities. Authors suggested 
that knowledge infrastructure increases growth but also decreases income gap as well as 
industrial agglomeration. Moreover, the impact of knowledge infrastructure is found to be 
larger in the case of high labor mobility. 
For Jahan and McCleery (2005), the infrastructure development can contribute to reduce 
poverty directly or indirectly. In fact, it directly affects poverty by improving people's access 
to health and education services. Through the indirect channel, investment in infrastructure 
influences poverty by increasing workers productivity, reducing transport costs, and by 
generating further employment, thereby leading to growth. Therefore, the infrastructure 
development can affect economically and socially the lives of the population. Jahan and 
McCleery (2005) also claim that investment in infrastructure affects growth and poverty 
reduction in several manners. They identified the first-round effects followed by subsequent 
impacts. In the first instance, the infrastructure development could lead to poverty reduction 
through economic growth. This can be done through the supply and demand side. Through 
supply, the infrastructure development is impacting the economy in terms of reducing costs, 
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improving the business climate and creating new opportunities. These supply-side effects entail 
the attraction of foreign and domestic investment that can foster industrial growth, increase 
employment and domestic production. Regarding the demand side, the actual effect of the 
demand for infrastructure development is expected when employment and revenues are 
generated by project implementation. The social dimension of good infrastructure corresponds 
to increases access to basic social services such as transportation and power. This would 
improve the living standards of the poor.  
Anderson et al. (2006) argue that there are two main effects whereby public infrastructure might 
affect the economy. They distinguish the macro from the micro effects. According to these 
authors, the macroeconomic effects focus on the potential impact of public investment on 
growth, investment and aggregate productivity. Regarding the microeconomic effects, public 
investment has both, quantity and price effect. The quality and quantity of public goods and 
services raise with the increasing in public investment in infrastructure. The quantity of public 
goods is initially rationed by firms and households because they are produced exclusively by 
the government. However, the quality and quantity of this rationed good raise if government 
make additional investment in infrastructure, therefore benefiting both firms and households in 
the process. In this case, much public infrastructure provides direct welfare benefits in the form 
of increased quality and quantity of final goods and services. Ogun (2010) studied the impact 
of physical and social infrastructure on living standard or poverty in Nigeria. The study showed 
that infrastructure development more to poverty reduction. These results also contributed 
showed that while infrastructure reduces poverty, specifically social infrastructure explains a 
greater part of the forecast error in poverty indicators relative to physical infrastructure. This 
suggests that massive investment in social infrastructure in cities would reduce poverty 
significantly in urban areas. 
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2.4. Econometric methodology 
This study employs panel-data vector autoregressive (panel VAR) method developed by Love 
and Zicchino (2006) to examine the government spending effect on inclusive growth by 
modeling the endogenous behavior between growth, income inequality and government 
spending. The specificity of the Panel VAR approach it combines two things together. On the 
one hand, it uses the traditional VAR approach, by treating the variables in the system as 
endogenous. On the other hand, it uses the panel-data method, enabling for unobserved 
individual heterogeneity by introducing fixed effects, resulting in an improved consistency of 
the estimation (Love and Zicchino, 2006). According to Martinez et al. (2012) public spending, 
are likely to be endogenous, due to reverse causality– from income inequality to select the 
instruments of expenditure policy and vice versa. Specifically, countries with higher unequal 
revenue distribution may decide to rely relatively more on public expenditures, and vice versa. 
Therefore, since government expenditure responds to underlying exogenous shocks, 
conventional econometrics methods that treat government spending as exogenous variable may 
be biased. The panel VAR approach is particularly interesting as it overcomes usual 
econometric limitations. Moreover, the panel VAR procedure also has the advantage from 
panel-data framework to allow unobserved individual heterogeneity for all the variables by 
introducing fixed effects which enhances the consistency of the estimation. We utilize a panel 
vector autoregressive (VAR) model to identify the possible causal relationship between the 
variables. The key benefit of this method is to exploit the individual time series and the cross-
sectional variations of the data and to avoid the bias associated with the cross-sectional 
regressions by considering the country-specific fixed effect. For Canova and Ciccarelli (2013), 
it captures static and dynamic interdependencies. It is undoubtedly a useful tool to give some 
good interpretation of inclusive impacts of government fiscal expenditure without modeling the 
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global economy. This setup also allows us to study the Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) of 
different shocks and how these affect other imbalances. 
The first step of the empirical analysis was to choose the optimal lag order in panel VAR and 
the moment condition. According to Andrews and Lu (2001) consistent moment and model 
selection criteria (MMSC) are based on Hansen's (1982) statistic of over-identifying 
restrictions. Therefore, according to three model selection criteria by Andrews and Lu (2001), 
the preferred model in our case was the first-order Panel VAR. This panel VAR model can be 
specified as follows: 
    𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝐴(𝐿)𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,         (1)  
                        𝑌𝑖𝑡 ≡ [
𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ
𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑡
]                             
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is a (1 ∗ 𝑘) dimension vector containing all stationary variables. 𝐴(𝐿) is a matrix 
polynomial in the lag operator with 𝐴(𝐿) =  𝐴1𝐿
1 + 𝐴2𝐿
2 + ⋯ + 𝐴𝑝𝐿
𝑝, 𝜇𝑖 is a vector of country 
specific effects and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is a vector of idiosyncratic errors. 𝐵𝑖𝑡 is a vector or scalar of public 
expenditure in education, health and infrastructure index.  
In the Panel VAR framework, it is important to impose some restrictions to make sure that the 
underlying structure is the same for all the cross-sectional members. In practice, such 
constraints are likely to not be respected; one can resolve this problem by using fixed effects 
denoted by 𝜇𝑖 in equation (1) to allow for individual heterogeneity in all the variables. However, 
the conventional approach of average differentiation, commonly used to remove fixed effects, 
can lead to biased coefficients because the fixed effect hypothesis means that the individual 
specific effect is correlated with the independent variables. Therefore, to overcome this problem 
we use forward mean-differencing, also known as the Helmert procedure (Arellano and Bover, 
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1995). In this procedure, to remove the fixed effects, all variables in the model are transformed 
in deviations from forward means. Let ?̅?𝑖𝑡
𝑚 = ∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑠
𝑚𝑇𝑖
𝑠=𝑡+1 /(𝑇𝑖 − 𝑡) denotes the means obtained 
from the future values of 𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑚, a variable in the vector 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = (𝑦𝑖𝑡
1 , 𝑦𝑖𝑡
2 , … , 𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑀)′, where 𝑇𝑖 denotes 
the last period of data available for a given countries series. Let 𝜀?̅?𝑡
𝑚 denotes the same 
transformation of 𝜀𝑖𝑡
𝑚, where 𝜀𝑖𝑡 = (𝜀𝑖𝑡
1 , 𝜀𝑖𝑡
2 , … , 𝜀𝑖𝑡
𝑀)′. Hence, we get transformed variables: 
?̃?𝑖𝑡
𝑚 = 𝛿𝑖𝑡(𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑚 − ?̅?𝑖𝑡
𝑚)        (2) 
And  
𝜀?̃?𝑡
𝑚 = 𝛿𝑖𝑡(𝜀𝑖𝑡
𝑚 − 𝜀?̅?𝑡
𝑚)         (3) 
where 𝛿𝑖𝑡 = √(𝑇𝑖 − 𝑡)/(𝑇𝑖 − 𝑡 + 1).  
This procedure gives more weight to data from the early period and allows no transformation 
on the last one since no future observation is available. The same transformation is applied on 
the error vector; indeed, given the assumptions of neither auto-correlation nor 
homoscedasticity, the procedure does not alter its characteristics. The final transformed model 
is thus given by: 
        ?̃?𝑖𝑡 = 𝐴(𝐿)?̃?𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀?̃?𝑡                                                       (4) 
        where ?̃?𝑖𝑡 = (?̃?𝑖𝑡
1 , ?̃?𝑖𝑡
2 , … , ?̃?𝑖𝑡
𝑀)′ , and 𝜀?̃?𝑡 = (𝜀?̃?𝑡
1 , 𝜀?̃?𝑡
2 , … , 𝜀?̃?𝑡
𝑀)′ , and 𝑌𝑖𝑡 ≡ [
𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ
𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑡
]          
Moreover, the differencing could also result from a simultaneity problem since the lagged 
regressors are correlated with the differenced error term. In addition, heteroscedasticity may 
also exist due to the presence of heterogeneous errors with different countries in the panel. 
Accordingly, after eliminating the fixed effects by differencing, the generalized method of 
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moments estimator (GMM) using lagged regressors as instruments is applied to estimate the 
coefficients more consistently. 
In our model, we assumed that the residuals vector (𝜀𝑖𝑡) was independent and identically 
distributed. However, this assumption typically fails in practice, as the concrete variance-
covariance matrix of errors is unlikely to be diagonal. Thus, to isolate the shocks on one of the 
VAR errors, it is necessary to decompose the residuals so that they become orthogonal. 
According to Sims (1980), the variables in VAR should have a recurrent causal order based on 
their degree of exogeneity. This procedure is also known as the Cholesky decomposition of the 
variance-covariance matrix of residuals and ensures the orthogonalization of the shocks. In 
other words, the variables that come earlier in the order affect the subsequent variables at the 
same time and with a lag, whereas the variables that come later only affect the previous 
variables with a lag (Love and Zicchino, 2006). 
As our panel exhibits a medium temporal dimension and a relatively small number of countries 
(10 countries), the panel with fixed effect specification (LSDV) is the most appropriated (Bun 
and Kiviet, 2006) and found to be consistent (Nickell, 1997). So Estimating equation (4) and 
drawing impulse response functions was done using the Stata code (XTVAR) of (Cagala and 
Glogowsky, 2014). XTVAR estimates a panel vector autoregression by employing a least 
square dummy variable estimator (LSDV). The estimator fits a multivariate panel regression of 
each dependent variable on lags of itself and all the other dependent variables.  
The key element in the use of VAR is the possibility to draw the impulse response function 
(IRF) and the variance decomposition of the error (FEVD)9 to identify the shocks. The impulse 
response functions (IRFs) are calculated by counting on the Cholesky decomposition. They 
                                                          
9 Impulse response functions describe the response of an endogenous variable over time to a shock in another 
variable in the system. Variance decompositions measure the contributions of each source of shock to the (forecast 
error) variance of each endogenous variable, at a given forecast horizon. 
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describe one variable’s reaction in reply to changes in another variable in the system, as all 
other shocks are held equal to zero. However, to isolate shocks to one of the variables in the 
system, it is essential to decompose the residuals using a method by which they turn into 
orthogonal, because the actual variance-covariance matrix of the errors is unlikely to be 
diagonal. The usual convention is adopting a particular ordering, and then any correlation 
between the residuals of any two elements is allocated to the variable that is coming first. The 
identifying assumption is that the following variables are affected simultaneously by the 
variables that appear earlier in the ordering, as well as with a lag, whereas the variables coming 
later affect the preceding variables only with a lag. That is to say, in the system, the variables 
coming earlier are more exogenous, while the variables coming later are more endogenous. 
Finally, to analyze the impulse response functions an estimation of their confidence intervals is 
needed. The standard errors of the impulse response functions need to be considered, because 
the matrix of IRFs is built from the estimated VAR coefficients. Consequently, the standard 
errors of the impulse response functions and the confidence intervals are generated by use of 
Monte Carlo simulations (Garita, 2011). 
2.5. Data and empirical investigation 
2.5.1. Data and variables 
To investigate the effect of public expenditure component on inclusive growth, we use annual 
observations from 1990 to 2015 for 10 Sub-Saharan African countries. The sample does not 
include early years because of the scarcity of fiscal data in macro level for Sub-Saharan African 
countries. We focus on three kinds on spending variables (education, health, and infrastructure) 
because according to the literature, these expenditures account for a major part of public 
expenditure in different countries. Also, the distributive nature of these expenses has been 
debated at length. 
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To carry out the study, we analyze the effect of these public expenditures on GDP per capita 
growth and Gini index. The fiscal variables (spending on health and education) are expressed 
in percentage of GDP.   
The Gini coefficients are from the Standardized World Income Database (SWIID) and 
measured the net Gini i.e., the Gini after tax and transfer. By maximizing comparability for the 
largest possible sample of countries and years, the SWIID is better suited to broadly cross-
national research on income inequality than previously available sources: it offers coverage 
double that of the next largest income inequality dataset, and its record of comparability is three 
to eight times better than those of alternate datasets (Solt, 2016). The Gini coefficient is used to 
assess the distributional effect of growth, which is an important aspect of inclusive growth. The 
other data are from World Development Indicators (World Bank) and World Economic Outlook 
Database (IMF). Due to the lack of infrastructure spending in the countries used in this study, 
we are building an infrastructure indicator. For the construction of our indices of infrastructure 
which takes into account both quantity and quality, we follow (Calderon and Serven, 2014). 
We use the principal component analysis to construct synthetic indices that capture information 
in two core infrastructure sectors – transport and power- which play a major role in economic 
development. The aggregate Index of infrastructure stocks is the first component of two 
variables: air transport, freight and improve water source (% of population with access). 
Infrastructure Index= 0.7071 *Transport + 0.7071 * Improve water 
The variables used in this study and their descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Description Statistics for variables 
Variables Observation Mean     Std. Dev. Min Max 
GDPpc growth    311 1.06    4.05 -15.28 15.65 
Net Gini 237 40.8 7.51 31 58.8 
Investment  312 20.32  9.48 4.30 61.46 
Education spending 312 3.67   1.56 .11 8.65 
Health spending 312 2.38     1.24 .02 6.93 
Infrastructure 260 2.44 1.3 0.04 6.93 
Source: Author calculation using data from WDI and SWIID database. 
 
2.5.2. Panel unit root test and cointegration analysis 
The aim is to establish the dynamic properties of the effect of government expenditures 
composition on both equity and economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa countries over the 
1990-2015 period. In particular, we are interested in the following questions: are government 
expenditures linked to economic growth and income inequality by a stable long-run 
relationship? Which component of public spending has a more significant effect on economic 
activities and equity? Are these relations robust over time?  
To overcome the issue of spurious regression that characterized earlier studies on the relation 
between government expenditure and growth and equity due to the neglect of time series 
properties, we follow the now standard approaching consisting of (i) assessing the stationarity 
of the time series, (ii) in the case the variables are not stationary, checking whether they are 
characterized by a cointegration relationship, (iii) in case cointegration holds, estimating error 
correction mechanism (ECM), which permits to analyze the long-run relationship between the 
variables jointly with the short-term adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium. 
Table 2 presents the results of unit root tests of IPS, ADF, and PP for the variables in the system. 
At the 5% level of significance, the results show that GDP per capita growth and net Gini are 
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stationary in levels. By against, the results find that time series variables, such as investment, 
public spending in education, spending in health and infrastructure are having unit roots at the 
level data. This is because the estimated unit root test statistics cannot reject the null hypothesis 
of non-stationarity at 5% level of significance. However, they are stationary at the first 
difference level, as the null hypothesis of non-stationarity is rejected at 5% level of significance 
(see Table 3). This confirms that these variables are integrated of order one, 1 (1). 
Table 2:  Results of Panel Unit Root Tests (in levels) 
 Variables Im, Pesaran and Shin ADF-Fisher PP-Fisher Level of Integration 
GDP pc growth    -3.805 -4.053 -11.412 I(0) 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
Net Gini -1.908 -1.894 -1.681 I(0) 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.046)  
Investment  0.933 1.445 0.220 I(1) 
 (0.824) (0.926) (0.587)  
Education spending 2.118 2.241 1.831 I(1) 
 (0.983) (0.987) (0.966)  
Health spending -1.617 -1.492 -2.123 I(1) 
 (0.053) (0.068) (0.017)  
Infrastructure 6.500 6.089 3.304 I(1) 
  (1.000) (1.000) (0.999)  
P values shown below test statistics. The null hypothesis for all test is a unit root (assumes individual unit root 
process). Two lags are introduced to allow for serial correlation in the errors. 
 
Table 3: Panel Unit Root Tests (At First difference) 
Variables Im, Pesaran and Shin ADF-Fisher PP-Fisher 
Investment  -6.149 -6.7257 -16.871 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Education spending -3.297 -3.499 -8.956 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Health spending -2.146 -2.130 -8.709 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.000) 
Infrastructure -4.075 -4.317 -14.192 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
P values shown below test statistics. The null hypothesis for all test is a unit root (assumes individual unit root 
process). Two lags are introduced to allow for serial correlation in the errors. 
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Cointegration test  
Once the stationarity order is defined, our next step is to apply panel cointegration test. Granger 
(1988) showed that when the time series become stationary only after being differentiated once, 
they might have linear combinations that are stationary without differencing. These series are 
generally called cointegrated. If the integration of order one is implied, the next step is to use 
the cointegration analysis to determine whether there is a long-term relationship between the 
set of integrated variables. Panel cointegration tests are improved aiming to analyze long-term 
relation-ships between panel series after advances in panel unit root tests.  The most important 
cointegration tests in econometric literature are these: 1995, 1999 and, 2004. Mccoskey and 
Kao (1998), Kao (1999), Larsson et al. (2001), Mark and Sul (2003), Guitierrez (2005). 
In this investigation, Westerlund (2007) cointegration test is deployed to test the existence of 
long run equilibrium relationship between public expenditure and inclusive growth.  
Westerlund (2007) implements the four error-correction-based panel cointegration tests which 
are general enough to allow a large degree of heterogeneity, both in the short-run dynamics and, 
in the long-run cointegration relationship and dependence across as well as within the cross-
sectional units. The underlying idea is to test for the absence of cointegration by establishing if 
the individual members of panel are error-correcting or not. Consider that we have a process of 
generating data in the form: 
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿𝑖
′𝑑𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖(𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝛽𝑖
′𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1) + ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑗∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 +
𝑃𝑖
𝑗=1 ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑗∆𝑥𝑖,𝑡−𝑗
𝑃𝑖
𝑗=0 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡   (3.11) 
Where 𝑖 =  1, . . . , 𝑁 and 𝑡 =  1, . . . , 𝑇 design cross-sectional units and the time-series, 
respectively, while, 𝑑𝑡 contains the deterministic components, for which there are three cases. 
In the first case, 𝑑𝑡 = 0 so (3.11) has no deterministic terms; in the second case, 𝑑𝑡 = 1 so  ∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 
is generated with a constant; and in the third case, 𝑑𝑡 = (1, 𝑡)
′, so ∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 is generated with both 
a constant and a trend. The parameter 𝛼𝑖 measures the speed of adjustment, that is, the speed at 
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which the system returns to its equilibrium relationship 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝛽𝑖
′𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1 after a sudden shock 
in one of the model variables. If 𝛼𝑖 < 0, then there is error correction which implies that 𝑦𝑖𝑡 
and 𝑥𝑖𝑡 are cointegrated; if 𝛼𝑖 = 0, there is absence of error correction and, thus absence of 
cointegration. Thus, we can formulate the null hypothesis of absence of cointegration as 
𝐻0: 𝛼𝑖 = 0 for all 𝑖. The alternative hypothesis depends on what is supposed about the 
homogeneity of 𝛼𝑖. Two of the tests, called group-means tests, do not require the 𝛼𝑖 coefficients 
to be equal, which means that 𝐻0 is tested versus 𝐻1: 𝛼𝑖 < 0 for at least one 𝑖. The second pair 
of tests, called panel test, assume that 𝛼𝑖 is equal for all 𝑖. 
Westerlund (2007) computes the group-mean tests in three steps. The first step consists in the 
estimation of equation (3.11) by least squares for each unit 𝑖. Having obtained 𝑒𝑖𝑡 and 𝛾𝑖𝑗, the 
second step is the computation of ?̂?𝑖𝑡 and then of ?̂?𝑖. The third step is the calculation of the 
group-mean tests in the following way: 
𝐺𝑇 =
1
𝑁
∑
?̂?𝑖
𝑆𝐸(?̂?𝑖)
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
𝐺𝑎 =
1
𝑁
∑
𝑇?̂?𝑖
?̂?𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
Similarly, the panel test is computed in three steps. The first test is the same as for the group-
mean tests and involves regressing ∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 and 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 on 𝑑𝑡, the lags of ∆𝑦𝑖𝑡, and the 
contemporaneous and lagged values of ∆𝑥𝑖𝑡. Then, the second step focuses on the estimation of 
the common error correction parameter, ?̂?, and its standard error, SE. Finally, the panel statistics 
are given by: 
𝑃𝑇 =
?̂?
𝑆𝐸(?̂?)
 
𝑃𝑇 = 𝑇?̂? 
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The above cointegration tests, proposed by Westerlund (2007) can be executed using command 
called “xtwest”, which can be used in Stata software. 
Table 4 reports the results of panel cointegration tests developed by Westerlund (2007). The 𝐺𝑇 
and 𝐺𝑎 statistics test whether cointegration exists for at least one individual. The 𝑃𝑇 and 𝑃𝑎 
statistics pool information over all the individual series to test whether cointegration exists for 
the panel as a whole. As shown by the robust p-value, for models with dependent variables 
Gini, the null hypothesis of no cointegration cannot be rejected by all the four tests. Regarding 
the model that have GDPpc growth as dependent variable, the statistic 𝐺𝑎 and 𝑃𝑎 does not allow 
to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration. Therefore, the empirical properties of the 
variables examined require estimation of the VAR in first differences, since no cointegration 
relationships exist between the (non-stationary) variables (in level). 
Table 4: Panel cointegration tests 
Dependent variable: GDPpc growth 
Statistic Value P-value 
Gt -2.780 0.004 
Ga -8.635 0.728 
Pt -8.647 0.008 
Pa -8.954 0.089 
   
Dependent variable: Net Gini 
Statistic Value P-value 
Gt -1.069 0.999 
Ga -0.932 1.000 
Pt -2.470 0.993 
Pa -0.574 0.996 
The Westerlund and Edgerton (2007) tests take no cointegration as the null, and 
P-values are robust critical values obtained through one lag. 
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2.6. Empirical results 
This section presents the impulse response functions and the variance decomposition from the 
panel VAR. Each of these IRFs is generated by Monte Carlo simulations with 200 repetitions. 
Areas between the upper and lower lines have a 95% confidence interval for IRFs over the next 
10 years. The four-variable XTVARs consist of investment, government spending on education 
and health as well as net Gini and GDP per capita growth.  
The impulse response functions in Figure 6 show that GDP per capita responds negatively to 
public spending on education, before having a positive but low impact. Reaching its minimum 
level in the first period, the increase in growth level appears nearly about 0.06 %. This positive 
response of income conserves its statistical meaningfulness from the 4th period. However, 
increases in government spending on education are likely to have a negative effect on the Gini 
coefficient. Figure 6 also shows that public investment reacts positively and significantly to 
government expenditure on education. These results indicated that the economic impact of 
public expenditure on education might be positive but limited in the case of growth in Sub-
Saharan African countries, whereas educational spending is likely to reduce income inequality 
slightly. 
These results are in line with some previous studies including Afzal and al. (2012) and 
Hanushek and Woessmann (2008) that report a significant and positive relationship between 
government expenditure on education and growth. Higher education always leads to quality 
labour supply, thus increase in total factor productivity and growth towards equilibrium output. 
Also, education promotes the innovative techniques, which encourages growth. The findings 
do not corroborate the results of Martinez et al. (2012) who find that government spending 
(education, health, and housing) tend to have greater effects on reducing income inequality than 
other spending items. This difference in results can be explained by the difference in samples 
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(time period and number of countries) or methodology used in these studies. On the other hand, 
the difficulty in targeting the poor with regular education spending in developing countries 
might explain the limited effect of government spending on education on Gini coefficient. In 
fact, among other reasons, these programs are in many countries targeting in urban areas, thus 
does not directly benefit the poor in rural areas or even those live in informal neighborhoods in 
urban areas. Thereby, given that inclusive growth implies there is an increase in economic 
growth on the one hand an equitable redistribution of the fruits of this growth on the other hand, 
our results show that a shock of public spending on education affects both aspects of inclusive 
growth but with minimal effect. 
Figure 6: Impulse response functions – public expenditure on education 
 
Source: Author’s estimates using XTVAR code. 
 
According to impulsive response functions obtained from public spending on health (Figure 7), 
the reaction of GDP per capita in response to an impulse given to government health 
expenditure is positive and significant during the entire period. However, after five periods, 
economic effects of an increase in health expenditure are likely to decrease. A plausible 
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explanation is that in developing countries, a large share of health spending is allocated to 
operating expenditure rather than funding medical equipment. These expenditures have little 
impact on the population’s health, especially those living in rural areas. Thus, unhealthy 
individuals are less fit both physically and mentally, they are expected to disrupt production 
and decrease productivity and tend to reduce economic growth. 
The response of net Gini coefficient, which measures the degree of inequality in the distribution 
of income in a country, is positive during the entire period. These results indicate that the public 
spending on health seems to increase the income gap between rich and poor in the countries 
used in this study. The finding confirms those found by Dollar and Kraay (2002). In fact, they 
have attempted to address how certain components of public policies like public spending on 
health and education impact poverty. They find that many supposedly “pro-poor” policies that 
direct investment in health and education do not have any significant impact on the income of 
the poor. They argue, however, that social spending in developing countries often benefits the 
rich and middle classes more than the poor. Therefore, a higher share of social spending on 
items such as health and education will not be reflected in higher incomes for the poor. Unlike 
to the education, health expenditure in sub-Saharan Africa appears to make it possible to reach 
only one aspect of inclusive growth (i.e. economic growth). 
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Figure 7: Impulse response functions – public expenditure on health 
 
Source: Author’s estimates using XTVAR code. 
 
Figure 8 draws the impulsive response function for infrastructure. The effect from a change in 
infrastructure is different to public education expenditure and public health spending. An 
expansion in infrastructure has a positive effect on growth and allows a reduction of the income 
gap between rich and poor (negative curve of Gini). Compared to the previous two cases for 
public expenditure on health and education which do not or have little growth inclusiveness 
effect, this result shows an increase in infrastructure has a long-term effect in achieving 
economic growth and in reduction of income inequality. This leads to an inclusion of growth in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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Figure 8: Impulse response functions – infrastructure 
 
Source: Author’s estimates using XTVAR code. 
 
Although the impulsive responses provide information about the effect of changes in one 
variable on another, they do not show how important shocks on one variable are in explaining 
fluctuations in other variables. To assess the importance of changes in one variable in 
explaining the shifts in other variables, we perform a variance decomposition. The variance 
decompositions display the proportion of movements in the dependent variables that are due to 
their own shocks versus shocks to the other variables. Table (5) reports the variance 
decomposition analysis derived from the orthogonalized impulse–response coefficient 
matrices. The variance decomposition in Table (5) clarifies how government spending on 
education and health and infrastructure index affect each component of inclusive growth 
(income inequality and economic growth) in the sample used in this study. The variance 
decomposition shows that public education expenditure explains approximately 0.14% and 
0.31% of the fluctuations of GDP per capita growth and Gini coefficient respectively. Health 
expenditure explains approximately 0.48% of changes in GDP per capita growth and 2.01% of 
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Gini index. The results in Table (5) also indicate that infrastructure shocks are essential to 
explain the inclusiveness of growth. Infrastructure explains 1.96% of the variation in growth 
and 0.20% of the change in net Gini.   
Table 5: Variance decomposition analysis 
Variation in the row variable explained by column variable (in %, 8 periods ahead) 
Model 1 (Education)     
 GDPpc growth    Net Gini Investment  Education spending 
GDPpc growth    81.83 0.26 17.77 0.14 
Net Gini 1.21 96.83 1.65 0.31 
Investment  .84 1.18 96.28 1.70 
Education spending 1.83 0.24 0.26 97.66 
Model 2 (Health)     
 GDPpc growth    Net Gini Investment  Health spending 
GDPpc growth    82.82 0.45 16.25 0.48 
Net Gini 1.21 96.23 0.55 2.01 
Investment  0.47 3.03 93.38 3.12 
Health spending 0.87 21.60 0.61 76.92 
Model 3 (Infrastructure)     
 GDPpc growth    Net Gini Investment  Infrastructure 
GDPpc growth    80.48 0.25 17.31 1.96 
Net Gini 1.70 96.42 1.68 0.20 
Investment  0.41 1.55 97.72 0.31 
Infrastructure 0.02 0.30 0.21 99.47 
Source: Author estimation. Numbers are expressed in percentage of the total variance; Projection: 8 periods 
ahead; Columns explain lines. 
 
To summarize, from impulsive response function and variance decomposition results, we find 
evidence that improving the infrastructure quality and stock has a major impact on the 
inclusiveness of growth in long term. This effect could be observed by an increase in GDP per 
capita growth and a reduction on income inequality measured by Gini index. However, public 
expenditure on education and health do not allow at the same time to increase the growth on 
the one hand and reduce income inequality in the other hand. In other words, our results do not 
find evidence that these two kinds of public spending affect the inclusiveness of growth in Sub-
Saharan Africa countries. 
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Firstly, these results can be explained by the fact that in many developing countries, a large part 
of public health budgets is allocated to hospital services, usually located in urban areas. These 
services are difficult or not at all accessible to large parts of the population living in rural areas 
and have high mortality rates caused by diseases. Besides, good governance is important in the 
delivery of health care, and returns on investment in health are low in poor governance 
environment (Lewis, 2006). Consequently, the allocation of funds to the health sector in the 
context of poor governance may be insufficient to improve health outcomes. Indeed, poor intra-
sectoral distribution, inadequate targeting, and inefficient delivery also explains the low impact 
of public spending on health. Some authors like Ugur and Dasgupta (2011) suggested that 
governance affects health through two main channels: its indirect effect on national income 
(corruption reduces economic growth) and thus on household income, and the determinants of 
health and directly on the health sector. In more developed countries, good governance in the 
health sector has a positive effect on health, while in less developed countries good governance 
affects it mainly through its indirect impact on income. 
Second, the limited effect of public expenditure on education in achieving inclusive growth can 
be explained by the fact that there may be variations in individual choice and parental human 
capital. In such a case, public spending on education does not reduce the income gap between 
the rich and the poor, even if everyone has equal access to education (Glomm and Ravikumar, 
2003). Moreover, expansion of education would not benefit the poor if they did not have enough 
resources to attend school, especially if they are taxed to generate revenue to finance education 
(Sylwester, 2000). 
Finally, several reasons support the view that infrastructure investment boosts inclusive growth, 
especially in developing countries with low infrastructure stocks (Easterly and Rebelo, 1993, 
and Arslanalp et al., 2010). A good road network or reliable electricity supply raises 
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productivity across industries and firms, and hence, the economy as a whole. Calderón and 
Servén (2010) found that both the quantity and quality of roads, telephones, and electricity had 
a significant beneficial effect on both growth and inequality. By cons, Estache and Fay (2007) 
showed that access to infrastructure was highly distorted against the poor. This reflects the lack 
of physical access and limited accessibility. Therefore, maximizing the inclusive impact of 
infrastructure requires expanding access to and affordability for the poor.  
2.7. Robustness Check 
Another estimator (PVAR) 
In this part, we focus on another panel VAR model estimator developed by Abrigo and Love 
(2016) which use the Stata code (PVAR). The method allows us to examine the dynamic 
relationship between governments spending and inclusive growth over time. The PVAR 
methodology treats all variables as endogenous and interdependent, so all the feedback effects 
are included explicitly in the model. In fact, the PVAR estimator uses the lagged values of 
regressors as instruments and estimates the coefficients by the generalized method of moment 
(GMM). Thus, it is a methodology that is well-suited to the questions this study aims to address. 
Figure 9, 10 and 11 (see Appendix) impulsive response function (IRF) for public expenditure 
on education, health, and infrastructure index respectively. First, the IRFs of education spending 
shows that the effect GDP per capita growth and net Gini have practically the same tendency 
as in the case of XTVAR estimator to a shock on public spending on education. However, the 
magnitude of the curves remains slightly higher in the case of the GMM method used by the 
PVAR estimator than the LSDV method. Second, given an impulse of public spending on 
health, the results are qualitatively the same as the case of XTVAR. Except that here, there is a 
considerable drop in the GINI index, which is even negative, indicating a decrease in income 
inequality. Third, according to figure 11, investment in infrastructure seems to have a positive 
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effect on growth even if this effect decreases other times. In the case of income inequality, a 
shock on investment in infrastructure is likely to lower the Gini coefficient up to the 7th period 
beyond which effect becomes positive and this is not significant. 
Overall, the inclusiveness of growth in African countries in the south of Sahara seems to be 
mainly driven by infrastructure. This finding is closed to the previous results using the LSDV 
estimator. The difference is being felt in the magnitude of the effect. 
Sub-panel 
The main goal of this part is to focus more precisely on a sample consisting essentially of 
countries in West Africa. A specific attention is paid to the six following countries: Côte 
d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Niger, and Senegal. The aim here is to check whether our results 
are not affected when we are specifically interested in countries operating in the same 
geographical space. These countries all belong to ECOWAS, thus sharing the same trade policy 
aimed at increasing intra-regional trade to promote the harmonious integration of the region 
into the world economy and stimulate economic activities in the region and also contribute to 
the improvement of the economic welfare of the citizens. The results represented in Figure 12, 
13 and 14 (see Appendix) confirmed that our results are quite similar to those obtained with the 
whole sample, the difference being that in the reduced sample, education spending does not 
affect income inequality.
 114 
 
2.8. Conclusion and policy implication 
This chapter examines empirically the effect of government expenditure policy on two critical 
aspects of inclusive growth that are economic growth and income inequality. The study is 
conducted using a panel VAR approach using data from 10 sub Saharan African countries over 
the period 1990 to 2015. The results are as follows: 
• Public health spending and infrastructure investment have significant positive effects 
on economic growth. 
• Public spending on education has a temporary negative effect before having a positive 
but limited effect on GDP per capita growth. 
•  Educational spending and infrastructure investment seem to alleviate income inequality 
significantly. 
• The effects of public health spending items on the Gini coefficient are positive and 
significant during the entire period, denoting an increase of income gap between rich 
and poor in the studied countries. 
These findings imply that investment in infrastructure may contribute to more inclusive growth 
in Sub-sub Saharan African economies than other government spending. Based on these results, 
we recommend that the following measures should be implemented to create government 
expenditures policies that will support the successful implementation of inclusive growth. In 
order to make growth more inclusive, temporary and well-targeted programs could be 
considered to help those being left out by the growth process. Governments of sub Saharan 
African countries should direct their policies strategies on increasing productive public 
expenditure on health, education, and infrastructure.  
First, an increase in government spending on education would result in improved primary and 
secondary school enrollment, academic excellence, research and development, human capital 
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development, as well as skilled and productive work. Therefore, this would greatly contribute 
to inclusive growth in the country.  
Second, if governments increase their expenditure on health by providing quality medicines, 
skilled health personnel, a clean and supportive environment, significant progress will be made 
to reduce waterborne illness, sexually transmitted diseases, malaria, poliomyelitis, etc. Above 
all, infant and maternal mortality would decline across the country. 
Last, since the use of public resources as infrastructure has led to inclusive growth, governments 
could improve further their productivity by providing infrastructural facilities such as good 
roads, electricity, water supply, communication, school and hospital buildings. In fact, good 
roads will have the effect of lowering the price of products and therefore increasing household 
consumption. Concerning investment in electrical infrastructure, they guarantee a constant 
power supply to households and industries. A steady power supply would help to reduce 
production costs and prices, but with significant output across sectors of the economy. Finally, 
water infrastructure would improve the supply of potable water, thereby eradicating the health 
risk associated with water consumption from unsafe sources. In short, the provision of 
infrastructure would necessarily create more jobs which, in turn, would translate to economic 
growth and social well-being. 
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2.9. Appendices 
Figure 9: Impulse response functions – public expenditure on education 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Impulse response functions – public expenditure on health 
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Figure 11 Impulse response functions – infrastructure 
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Figure 13: Health 
 
 
Figure 14: Infrastructure 
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Table 6: Variance decomposition analysis using PVAR estimator 
Variation in the row variable explained by column variable (in %, 10 periods ahead) 
Model 1 (Education)     
 GDPpc growth    Net Gini Investment  Education spending 
GDPpc growth    88.35  0.53   10.0  1.12 
Net Gini 0.96     93.46     1.64 3.94 
Investment  0.56    3.70     77.12    18.62 
Education spending 4.87  1.03 2.66    91.44 
Model 2 (Health)     
 GDPpc growth    Net Gini Investment  Health spending 
GDPpc growth    86.26      3.50       5.73     4.51 
Net Gini 4.37       67.76      16.51      11.36 
Investment  0.63      3.42      89.48        6.48 
Health spending 4.37    30.72      41.81     23.09 
Model 3 (Infrastructure)    
 GDPpc growth    Net Gini Investment  Infrastructure 
GDPpc growth    80.13 2.03      16.48   1.36 
Net Gini 10.48 27.07 46.59 15.86 
Investment  0.66 1.55 95.52 2.27 
Infrastructure 10.24 18.18 37.66 33.92 
 
 
Countries 
Côte d'Ivoire Mali 
Ghana Mauritania 
Guinea Niger 
Malawi Senegal  
South Africa Zambia 
 
 
Model selection criteria: Lag-order selection statistics for panel VAR estimated 
Lag CD J J pvalue MBIC MAIC MQIC 
1 .999963 143.0066 .0135994 -421.9531 -72.9934 -214.392 
2 .9999982 73.83436 .4179817 -302.8055 -70.16564 -164.4314 
3 .9999964 33.7613 .5755131 -154.5586 -38.2387 -85.37158 
Based on the three model selection criteria by Andrews and Lu (2001) and the over-all 
coefficient of determination (CD), first-order panel VAR is the preferred model, since this has 
the smallest MBIC, MAIC and MQIC. 
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Panel VAR-Granger causality Wald test 
Ha: Excluded variable Granger-causes Equation variable 
Ho: Excluded variable does not Granger-cause Equation variable 
Equation \ Excluded chi2 df Prob>chi2 
    
GDP pc growth    
Net gini 35.298 1 0.000 
Investment 119.264 1 0.000 
Education 71.680  1 0.000 
Health 25.722 1 0.000 
Infrastructure 97.763 1 0.000 
ALL 155.581  5 0.000 
Net gini    
GDP pc growth 5.033  1 0.025 
Investment 0.024 1 0.878 
Education 9.047  1 0.003 
Health 3.277  1 0.070  
Infrastructure 10.775 1 0.001 
ALL 37.066 5 0.000 
Investment    
GDP pc growth 0.032  1 0.859 
Net gini 9.147  1 0.002 
Education 7.562  1 0.006 
Health 4.132 1 0.042  
Infrastructure 52.138  1 0.000 
ALL 62.141  5 0.000 
Education    
GDP pc growth 25.970 1 0.000 
Net gini 7.700 1 0.006 
Investment 10.012 1 0.002 
Health 17.035 1 0.000 
Infrastructure 28.887 1 0.000 
ALL 99.493 5 0.000 
Health    
GDP pc growth 7.166 1 0.007 
Net gini 5.878 1 0.015 
Investment 0.888 1 0.346 
Education 0.060 1 0.806 
Infrastructure 11.201 1 0.001 
ALL 23.478 5 0.000 
Infrastructure    
GDP pc growth 1.315 1 0.002 
Net gini 117.126 1 0.000 
Investment 0.355 1 0.002 
Education 1.236 1 0.266 
Health 9.571 1 0.002 
ALL 147.425 5 0.000 
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Stability test 
Model 1: with education 
 
 
 
 
 
All the eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle. 
Panel VAR satisfies stability condition. 
 
 
Model 2: with health 
Eigenvalue       
Real Imaginary Modulus 
    
.933654 0 .933654 
.5644591 .158592 .5863151 
.5644591 -.158592 .5863151 
.1943048 0 .1943048 
All the eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle. 
Panel VAR satisfies stability condition. 
 
 
 
Model 3: with infrastructure 
Eigenvalue         
Real Imaginary Modulus 
    
.8378146 .4656283 .9585109 
.8378146 -.4656283 .9585109 
.9381855 0 .9381855 
.2383254 0 .2383254 
All the eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle. 
Panel VAR satisfies stability condition. 
  
Eigenvalue         
Real Imaginary Modulus 
    
.8695113 0 .8695113 
.7425849 0 .7425849 
.5494624 0 .5494624 
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PART 2: FISCAL ADJUSTMENT, FISCAL FORECAST AND INCLUSIVE 
DEVELOPMENT 
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CHAPTER 3: DOES FISCAL ADJUSTMENT AFFECT THE INCLUSIVENESS 
OF ECONOMIC GROWTH IN CÔTE D’IVOIRE? 
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Abstract 
This chapter examines the inclusiveness effects of fiscal consolidation in Côte d’Ivoire, using 
Bayesian Model Averaging method. Using a tighter fiscal stance, measured by changes in the 
cyclically-adjusted primary balance (CAPB), over the period 1980-2014, The results show that 
fiscal consolidations are followed by an improved in growth performance, but also income gap 
decreases after periods of fiscal adjustments in Côte d’Ivoire. In other words, there is no trade-
off between growth and income inequality when implementing fiscal consolidations in Côte 
d’Ivoire. This conclusion contrasts the results of several papers that analyze the impact of fiscal 
consolidations on inequality at the national level. The findings also suggest that tax-based fiscal 
consolidations seem to increase economic growth. However, the results did not find evidence 
to the expansionary effect of spending-based fiscal adjustment. These results could be explained 
by the fact that in developing countries, tax based-adjustment are generally a base-broadening 
measures. Therefore, this will contribute to strong tax revenue collections and play an important 
role in achieving higher, sustainable economic growth. Moreover, we find that tax revenue 
increases in Côte d’Ivoire is not associated with increases in inequality. Interestingly, when 
fiscal consolidation is achieved via revenue side, income inequality seems to be reduced further. 
In addition, reductions in primary expenditures do not seem to reduce the income gap. 
 
Keywords: Fiscal consolidation, income inequality, growth, inclusive growth, Bayesian Model 
Averaging (BMA), incidence curve. 
JEL Classification Numbers: E62, D31, O47, I31, C11, H22 
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3.1. Introduction 
The redistributive consequences of economic adjustment following the great recession of 
2007/09 have been at the center of policy discussions in advanced and emerging economies as 
well as in developing countries. Social unrest has begun to be felt, even in those economies that 
have achieved positive results in terms of sustained growth and the reduction of poverty and 
inequality. In this context, there has been increased policy interest in the macroeconomic effects 
of inclusive growth and, in particular, the link between inequality and fiscal policy. While the 
empirical literature on the microeconomic determinants of inequality and growth is vast, 
especially in Côte d'Ivoire, much less attention has been paid to the underlying macroeconomic 
setting. This chapter attempts to bridge this gap by using fiscal data at the state level for Côte 
d'Ivoire to assess the links between national fiscal policy and inclusive growth. The developing 
countries experiences have shown that the simple expansion of output in the form of increase 
in gross domestic product (GDP) is not a sufficient condition for economic development, 
reduction of poverty and inequality. The trickle-down theorist’s development (Kuznets, 1955) 
thinks that the reduction of inequality and poverty arises from the growth process. But for those 
of pro-poor growth, growth is not a sufficient condition, and therefore it is necessary to 
distinguish a “growth effect” and “inequality effect”10 (Bourguignon, 2003; Dollar & Kraay, 
2002; Ravallion & Chen, 2003). In order that increase in GDP leads economic development, it 
should be accompanied by institutional and attitudinal changes. Therefore, there is a lot of work 
to be done to make economic development more significant in Africa especially in Côte 
d’Ivoire. The French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs (IRIS), throught its 
Observatory of Humanitarian Prospective report in 201511 shows that in Côte d’Ivoire there is 
                                                          
10 According to pro-poor growth theory, the reduction of poverty goes through a "growth effect" (which measures 
the impact of an improvement in average income in the absence of changes in its distribution) and "inequality 
effect "(resulting from a change in the distribution of income in the absence of any change in the average income). 
11 Observatoire de la Prospective Humanitaire : Analyse prospective Côte d’Ivoire 2020 Une période décisive. 
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a consensus on the fact that economic growth has failed to be inclusive, that is, reduce in poverty 
and inequality. This result is valid for the pre or post-crisis period. Thus, the poverty rate 
(proportion of people below the accepted threshold of human development) in Côte d’Ivoire 
reached 48.9 % in 2008, putting the country at the 171 nd rank of 187 countries. The poverty 
rate was already high during the decade 1990: 32.3% in 1993 and 36.8% in 1995. But also, 
poverty has sharply worsened in the post-crisis period. Poverty has sharply worsened before 
the post-crisis period to nearly in 2015 almost 46.3% of which 56.8 are in rural areas against 
35.9% in urban areas. Noting the magnitude of the problem, the need to make growth inclusive 
in both social and economic dimensions should become the major concern of government. 
Growth is usually considered inclusive if its benefits are widely shared across the population. 
Although there is no commonly accepted definition, inclusive growth usually refers to the goal 
of fostering high growth. It provides productive employment and equal opportunities. Thereby, 
all segments of society can share in the growth and employment. In other word, it aims towards 
productive employment generation and fruits of growth are equitably distributed among the less 
privileged segment of the society. Inclusive growth then redress inequalities in outcomes, 
especially those experienced by the poor (IMF, 2013). For analytical goals, growth is usually 
considered inclusive if it is sustained over time, and broad based across sector; creates 
productive employment opportunities and includes a large part of a country’s labor force. 
Additional dimensions of inclusive growth include gender, regional diversification, and 
empowerment of the poor, including through inclusive institutions. We focus in the chapter 
only on the distributional characteristics of growth. Therefore, in this work growth is considered 
inclusive if it helps improve equity.  
The perception of inclusive growth gained significant importance due increasing poverty and 
income inequality. Policies for inclusive growth are important components of most government 
reform agenda for sustainable growth. For instance, a country that register rapid growth over a 
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decade, but has not seen substantial reduction in poverty and inequality may need to refocus 
specifically on the inclusiveness of its growth strategy. This strategy should include the equality 
of opportunity for individuals and firms. In addition to poverty and inequality, social indicators 
including health and education have also acquired incomparable interest in the literature of 
inclusive growth. According to Ravallion (1995) and Pritchett and Summers (1996), there exists 
positive relationship between health services and economic growth. Whereas, Barro & Lee 
(1997) highlighted positive effect of education on economic growth. Especially, education and 
health endowments of individuals are important components of human capital that enhance 
productivity, social mobility and improves social participation in decision making and raise the 
standard of living or reduce poverty.  
Sometimes growth theory can support the choice of specific variables, but the inclusion or 
exclusion of most variables is generally arbitrary, a phenomenon termed the "open-mindedness" 
of growth theory (Brock and Durlauf, 2001). Moreover, while theory can provide general 
qualitative variables (such as human capital), it does not tell us how these variables should be 
specified or measured. So, we are confronted with (at least) two types of uncertainty, which 
leads to uncertainty in the model. Since there is a wide range of possible model specifications, 
we often find contradictory conclusions. To make matters worse, the results of the estimate are 
often not robust to small changes in the specification of the model, making credible 
interpretations of the results dangerous. Appropriate treatment of the uncertainty of the model 
is clearly important. Such a treatment is the model averaging, where the goal of the investigator 
is not to find the best possible model but rather to find the best possible estimates. Each model 
contributes to the information on the parameters of interest and all this information is combined 
taking into account the confidence we have in each model, based on our prior beliefs and data 
(Magnus et al. , 2010). In order to combine the selection of the model and the estimation, the 
Bayesian method offers a natural framework. 
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This chapter defines a BMA approach to assess the effect of fiscal adjustment on the inclusive 
growth in Côte d'Ivoire over the period 1980-2014. The chapter also contributes to basic 
knowledge of the structural determinants of inclusive growth by analyzing an expanded set of 
determinants of inclusive growth, namely factors related to economic, social, and institutional 
influence. The further contents of the chapter can therefore be summarized as follows. Section 
2 examines the literature review, section 3 presents the historical and regional perspectives of 
growth and poverty in Côte d’Ivoire, while section 4 exposes some stylized facts. Section 5 
discusses the method, sources of data and measurement of variables while section 6 discusses 
the empirical estimates of the effects of fiscal adjustment on inclusive growth in Côte d’Ivoire. 
Section 7 Conclude and presents policy recommendation. 
3.2. Growth, inequality and fiscal Consolidation: Relation to the literature 
There is a relatively large number of studies on the potential impact of fiscal consolidation on 
economy. Guajardo et al. (2014) investigates the short term effects of fiscal consolidation on 
economic activity in OECD countries, using the narrative approach of Ramey and Shapiro, 
1998) and Ramey (2011). The finding suggest that fiscal consolidation has contractionary 
effects on private domestic demand and GDP. Thereby, a 1 percent of fiscal consolidation leads 
to real GDP declines by 0.62 percent and reduces real private consumption by 0.75 percent. 
Yang, et al. (2015) focus also on the short-term effects of fiscal adjustment on economic activity 
in 20 OECD countries from 1970 to 2009. They compare two approaches: the traditional 
approach based on changes in cyclically adjusted primary balance (CAPB) and the narrative 
approach based on historical records. Their finding highlights that fiscal adjustments always 
have contractionary effects on economic activity in the short term: a 1% increase in fiscal 
consolidation leads to a fall of 0.3% in output. Moreover, it follows that spending-based fiscal 
adjustments lead to smaller output losses than tax-based fiscal adjustment. 
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McDermott and Wescott (1996) argue that the success of debt ratio reduction depends on the 
size and composition of fiscal adjustment. They show that fiscal adjustments based on spending 
cuts are more likely to succeed than taxes. In addition, the larger the size of fiscal adjustment, 
the more likely it is to succeed. On the other hand, they show that fiscal adjustments are more 
likely to fail during a global recession. Alesina et al. (2015) support previous conclusions, 
noting that tax adjustments produce deeper and longer recessions than those based on 
expenditures. Pappa et al. (2015) study the impacts of fiscal consolidation in an environment of 
corruption and tax evasion and find that fiscal consolidation leads to significant losses in output 
and welfare and that much of the welfare loss is due to increases in taxes that create the 
incentives to produce in the less productive shadow sector. 
Afonso et al. (2006) assess fiscal consolidations in Central and Eastern European countries and 
suggest that expenditure-based adjustments have been more successful. Giudice et al. (2007) 
conclude that fiscal consolidation is more likely to foster economic growth during periods of 
below potential output and when fiscal adjustment is based on spending cuts. (Romei, 2015) 
studies the issue of the optimal speed and composition of a fiscal consolidation, evaluating the 
impact of different speeds of adjustment and of variations in several fiscal instruments on 
aggregate welfare. The main finding of this work is that a fiscal consolidation should be done 
quickly and by cutting public expenditure. 
It should be noted that most of the existing studies on the economic effects of fiscal 
consolidation have focused on the effects of fiscal adjustments on economic growth; the 
distributive effects of austerity have benefited relatively less from research efforts. Almost of 
the studies on the redistributive effect of fiscal consolidation are conducted on a sample of 
OCDE countries or a set of advanced countries. Mulas-Granados (2005) studies the short-term 
economic impact of alternative fiscal adjustment strategies, with an especial focus on their 
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effect on economic growth and income distribution. Using a sample of 53 adjustment episodes 
occurred in the fifteen EU Member States over the period 1960-2000, the result presents very 
strong empirical evidence pointing to the existence of a trade-off between growth and equality, 
mediated by fiscal consolidations. More specifically, while expenditure-based adjustments are 
more effective in terms of subsequent economic growth than revenue-based adjustments, they 
do so at the expense of increasing income inequality. Therefore, according to author, inequality 
during fiscal adjustment rises especially when the latter is based on a retrenchment of spending, 
and even more so in the case of cuts in social spending. Tax-based consolidations that rely more 
on indirect taxes overall tend to worsen inequality, while this is not the case when indirect tax 
increases are combined with offsetting measures, such as direct measures targeted at poor 
households.  
Agnello (2012) study the effects of fiscal consolidation on income distribution in a sample of 
18 OECD countries over the period 1970-2010. Their results support an equalizing effect of 
austerity measures. They find that "successful" fiscal adjustments tend to be strongly beneficial 
at achieving a more equal income distribution. In fact, the net income Gini index falls in 
statistically significant manner by when the fiscal consolidation succeeded in bringing public 
debt back to a lower level. Rawdanowicz et al. (2013) point out that fiscal consolidations could 
increase income inequality through multiple channels. An important channel could be an 
increase in unemployment that widens disparities in market incomes; Moreover, reductions in 
social transfers can affect households in the lower parts of the income distribution, and a decline 
in public programs benefiting the poor might also increase inequality in disposable income. 
Azevedo et al. (2014) assess the links between sub-national fiscal policy and income inequality 
in Brazil over the period 1995-2011, using state-level fiscal data with household survey data. 
The results indicate that a tighter fiscal stance at the sub-national level is not associated with a 
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deterioration in inequality measures. In addition, the results suggest that revenue increases in 
Brazilian states were not associated with increases in inequality. Moreover, reductions in 
primary expenditures do not seem to have had deleterious impacts on inequality measures. This 
finding contrasts with the conclusions of several papers in the burgeoning literature on the 
effects of fiscal consolidation on inequality using national data for OECD economies. 
3.3. Côte d’Ivoire’s growth and poverty from historical and regional 
perspectives 
Côte d’Ivoire, from the early 1960s focuses its development policy on the expansion of 
commodity exports and the import substitution based on a few industries. Strong growth is 
recorded and the structural changes taking place without proper internal and external 
imbalances. The average growth rate is still high (over 8%) during the first fifteen years of 
independence of the country (1960-1975). This period is qualified as “Ivorian miracle”. 
However, corruption related to the implementation of projects financed by the European Union 
and the debt payment arrears incurred in international institutions, leading, in 1998, they break-
up their partnership with Côte d'Ivoire. The negative impact of this situation on economy is 
exacerbated by the military coup of December 1999 and the political instability that results. In 
September 2002, the armed conflict has led to the discontinuance of several development 
projects and the decline in activity in the various economics sectors. During this crisis, 
economic activity fell by an average of -1% over the period 2000-2004. The recovery that 
started in 2004, with a 1.5% growth rate, allowed the real GDP to progress an average of 1.9% 
between 2005 and 2009. In 2009, despite the international financial crisis, the real GDP growth 
rate reached 3.8%, against 2.3% in 2008. Due to the post-election crisis, the growth rate for 
2010 was 2.4% instead of 3% initially projected to drop to -4.7% in 2011 and rise to 9.8% in 
2012. In total over the period 2000-2009 real GDP per capita declined by 1.2% in annual 
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average highlighting the decline of -0.2% previously observed over the period 1990-1999. To 
address poverty, Côte d’Ivoire has launched the implementation of its Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper (PRSP) for the period 2009-2013. The PRSP establishment should also help to 
achieve the Millennium Development Goals. However, the situation in post-election crisis that 
just experienced Côte d’Ivoire has affected these efforts, pushing down real GDP by 4.7% in 
2011. The recovery has proved stronger in 2012 with a rate of 10.7%.  
Macroeconomic indicators confirm the spectacular recovery in Côte d'Ivoire, which is being 
carried out along the trajectory desired by the government from the National Development Plan 
2012-2015. Growth is projected to increase by 9.3% from 2012 to 2014, with an expected 9.8% 
increase in 2016 due to strong public and private investment and very wise inflation. Cote 
d'Ivoire in peace benefits fully from its position as a regional hub and generates a trade surplus 
thanks to fairly diversified agricultural exports (cocoa, coffee, cashew nuts, hevea ...). Faced 
with this revival, the country did not remain without initiative. Reforms in public finance and 
tax administration, as well as greater fiscal discipline, including deficits, have led to a credible 
debt reduction as a percentage of GDP. Governmental voluntarism has manifested itself on all 
fronts. In food-producing agriculture, where rice production has increased by almost half 
compared to 2012. In mines, where gold has almost doubled in the same period. While drawing 
up this list, analysts point out that it does not greatly improve the daily lives of households and 
businesses. Microeconomics is still suffering. Poverty hardly decreases, and subsidy cuts have 
boosted electricity prices, leading social unrest in all countries. In fact, although effort made by 
government to improve public infrastructure, the quantitative and qualitative deficit in basic 
social infrastructure (education, health, housing, energy) does not allow the poor to improve 
the quality of their human capital. They are harmed from the start and have difficulty 
subsequently improving their standard of living. This situation keeps the Ivorian’s in the vicious 
circle of poverty. The economic growth in Côte d'Ivoire is also encouraged by the gross 
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exploitation of raw materials, which has little impact on employment due to the low processing 
of products from the primary sector. As evidence, according to UN Comtrade statistics, 
manufactures account for less than 10% of Côte d'Ivoire's total exports. As a result, raw 
materials are exported unprocessed, so the local population does not feel the benefits in terms 
of employment. Moreover, the lack of integration of the Ivorian economy leads to the weakness 
of intermediate trade between the different sectors. This lack of complementarity or integration 
does not favor the creation of indirect jobs in other sectors. For example, low trade and 
interactions between agriculture and industry imply that an agricultural enterprise will have 
little impact on an industrial enterprise. This limits opportunities for wealth creation and jobs. 
There can be no poverty reduction without wealth creation and jobs. Moreover, Ivorian taxation 
remains too complex and credit is still scarce, especially for Small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs). As a result, wage employment, up by 25% in four years, does not appear 
to exceed the 10% share of the total labor market, with the vast majority of positions remaining 
in the informal sector without pension or social protection. 
Corruption and poor governance are also the major source of poverty in Cote d'Ivoire because 
they promote unequal allocation of resources. The poor are far removed from the spheres of 
decision making, making it easier to divert resources intended for them. Poor targeting of the 
poor enables the rich to benefit more from social transfer policies such as subsidies, subsidies, 
etc. This prevents channeling the fruits of growth to the most deprived. Racket contributes to 
the burden of the most deprived. For example, rackets set up by the syndicates in the public 
transport sector lead to an increase in the price of public transport. Corruption, racketeering, 
bad governance contributes to the rising cost of living. 
In Côte d'Ivoire, Income share held by richest 10% in 2008, was 32.8% of total revenue against 
30.4% for the 60% poorest. As shown the Table 1, only the share of the richest 10% decreased 
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compared to their situation in 2002. Overall, the household income declined between 2002 and 
2008 and this decline is even more important the household income is high. This can be 
explained by the departure of many of the wealthy outside the country at the height of the crisis, 
the relocation of some large companies and seats of institutions like the African Development 
Bank (ADB). In addition, several companies have stopped their activities consecutively to the 
slowness of the business environment observed following the events of March and November 
2004. 
In 2015, on the basis of the human development indicator (HDI), this giant of the West Africa 
Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) ranked 172 out of 188. furthermore, the Human 
Poverty Index (HDI) which takes into account the deficit registered in three main fields of 
human existence (life expectancy, level of education, living condition), states that a ratio of 
46.2% of the Ivorian population is affected by the different forms of poverty. This inventory of 
fixtures reveals a lot about the difficult socioeconomic situation in which Cote d’Ivoire is since 
the last decades. The country recorded a slight improvement on the poverty reduction side and 
the achievement of some MDGs. However, efforts are still needed. The poverty rate decreased 
from 48.9% in 2008 to 46.3% in 2015. Poverty in Côte d’Ivoire remains fundamentally a rural 
challenge, with almost 56.8% of the rural population living under the poverty line, against 
35.9% living in urban areas in 2015. The political crisis seriously aggravated an already 
precarious humanitarian situation. 
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Figure 1: Evolution of GDP and GDP Per Capita growth rate in Côte d’Ivoire  
 
Source: Author, from World Development Indicators, World Bank. 
 
Figure 2 shows the progression of poverty headcount rate depending on the availability of data 
in Côte d’Ivoire between 1985 and 2008. We are witnessing a growing poverty rate overs year. 
In 2008, more than 29.02 percentage of the population in Côte d’Ivoire were living on less than 
$1.90 a day at 2011 international prices. The percentage of people living below the poverty line, 
that is, $ 1.90 was less than 10% before the year 1988. With population growth, poverty has 
experienced an upward trend reaching about 19% in 1995 before rising to 26% in 1998. The 
poverty level remained consistently high until 2008 with a rate of 29% due to successive socio-
political and military crises. 
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Figure 2. Percent of population below the poverty line in Côte d’Ivoire 
  
Source: Author, from World Development Indicators, World Bank. 
 
3.4. Growth, inequality and poverty: stylized fact 
3.4.1. Structure of income per decile at national level 
The analysis of the income structure at the national level aims to assess the evolution of 
inequalities in 2015 compared to the 2002 and 2008 surveys, as well as the distribution of total 
consumption per decile (Table 1). The 2002 living standard survey (ENV) revealed worsening 
inequality between 1998 and 2002. On the other hand, the results show a less unequal 
distribution of income in 2015 than in 2002 and 2008. Indeed, the share of the poorest 10% in 
total consumption is 2.7% in 2015 against 1.7% in 2002 and 2.2% in 2008; that of the richest 
10% is 28.9% in 2015 against 40.0% and 32.8% respectively in 2002 and 2008. Moreover, by 
2015, the richest 10% spend on average 10.7 times more than the poorest 10%. This ratio was 
23.5 in 2002 and 14.9 in 2008, which means that the income gap between the deciles is showing 
a downward trend and confirms an attempt to gradually reduce the inequalities since 2002. In 
addition, the general level of per capita consumption had declined between 2002 and 2008, 
improved in 2015. This average consumption increased from 461 243 FCFA in 2002 to FCFA 
342,730 and FCFA 386,215 in 2015. In other word, this correspond to a decrease of 25.7% at 
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national level between 2002 and 2008 and an increase of 12.7% between 2008 and 2015. This 
increase is observed in all deciles. Therefore, this increase seems to indicate the idea that the 
reduction of inequalities is accompanied by an increase in household incomes. 
Table 1: Per Capita Household Expenditure by decile 
Decile Per capita average expenditure in CFA Share in total consumption, in percentage 
 2002 2008 2015 2002 2008 2015 
1 77,947 74,428 87,708 1.7 2.2 2.7 
2 128,529 121,528 145,779 2.8 3.6 4.5 
3 168,076 156,155 187,017 3.6 4.6 5.5 
4 208,376 189,178 224,543 4.5 5.5 6.2 
5 255,048 226,375 263,711 5.5 6.6 7.4 
6 313,430 270,346 313,514 6.8 7.9 8.8 
7 389,117 327,177 377,575 8.4 9.5 9.4 
8 506,684 401,495 460,678 11 11.7 11.6 
9 719,341 537,785 605,161 15.6 15.7 15 
10 1,846,614 1,123,646 1,197,906 40 32.8 28.9 
       
whole 461,243 342,730 386,215 100 100 100 
Source INS - Côte d’Ivoire, ENV 2015, P51 
 
3.4.2. Growth Incidence Curves (GIC) 
Growth incidence curves are increasingly used to describe the distributional effects of growth. 
It is a useful tool to examine the interaction between growth, poverty and inequality. 
Specifically, growth incidence curves measure how consumption growth differed across groups 
compared to the average and the mean consumption growth. In plotting growth incidence 
curves, the vertical axis reports the growth rate of consumption expenditure, and the horizontal 
axis reports consumption expenditure percentiles (Foster et al., 2013). The part of the curve 
above zero points at the deciles that benefit from growth, and the part below zero points at the 
deciles that lost because of growth. The part of the curve that is above its own mean points at 
the deciles of the population that benefit from growth relatively more than an average 
household. The part of the curve below the mean, but still above zero, points at the deciles that 
also benefit from growth but less than an average household. A negatively sloping growth 
incidence curve suggests that income or spending of the poorer deciles of the population grows 
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faster than income or spending of the richer deciles. Because in this case the poorer groups of 
the population are catching up with the richer, a negatively sloping growth incidence curve can 
be viewed as one of the indications of inclusiveness of growth.  
We use household consumption expenditure per capita as the welfare measure to graph the 
growth incidence curves for the period 2002-2015 (Figure 3). Several reasons explain our 
choice of household expenditure as measure of welfare relative to their income. First, income 
tends to be more volatile than consumption and certain types of income (such as income from 
self-employment) tend to be under-reported in surveys. Second, it is common for consumption 
to be more evenly distributed among households than income because wealthier households 
tend to save a larger part of their income, which could bias estimates of inequality downward. 
The great interest of a GIC is that it makes it possible to evaluate the appropriateness of changes 
in a given indicator of well-being according to different normative approaches. The growth in 
the average value of an indicator will indicate the direction and magnitude of the change in 
social well-being (assuming other indicators remain constant) only if a utilitarian approach is 
used (in which the utility of losses or gains for all individuals are weighted equally). Also, under 
some quite specific assumptions about the relationship between the observed indicator and 
unobserved well-being. On the other hand, a GIC can indicate the direction and extent of social 
welfare if a broader welfarist approach is used, in which case the change in social welfare is 
deducted from a weighted average of Growth at each quantile of the indicator. It can also show 
the direction and greatness or size when a Rawlsian approach is used, in which case the variation 
in social welfare is deduced from the quantity of growth at the lowest quantile.  
A GIC can also be used to calculate the average growth rate of the poor, which is the definition 
of pro-poor growth from the "absolute" point of view proposed by Ravallion and Chen (2003). 
A policymakers or donor wanting to alleviate or eradicate poverty could legitimately view this 
 139 
 
definition of pro-poor growth as the ultimate standard by which policy interventions should be 
judged. It is possible to obtain the GIC by a simple plot of growth between two years at each 
quantile.  
Figure 3: Growth Incidence Curves for per Capita Household Expenditures between 2002 and 
2008; and between 2008 and 2015 
 Chart 1 Chart 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Authors’ estimates using data from INS - Côte d’Ivoire, ENV 2015 Surveys. 
 
As depicted Chart 1 and 2 in Figure 3, in Côte d’Ivoire growth in expenditure per capita in real 
terms of the households at the bottom of the income distribution was significantly higher than 
those at the top between the period 2002 and 2015. When regarding Chart 1 of the growth 
incidence curve 2002/2008, except the top 10 deciles, all groups of households experienced 
growth well. However, only the poorest deciles (that is 1 to 5 deciles) registered growth above 
the mean growth rates and median. Furthermore, when comparing the 2008 survey with the 
2015 survey (Chart 2), over this later period poorer groups have experienced higher growth in 
expenditures while richer groups displayed a decrease. Overall, over the two sub-periods 2002-
2008 and 2008-2015, the growth incidence curves slope is negative, that is downward-sloping. 
It shows that in Côte d’Ivoire, the distribution of income seems to become more and more equal 
between the different income groups. 
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3.5. Data and Methodological Approach 
3.5.1. Data 
The dependent variables used in the regressions are: (i) The Gini coefficient for disposable 
income taken from the SWIID database. (ii) Real GDP per capita growth rate as measure of 
economic growth, in line with previous literature. 
Definition of fiscal adjustments 
In order to measure the impact of fiscal adjustments we use the cyclically adjusted primary 
balance (CAPB) as the measure of the government’s fiscal stance. The interest of this fiscal 
measure is that it isolates discretionary policy action from effects resulting from economic 
activity such as inflation or real interest rate changes. Especially, we use primary fiscal variables 
that exclude interest payments because the fluctuations in interest payments cannot be 
considered discretionary. To make the cyclical correction, we follow the method proposed by 
Alesina and Ardagna (2010) and Yang et al. (2015). According to authors, such fiscal variable 
is simpler and more transparent than more complicated official measures such as those of the 
OECD and the IMF that use estimates of potential output and fiscal multipliers. The underlying 
principle of this method, as mentioned Yang et al. (2015), is that since public expenditure is 
negatively dependent on GDP as a result of unemployment benefits, and because revenue 
responds positively to GDP as a result of tax revenues, changes in cyclically-adjusted fiscal 
variables can be calculated from the difference between the predicted current-year value (which 
would prevail if unemployment had not changed since the previous year) and the actual value 
of the previous year.  
Although CAPB is used to measure fiscal consolidations in several studies, however, this is not 
a perfect measure and can lead to biased results (Romer and Romer, 2010). CAPB may consider 
non-policy factors that are correlated with exogenous variables affecting inequality or growth. 
 141 
 
For example, a boom in the stock market leads to higher incomes and therefore higher tax 
revenues. This translates into an improvement in CAPB, although not being in response to fiscal 
adjustments. In addition, this will likely affect other variables, such as higher consumption and 
investment. Therefore, the correlation between an increase in CAPB and the error term is likely 
to be positive. This can lead to an upward biased estimate (IMF, 2011). CAPB may also suffer 
from measurement error if it omits periods in which fiscal adjustments have been accompanied 
by countervailing negative shocks. 
The CAPB, however, can also be affected crucially by the commodity price volatility. Tax 
receipts in developing countries increase with rising prices for imported or exported products 
(Ehrhart and Guerineau, 2013). For imported products, this increase in tax revenues is due to 
the fact that more tariffs being collected but, because of the numerous tax exemptions granted 
in times of high prices, the positive impact on tax revenues may not always occur. For large 
commodity-exporting economies, the increases in tax revenues due to soaring export prices 
come from an increase in profit tax and non-tax revenues, such as dividends or royalties levied 
on companies, which produce primary products. Then, commodity price instability, both for 
imported and exported products has an adverse effect on fiscal balance in developing countries.  
Therefore, contrary to Yang et al. (2015) that use a share price index as an additional variable 
determining the CAPB, we use the international price of cocoa. In fact, cocoa accounts for 15% 
of Côte d'Ivoire's GDP and more than 50% of its export earnings. When considering cocoa price 
as a business cycle factor, it would be ideal to include other types of commodity prices such as 
oil price and coffee price. But we use only the price of cocoa as a business cycle factor due to 
its particular relevance to tax revenues, and we believe this index is representative of the other 
commodity price movement. 
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Our measure of the changes in the CAPB is constructed following Yang el al. (2015). First, to 
get the cyclically adjusted spending as a ratio to GDP, we regress primary spending on a time 
trend and the unemployment rate (𝑈𝑡) for the country: 
             𝐷𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝛾2𝑈𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡                                                            (1) 
Then, with the estimated coefficients (𝛾1, 𝛾2) and the preceding-year unemployment rate 
(𝑈𝑡−1), we calculate the value of primary spending adjusted for changes in unemployment: 
             𝐷𝑡
∗(𝑈𝑡−1) = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝛾2𝑈𝑡−1                                                    (2) 
The changes in discretionary spending are calculated as: 𝐷𝑡
∗(𝑈𝑡−1) − 𝐷𝑡−1. A similar 
procedure is applied to compute the cyclically adjusted revenues. However, in this step, the 
cocoa price index is added to the regression. 
             𝑅𝑡 = 𝜑0 + 𝜑1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝜑2𝑈𝑡 + 𝜑3𝐶𝑜𝑐𝑜𝑎_𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡                            (3) 
𝑅𝑡
∗ (𝑈𝑡−1, 𝐶𝑜𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡−1) = ?̂?0 + ?̂?1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + ?̂?2𝑈𝑡−1 + ?̂?3𝐶𝑜𝑐𝑜𝑎_𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡−1   (4) 
Finally, the changes in discretionary fiscal policy are obtained as follows 
             ∆𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐵 = [𝑅𝑡
∗ − 𝑅𝑡−1] − [𝐷𝑡
∗ − 𝐷𝑡−1]                                                   (5) 
The literature identifies fiscal adjustment episodes as important and sustained changes in 
CAPB. The size and persistence criteria differ considerably from one study to the next. For 
instance, Alesina and Ardagna (2010) consider a period of fiscal consolidation when the change 
in CAPB is at least 1.5% p of GDP in 1 year. While for Giavazzi and Pagano (1996), the 
cumulative change is at least 5, 4, 3% p of GDP in respectively 4, 3, or 2 consecutive years, or 
3% p in 1 year. Another example is the criteria defined by Alesina and Ardagna (2013) that 
deem the period of fiscal adjustment correspond at the time that the cumulative change in CABP 
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is at least 2% p of GDP in 2 consecutive years and at least 3% p of GDP in 3 or more years with 
the improvement of each year. 
The fiscal adjustment episodes considered in our study can be defined as follows: 
A period of fiscal adjustment is a year in which the cyclically adjusted primary balance (CAPB) 
improves by at least 1 per cent of GDP. 
This allows us to ignore all periods where the change in CAPB is likely to be due to exogenous 
changes in other variables instead of policy changes. We do not aim to distinguish between 
discretionary and non-discretionary policies, and assume firms and households react to both in 
a similar way. 
A tax-based fiscal adjustment is a period where CAPB improves by 1% or more and government 
revenues as % of GDP increase by 0.5% or more. 
A spending-based fiscal adjustment is a period where CAPB improves by 1% or more and 
government spending as % of GDP decreases by 0.5% or more. 
Other variables are included in the baseline specifications. The institutional quality data are 
from ICRG. Fiscal Variables for the calculation of CAPB are from BCEAO online database. 
All other data are obtained from World Bank database. Each variables of model have been 
presented briefly in Table (2). In advance we concisely explain about some variables of this 
model. 
It has been argued that inflation generally worsens poverty and income inequality. First, 
inflation can reduce real income. Second, worker’s real income will decline if their nominal 
wages increase less than the price of goods that they consume. Inflation lowers the overall 
purchasing power of households and tends to raise poverty (Agénor, 2005). Romer and Romer 
(1998) studied the incomes of the poor and show that in the short run, higher inflation when 
 144 
 
following economic growth can sustain the incomes of the poor. However, in the long term, 
taking into account the economic uncertainty, it can harm both incomes and the incomes of the 
poor. Using large sample of household survey, Easterly and Fischer (2001) found that the poor 
were more likely than the rich to mention inflation as a problem, and that inflation compromise 
the welfare of poor more than it does that of the rich. In the same line, Ferreira and Litchfield 
(2001) found in the case of Brazil that higher inflation leads to a lower share of income held by 
the poorest income group. 
The population growth is expected worsen inclusive growth as faster growing societies 
experience faster growing demand for public services. This increases difficulty of governments 
to provide those services. Therefore, high population growth puts a considerable break on per 
capita growth prospects. It also contributes significantly to low achievement in poverty 
reduction and is associated with households moving into poverty. 
The quality of institutions is very important. For example, the good socioeconomic conditions 
that is an assessment of the socioeconomic pressures at work in society that could constrain 
government action can contribute to better redistribution in income. By against, the weakness 
in institutional quality such as corruption is clearly a very serious problem that is detrimental 
to inclusive growth. Corruption robs the poor most of all and deprives people of access to 
service and of the opportunity to earn living. In some countries, it is a major obstacle to 
economic growth. 
Another important variable that can affect the inclusiveness of growth are, public investment, 
trade open and inflation. We use dummy variable in the model in order to consider the effect of 
war in Côte d’Ivoire (2002-2007; 2010-2011) on inclusive growth. We consider the period from 
2002 to 2007 as a period of crisis since the actual stability of the socio-economic situation 
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performed with the signing of the Ouagadougou political agreement of March 2007. This 
dummy variable adopts one for war years and zero for other years. 
Descriptive statistic of variables 
The Table below provides a summary of the descriptive statistics analysis of the variables in 
our model. 
Table 2: Descriptive statistic 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Net Gini 24 42.1644 3.622694 37.4207 46.99839 
GDP pc growth 35 -1.354963 4.315795 -14.76217 8.091487 
ΔCAPB 33 .2727273 .452267 0 1 
Inflation 34 4.935162 5.139015 -.8058797 26.08157 
Public investment 34 12.42278 4.14792 8.253466 24.36938 
Population growth 34 2.956777 .8426052 1.762252 4.366627 
Trade open 34 76.45967 11.50552 55.34852 95.06973 
Corruption 30 2.647222 .8013797 1.5 4 
External conflic 30 9.576389 .8953961 8.083333 12 
Military in politics 30 3.031944 1.68736 .1666667 5 
Crisis (dummy) 35 .2285714 .426043 0 1 
Source: Author, using data from BCEAO, WDI, ICRG 
 
Generally, one can note that standard deviations are low meaning that the variances are minimal 
between the variable values. 
3.5.2. Methodology of estimation: Bayesian model averaging (BMA) 
A standard representation of the economic growth regression is: 
                   𝑌 = 𝜃𝑋 + 𝜀                                          (6) 
Where Y represents the vector of growth rates and X is a set of growth determinants. In the 
literature, there exist potentially several empirical growth models, each given by a different 
combination of explanatory variables and each with some probability of being the “true” model. 
In other words, Bayesian methods frame the problem of identifying the determinants of 
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economic growth in terms of uncertainty about the true sets of explanatory variables (model 
uncertainty). This is the starting point of the BMA methodology. The Bayesian model averaging 
(BMA) use in this study was introduced by Magnus et al. (2010) to fit a classical linear 
regression model with uncertainty about the choice of explanatory variables. The Bayesian 
approach to model uncertainty is to first attach prior probabilities to alternative sets of 
explanatory variables and then update these probabilities using data. The statistical framework 
is a classical linear regression model with two subsets of explanatory variables. The focus 
regressors contain explanatory variables that we want in the model because of theoretical 
reasons or other considerations about the phenomenon under investigation. The auxiliary 
regressors contain additional explanatory variables of which we are less certain. In fact, the 
problem of model uncertainty arises because different subsets of auxiliary regressors could be 
excluded from the model to improve, in the mean squared error sense, the unrestricted ordinary 
least-squares estimator of the focus parameters. When there are k2 auxiliary regressors, the 
number of possible models to be considered is = 2𝑘2.  BMA runs many regressions with 
different subsets of the explanatory variables on the right-hand side and then constructs a 
weighted average over these regressions. Detailed discussions of application of BMA in 
economics can be found, for instance, in Fernández et al. (2001), Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004), 
and Moral-Benito (2012). For more detail, see Feldkircher and Zeugner (2009). In our study, 
we only give intuition for the technical terms needed for the evaluation of the results. The 
weights used in the BMA estimation are called posterior model probabilities and capture how 
well individual regressions fit the data – thus the weights are analogous to adjusted R-squares 
or information criteria used in frequentist econometrics. For each variable, the sum of the 
posterior probabilities of models in which the variable is included indicates the so-called 
posterior inclusion probability (i.e. the posterior probability that a variable is included in the 
model), which is analogous to statistical significance. If the posterior inclusion probability of a 
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variable is close to one, almost all models that are effective in explaining the variance in the 
reported “Inclusive growth” include that variable. BMA provides for each variable the posterior 
coefficient distribution. The posterior coefficient distribution gives us the posterior mean 
(analogous to the estimated coefficients), t-ratios, and two standard error bands. An auxiliary 
regressor is considered to be robustly correlated with the outcome if either the t-ratio on its 
coefficient is greater than one in absolute value or, equivalently, the corresponding two-
standard error band does not include zero. 
In order to estimate the distributional impact of fiscal consolidation episodes, we estimate the 
following equation: 
                           𝑌𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡        (7) 
where 𝑌 denotes, one of our dependent variables (Inclusive growth index, Gini coefficient, or 
GDP per capita growth rate). 𝐹𝐴 represents the changes in the CAPB in percent of GDP in 
periods of fiscal adjustment and zero otherwise; 𝑋 is a vector of control variables and 𝜀𝑡 is the 
error term. 
3.6. Empirical results 
One of the most important privileges about BMA analyzing is the high level of trust in 
coefficients estimated in explanatory variables. Because these coefficients are not estimated 
based on just one model, but they are derived from averaging model of estimated coefficients 
in every single variable with many recapitulations or effective samplings. The coefficient for 
each of BMA estimates is calculated in this way: 
?̂?1 = ∑ 𝜆𝑖
𝑙
𝑖=1
?̂?1𝑖 
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?̂?1𝑖 is the possibility of “i” numbers of model and is an estimation of which is gained in case of 
𝑀𝑖 model being. The t-ratio is used to determine whether the coefficients are statistically 
significant. The estimation result can be seen in Table (3) that gives the t-ratio and the posterior 
inclusion probability (pip) for each of the BMA estimation. In the case where Bayesian Model 
Approach is used, the criteria of significance of explanatory variables is usually considered 𝑡 ≥
2 for the large number of observations. For example, the studies using panel data considered 
the criteria 𝑡 ≥ 2. But in the studies with few data available like time series, the criteria  𝑡 ≥ 1 
is used (see Mohsen, 2015). In this circumstance we can be less strict about statistical 
significance. Thus, we regard  𝑡 ≥ 1 for robustness of regressor to explain the results of Table 
(3). 
Table (3) presents the estimated coefficients of the changes in the CAPB on the inclusive 
growth, and more specifically on both equity measure by Gini index and economic growth in 
our baseline model. Estimates in column (1) show that fiscal consolidations in previous years 
have a statistically significant positive effect on a current GDP per capita growth. This result is 
consistent to the literature so-called non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy generated by authors 
such as Cour et al. (1996), Miller, and Russek (2003) and Alesina and Ardagna (2010). 
According to this literature, there is an improvement in growth after periods of fiscal 
adjustment, which is interpreted as evidence of non-Keynesian effects during fiscal 
consolidation episodes. 
Regarding the effect of fiscal adjustment on income inequality, estimates suggest that an 
improvement of 1% in previous years CAPB reduce income inequality in current period 
(Column 2), with an overall impact of 0.062 on the Gini coefficient. This means that income 
gap decreases after periods of fiscal consolidation. The result is in line to those obtained by 
Azevedo et al. (2014). Their found a negative and significant relationship between in cyclically 
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adjusted-primary balances and Gini coefficient, meaning that a tighter fiscal stance in Brazilian 
states does not seem to increase inequality over the period of study. These results are contrary 
to those of several studies that have studied the impact of fiscal consolidations on inequality at 
the national level for OECD countries. 
Table (3): Effect of fiscal adjustment on growth and income inequality 
  GDP per capita growth Gini coefficient 
 
(1) (2) 
VARIABLES All adjust. All adjust. 
      
ΔCAPB (t-1) 2.074* -0.062* 
 (1.325) (0.036) 
Inflation (t-1) 0.189* -0.002 
 (0.125) (0.002) 
Public investment (t-1) -0.112 0.022** 
 (0.327) (0.009) 
Trade openness (t-1) 0.265** -0.004** 
 (0.085) (0.002) 
Population growth (t-1) -0.214 -0.0231 
 (0.760) (0.035) 
Corruption (t-1) 0.544 -0.034* 
 (1.199) (0.018) 
External conflic (t-1) 0.069 0.008* 
 (0.409) (0.013) 
Military in politics (t-1) -0.086 -0.024 
 (0.316) (0.016) 
Crisis (dummy) -4.393** 0.059* 
 (1.678) (0.042) 
   
Constant -21.03* 3.949*** 
 (10.24) (0.228) 
   
Observations 30 24 
Notes: Our dependent variables are Gini index, and GDP per capita growth 
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Spending versus taxes-based consolidation effect on equity and growth 
Does the composition of fiscal consolidation (spending versus taxes-based) matter for growth 
inequality? The literature suggests that evidence of expansionary effects is strongest for fiscal 
adjustments implemented mainly by cutting government spending rather than by increasing 
taxes. Therefore, in this section, we investigate what role the composition of fiscal adjustment 
plays in the response of economic growth and income inequality. In particular, we re-estimate 
our baseline specification for two types of fiscal adjustments. As mention above, the first type, 
denoted as “tax-based fiscal adjustment” is a period where CAPB improves by 1% or more and 
government revenues as % of GDP increase by 0.5% or more. The second type denoted as 
“spending-based fiscal adjustment” corresponds to years where CAPB improves by 1% or more 
and government spending as % of GDP decreases by 0.5% or more. The results are reported in 
Table (4). 
Regarding tax-based adjustments, column (1) reports that growth responds positively to the 
year ahead tax-based fiscal consolidations episode. One explanation is that in developing 
countries and especially in Cote d'Ivoire, tax based-adjustment are generally a base-broadening 
measures that could take several forms; eliminating or curbing tax expenditures such as 
deductions, exclusions, credits, exemptions, property tax, and preferential treatment of capital 
income over labor income. Therefore, broadening of tax base will contribute to strong tax 
revenue collections and play an important role in achieving higher, sustainable and inclusive 
economic growth. However, our result did not find evidence to the expansionary effect of 
spending-based fiscal adjustment (column 2). 
Moreover, the evidence suggests that fiscal adjustments that are driven by the spending cuts 
seem to not help reducing the income gap (Column 4). Interestingly, when fiscal consolidation 
is achieved via revenue side, income inequality seems to be reduced further (Column 3). These 
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results are close to those obtained by Agnello and Sousa (2012). According to these authors, 
while fiscal adjustments following the reduction of public expenditure seem to hurt income 
distribution, the increase in tax seems to reduce income inequality. This evidence suggests that 
policymakers could achieve their goal of equal income distribution from a properly designed 
tax-based consolidation plan. Furthermore, fiscal adjustment focusing on indirect taxes may 
improve equity (Ciminelli et al., 2017). For authors, this outcome may be partly explained by 
the operation of a positive labor supply channel. Authors think that individual are more 
incentives to take part in the labor market with the establishment of indirect taxes. One 
explanation is that indirect taxes raise the price of consumer goods, leading to a negative income 
effect. Additionally and in line with Bastagli et al. (2012), in developing economies, 
consolidation policies can be put in place to mitigate its negative impact on income 
redistribution. However, this must be accompanied by an improvement in the progressiveness 
of the tax and transfer systems of the global economy. Given that a large share of public 
spending in developing economies is not progressive, the spending cuts implemented during 
the fiscal adjustment can actually improve equity, depending on where consolidation is 
concentrated. Similarly, the government can improve its ability to protect poor households 
during adjustment periods by the reinforcement of social safety nets. However, to be 
sustainable, fiscal adjustment in developing economies is likely to require revenue measures 
(Bevan, 2010; Gupta et al., 2005). Any adverse impact of tax measures on inequality can be 
mitigated if they are accompanied by tax reforms that enhance the efficiency and fairness of the 
tax system, such as a greater reliance on progressive income taxation combined with removing 
opportunities for tax avoidance and tax evasion. 
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Table (4): Spending and tax-based adjustment effect on growth and income inequality 
  GDP per capita growth Gini coefficient 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Tax-based Spend.-based Tax-based Spend.-based 
          
ΔCAPB (t-1) 2.157* 0.492 -1.468* 0.116 
 (1.621) (2.029) (1.378) (1.354) 
Inflation (t-1) 0.249* 0.195* -0.218** -0.132* 
 (0.134) (0.134) (0.088) (0.088) 
Public investment (t-1) -0.050 -0.220 1.300** 1.374*** 
 (0.353) (0.357) (0.444) (0.324) 
Trade open (t-1) 0.207** 0.242** -0.077* -0.132* 
 (0.087) (0.091) (0.068) (0.073) 
Population growth (t-1) -0.213 -0.239 -0.604 -0.169 
 (0.770) (0.822) (1.414) (0.957) 
Corruption (t-1) 0.118 0.454 -0.055 -1.342 
 (1.240) (1.266) (1.402) (0.861) 
External conflic (t-1) 0.081 0.152 0.213 0.302 
 (0.427) (0.521) (0.649) (0.576) 
Military in politics (t-1) -0.093 -0.097 -1.323* -1.513** 
 (0.328) (0.350) (0.694) (0.557) 
Crisis (dummy) -3.917** -5.082** 2.864* 3.713** 
 (1.872) (1.719) (2.294) (1.667) 
     
Constant -16.34 -17.83 38.28*** 42.76*** 
 (10.08) (11.40) (9.298) (8.783) 
     
Observations 30 30 24 24 
Notes: Our dependent variables are Gini index, and GDP per capita growth 
 
3.7. Robustness check 
In order to further test the robustness of the baseline results reported in the previous section, we 
perform several robustness checks, as calculating an alternative measure of fiscal consolidation 
as well as adding other control variables.  For the construction of the new fiscal consolidation 
variable, we follow the same procedure developed above, but here, we use the output gap as a 
proxy for business cycle fluctuations instead of unemployment to cyclically adjust government 
spending and revenue. This allows us to calculate the alternative CAPB measure. Next we 
follow Alesina and Ardagna (1998), Giudice and Alessandro (2007), Ardagna (2004) in order 
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to define definition of fiscal adjustment. Therefore, fiscal adjustment corresponds to period 
where the change in CAPB is at least 2% p of GDP in 1 year or at least 1.5% p of GDP per year 
in both 2 consecutive years. 
Table (5) shows that the baseline results (columns 1-2) are robust to alternative CAPB 
definitions (columns 3-4) and alternative criteria for the definition of fiscal adjustment (columns 
5-6) and also. In each case, fiscal adjustment has a similarly sized positive effect on growth, 
while it is a negatively links to inequality meaning that after a period of fiscal austerity, growth 
improves, and income inequality decreases. These two effects contribute to more inclusive 
growth. In addition, all variables keep the right sign and their level of significance. 
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Table 5: Effects of fiscal adjustment on equity and growth: alternative measures  
 Baseline result Alternative CAPB definitions Alternative criteria for fiscal adjust. 
 
GDP pc grth Gini coef. GDP pc grth Gini coef. GDP pc grth Gini coef. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables All adjust. All adjust. All adjust. All adjust. All adjust. All adjust. 
              
ΔCAPB (t-1) 2.074* -0.0621* 3.561** -2.564* 2.074* -0.062* 
 
(1.325) (0.036) (1.202) (1.310) (1.325) (0.036) 
Inflation (t-1) 0.189* -0.002 0.271** -0.158* 0.189* -0.002 
 
(0.125) (0.002) (0.113) (0.081) (0.125) (0.002) 
Public investment (t-1) -0.112 0.022** 0.062 1.152*** -0.112 0.022** 
 
(0.327) (0.008) (0.300) (0.287) (0.327) (0.008) 
Trade open (t-1) 0.265** -0.004** 0.256*** -0.193** 0.265*** -0.004** 
 
(0.085) (0.002) (0.074) (0.072) (0.0850) (0.002) 
Population growth (t-1) -0.214 -0.023 -0.221 -0.550 -0.214 -0.023 
 
(0.760) (0.035) (0.717) (1.207) (0.760) (0.035) 
Corruption (t-1) 0.544 -0.034* 0.818 -1.671** 0.544 -0.033* 
 
(1.199) (0.018) (1.069) (0.795) (1.199) (0.018) 
External conflic (t-1) 0.069 0.008* 0.022 0.323 0.0693 0.008 
 
(0.409) (0.013) (0.330) (0.555) (0.409) (0.013) 
Military in politics (t-1) -0.086 -0.024 -0.101 -1.186* -0.0860 -0.024* 
 
(0.316) (0.016) (0.309) (0.604) (0.316) (0.016) 
Crisis (dummy) -4.393** 0.059* -3.295** 3.517** -4.393** 0.059* 
 
(1.678) (0.042) (1.567) (1.534) (1.678) (0.042) 
   
  
  
Constant -21.03* 3.949*** -23.43** 51.11*** -21.03* 3.949*** 
 
(10.24) (0.228) (9.000) (8.915) (10.24) (0.228) 
       
Observations 30 24 30 24 30 24 
 Notes: Our dependent variables are Gini index, and GDP per capita growth   
 
Next, we check the robustness of our findings to the inclusion of other variables to control for 
government consumption, as well as the institutional environment namely investment profile. 
The results are present in the Table 6. Here again, the results regarding our interest variable that 
measures fiscal adjustment are consistent with our previous estimates. Although there is no 
statistically significant evidence for government spending effect on both equity and growth, we 
observe that the results concerning the other variables are almost the same. 
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Table 6: Robustness with adding news variables 
 Baseline result Adding news variables 
 GDP pc grth Gini coef. GDP pc grth Gini coef. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES All adjust. All adjust. all All 
          
ΔCAPB (t-1) 2.074* -0.062* 2.150* -0.053* 
 (1.325) (0.036) (1.419) (0.033) 
Inflation (t-1) 0.189* -0.002 0.218* -0.001 
 (0.125) (0.002) (0.137) (0.002) 
Public investment (t-1) -0.112 0.022** -0.063 0.0209** 
 (0.327) (0.008) (0.389) (0.007) 
Trade open (t-1) 0.265** -0.004** 0.297** -0.004** 
 (0.085) (0.002) (0.104) (0.002) 
Population growth (t-1) -0.214 -0.023 -0.270 -0.004 
 (0.760) (0.035) (0.941) (0.024) 
Corruption (t-1) 0.544 -0.033* 0.961 -0.035* 
 (1.199) (0.018) (1.371) (0.018) 
External conflic (t-1) 0.069 0.008* 0.054 0.001 
 (0.409) (0.013) (0.531) (0.008) 
Military in politics (t-1) -0.086 -0.024 -0.230 -0.036** 
 (0.316) (0.016) (0.515) (0.016) 
Crisis (dummy) -4.393** 0.059* -4.524** 0.053* 
 (1.678) (0.042) (1.767) (0.039) 
Investment profil   0.150 0.013* 
   (0.480) (0.008) 
Government consump   0.268 -0.003 
   (0.419) (0.006) 
     
Constant -21.03* 3.949*** -29.21* 4.009*** 
 (10.24) (0.228) (16.48) (0.270) 
     
Observations 30 24 30 24 
Notes: Our dependent variables are Gini index, and GDP per capita growth 
 
We also test the robustness of our results by focusing on alternative method of estimation 
namely weighted average least squares (WALS) approach, developed in Magnus et al. (2010). 
According to Authors, the WALS approach has both theoretically and practically advantage to 
standard Bayesian model averaging (BMA). Theoretical, it is superior because it examines the 
ignorance about the priors in a different manner, thereby obtaining a better risk profile and, in 
particular, avoiding unlimited risk. Practical, it is superior because its computing time increases 
linearly rather than exponentially with the dimension of the space of model selection. In 
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addition to these two problems, there are other embarrassing aspects with BMA model. One is 
that BMA takes different priors for the same parameter depending on which sub-model is 
considered. This is a bit difficult to interpret. Another uncomfortable aspect is that - since the 
exact BMA is computationally so demanding - it is very difficult to envisage extensions, for 
example “non-spherical perturbations”. The WALS method addresses all these problems. The 
computational burden is trivial, and the proposed prior is attractive because it is "neutral" 
(imitating ignorance) and also close to the optimum in the sense of minimizing a risk or regret 
criterion (Magnus, 2002). 
Table (7) shows standard error and t-ratio for each of the WALS estimates which shed some 
light on the relative importance of each regressor. As in the case of BMA, statistical significance 
of a regressor is evaluated by t-ratio of respective coefficient. Also, the criteria t ≥ 1 is used. 
The results show that our model is consistent to the use of another estimation method. Even if 
there is a slight change in the amplitude of the coefficients, practically all variables keep the 
same sign and significance as the BMA estimate. The results confirm our finding that in fiscal 
consolidation period, there is no trade-off between growth and income inequality. This mean 
that fiscal adjustment does not alter the inclusiveness of growth in Côte d’Ivoire. Moreover, the 
result provide evidence that tax-based adjustment contributed more to the inclusiveness of 
growth with a positive effect on growth while reducing income gap. 
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Table 7: An alternative method, the WALS estimator 
  GDP per capita growth Gini coefficient 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES All adjust. Tax-based Spend.-based All adjust. Tax-based Spend.-based 
              
ΔCAPB (t-1) 1.987* 2.060* 0.707 -0.069** -1.556* -0.087 
 (1.348) (1.645) (2.055) (0.031) (1.326) (1.297) 
Inflation (t-1) 0.170* 0.226* 0.167* -0.002* -0.228** -0.147* 
 (0.132) (0.143) (0.139) (0.002) (0.089) (0.087) 
Public investment (t-1) -0.105* -0.046 -0.200* 0.019** 1.180** 1.265*** 
 (0.342) (0.370) (0.370) (0.008) (0.503) (0.315) 
Trade open (t-1) 0.260** 0.205** 0.244** -0.004** -0.062 -0.114* 
 (0.087) (0.091) (0.092) (0.001) (0.066) (0.070) 
Population growth (t-1) -0.360 -0.309 -0.351 -0.028* -0.538 -0.247 
 (1.691) (1.719) (1.791) (0.027) (1.546) (1.361) 
Corruption (t-1) 0.520 0.100 0.390 -0.037** -0.304 -1.508* 
 (1.230) (1.265) (1.281) (0.017) (1.670) (0.841) 
External conflic (t-1) 0.331 0.373 0.577 0.0153* 0.429 0.574 
 (0.770) (0.780) (0.817) (0.0135) (0.960) (0.643) 
Military in politics (t-1) -0.195 -0.229 -0.257 -0.019* -1.207* -1.308** 
 (0.720) (0.732) (0.785) (0.012) (0.692) (0.591) 
Crisis (dummy) -4.681** -4.230** -5.378*** 0.0525* 2.658* 3.674** 
 (1.766) (1.971) (1.778) (0.038) (2.593) (1.732) 
       
Constant -22.27* -18.09 -21.08 3.909*** 36.60*** 40.12*** 
 (11.94) (12.00) (13.21) (0.201) (9.275) (9.271) 
       
Observations 30 30 30 24 24 24 
Notes: Our dependent variables are Gini index, and GDP per capita growth
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3.8. Conclusion 
This chapter examines the inclusiveness effects of fiscal consolidation in Côte d’Ivoire. Using 
a tighter fiscal stance, measured by changes in the cyclically-adjusted primary balance, over the 
period 1980-2014, it shows that fiscal consolidations are followed by an improved in growth 
performance, but also income gap decreases after periods of fiscal adjustments in Côte d’Ivoire. 
In other words, the results suggest there is no trade-off between growth and income inequality 
when implementing fiscal consolidations in Côte d’Ivoire. This conclusion contrasts to the 
results of several papers that analyze the impact of fiscal consolidations on inequality at the 
national level. 
Our results also suggest that tax-based fiscal consolidations seem to increase economic growth. 
However, we have not found evidence to the expansionary effect of spending-based fiscal 
adjustment. These results could be explained by the fact that in developing countries, tax based-
adjustment are generally a base-broadening measures. Therefore, this will contribute to strong 
tax revenue collections and play an important role in achieving higher, sustainable economic 
growth. Moreover, we find that tax revenue increases in Côte d’Ivoire were not associated with 
increases in inequality. Interestingly, when fiscal consolidation is achieved via revenue side, 
income inequality seems to be reduced further. In addition, reductions in primary expenditures 
do not seem to reduce the income gap. 
To be sustainable, fiscal adjustment in developing economies will likely require revenue 
measures (Bevan, 2010, Gupta et al., 2005). Any negative impact of tax measures on inequality 
can be mitigated if they are accompanied by tax reforms that enhance the efficiency and fairness 
of the tax system, such as a greater reliance on progressive income taxation combined with the 
removal of opportunities for tax avoidance and evasion. 
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While this analysis provides an argument for tax-based rather than expenditure-based 
adjustments, it focuses on overall effects. Therefore, policy implications cannot be drawn 
without first studying the specific areas where spending cuts and tax increases are implemented. 
For example, broadening the bases of corporate and personal income taxes by reducing tax 
exemptions, closing loopholes, and improving tax compliance would increase revenues to fund 
incremental transfers. An increase in the consumption tax base (e.g., widespread adoption of 
value-added tax) would increase tax revenues, and these consumption taxes could also be 
designed to mitigate the adverse distributional effects (e.g., through appropriate treatment of 
small businesses and the application of excises to luxury goods). Further analysis should focus 
on providing more detailed estimates of the types of spending cuts and tax increases that lead 
to better and worse outcomes. Similarly, spending cuts in disability benefits would likely have 
a greater impact on inequality than any increase in taxes. Therefore, revenue constraints would 
require increased use of targeted social spending to protect households from poverty and 
improve the education and health of poor households.  
Future research could also focus on the “narrative” approach to calculating fiscal adjustments 
in order to improve the evidence presented. 
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3.9. Annex 
 
Annex A 
 
All adjustment 
 
GDP pc grwth Coefficients Standard error t-ratio pip [1-Std. Err. Bands] 
ΔCAPB (t-1) 2.074419 1.325063 1.57 1.00 .7493564 3.399482 
Inflation (t-1) .1889882 .1245311 1.52 1.00 .0644571 .3135193 
Public investment (t-1) -.1116566 .3268585 -0.34 1.00 -.4385151 .2152019 
Trade open (t-1) .2651142 .0850265 3.12 1.00 .1800876 .3501407 
Population growth (t-1) -.2143852 .7601691 -0.28 0.21 -.9745543 .5457839 
Corruption (t-1) .5442505 1.198561 0.45 1.00 -.6543101 1.742811 
External conflic (t-1) .069275 .4088309 0.17 0.17 -.3395559 .4781059 
Military in politics (t-1) -.0860091 .316 -0.27 0.21 -.4020091 .2299909 
Crisis (dummy) -4.393484 1.677955 -2.62 1.00 -6.07144 -2.715529 
Constant -21.03308 10.23762 -2.05 1.00 -31.27069 -10.79546 
 Dependent variable: GDP per capita growth; pip is a posterior inclusion probability 
 
 
Gini coeff. Coefficients Standard error t-ratio pip [1-Std. Err. Bands] 
ΔCAPB (t-1) -.0621367 .0358745 -1.73 1.00 -.0980112 -.0262622 
Inflation (t-1) -.0020148 .0020455 -0.98 1.00 -.0040603 .0000307 
Public investment (t-1) .0220519 .0088521 2.49 1.00 .0131998 .030904 
Trade open (t-1) -.0038058 .0016084 -2.37 1.00 -.0054142 -.0021973 
Population growth (t-1) -.0230976 .0355387 -0.65 0.41 -.0586362 .0124411 
Corruption (t-1) -.0335182 .0185868 -1.80 1.00 -.052105 -.0149315 
External conflic (t-1) .0080353 .0134113 0.60 0.39 -.005376 .0214466 
Military in politics (t-1) -.0236909 .0163539 -1.45 0.76 -.0400447 -.007337 
Crisis (dummy) .0599068 .0417215 1.44 1.00 .0181853 .1016283 
Constant 3.948848 .2279542 17.32 1.00 3.720894 4.176802 
Dependent variable: Gini coefficient; pip is a posterior inclusion probability 
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Tax-based Adjustment 
 
 
GDP pc grwth Coefficients Standard error t-ratio pip [1-Std. Err. Bands] 
ΔCAPB (t-1) 2.156848 1.620598 1.33 1.00 .53625 3.777446 
Inflation (t-1) .2494131 .1338656 1.86 1.00 .1155475 .3832787 
Public investment (t-1) -.0503015 .353488 -0.14 1.00 -.4037895 .3031865 
Trade open (t-1) .2066706 .0873501 2.37 1.00 .1193205 .2940207 
Population growth (t-1) -.2132797 .7696461 -0.28 0.21 -.9829258 .5563664 
Corruption (t-1) .1184191 1.240073 0.10 1.00 -1.121654 1.358493 
External conflic (t-1) .0811732 .4266722 0.19 0.17 -.345499 .5078454 
Military in politics (t-1) -.0935406 .3279097 -0.29 0.21 -.4214502 .2343691 
Crisis (dummy) -3.91746 1.872223 -2.09 1.00 -5.789682 -2.045237 
Constant -16.33579 10.07513 -1.62 1.00 -26.41092 -6.26066 
Dependent variable: GDP per capita growth; pip is a posterior inclusion probability 
 
 
 
Gini coeff. Coefficients Standard error t-ratio pip [1-Std. Err. Bands] 
ΔCAPB (t-1) -1.467866 1.377892 -1.07 1.00 -2.845758 -.0899743 
Inflation (t-1) -.2179389 .0886131 -2.46 1.00 -.3065521 -.1293258 
Public investment (t-1) 1.299738 .44378 2.93 1.00 .8559579 1.743518 
Trade open (t-1) -.0771863 .0688508 -1.12 1.00 -.1460371 -.0083354 
Population growth (t-1) -.6036399 1.414436 -0.43 0.30 -2.018076 .8107964 
Corruption (t-1) -.0553283 1.401576 -0.04 1.00 -1.456904 1.346247 
External conflic (t-1) .2130904 .6493449 0.33 0.25 -.4362545 .8624353 
Military in politics (t-1) -1.322862 .6940933 -1.91 0.86 -2.016955 -.6287687 
Crisis (dummy) 2.864304 2.293928 1.25 1.00 .5703755 5.158232 
Constant 38.28258 9.297972 4.12 1.00 28.9846 47.58055 
Dependent variable: Gini coefficient; pip is a posterior inclusion probability 
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Spending-based Adjustment 
 
GDP pc grwth Coefficients Standard error t-ratio pip [1-Std. Err. Bands] 
ΔCAPB (t-1) .4919049 2.028863 0.24 1.00 -1.536958 2.520767 
Inflation (t-1) .1952003 .1340607 1.46 1.00 .0611397 .329261 
Public investment (t-1) -.2195677 .3572582 -0.61 1.00 -.5768259 .1376905 
Trade open (t-1) .2423319 .0911908 2.66 1.00 .1511411 .3335228 
Population growth (t-1) -.2386435 .8219606 -0.29 0.21 -1.060604 .5833171 
Corruption (t-1) .4537125 1.266139 0.36 1.00 -.8124269 1.719852 
External conflic (t-1) .1521645 .521436 0.29 0.20 -.3692715 .6736005 
Military in politics (t-1) -.0967167 .3500474 -0.28 0.21 -.4467641 .2533306 
Crisis (dummy) -5.082114 1.718902 -2.96 1.00 -6.801016 -3.363212 
Constant -17.82684 11.40358 -1.56 1.00 -29.23042 -6.423259 
Dependent variable: GDP per capita growth; pip is a posterior inclusion probability 
 
 
Gini coeff. Coefficients Standard error t-ratio pip [1-Std. Err. Bands] 
ΔCAPB (t-1) .1158537 1.353773 0.09 1.00 -1.237919 1.469626 
Inflation (t-1) -.1324965 .0885376 -1.50 1.00 -.2210342 -.0439589 
Public investment (t-1) 1.373749 .3239215 4.24 1.00 1.049827 1.69767 
Trade open (t-1) -.1318375 .0732168 -1.80 1.00 -.2050542 -.0586207 
Population growth (t-1) -.168977 .9569946 -0.18 0.21 -1.125972 .7880176 
Corruption (t-1) -1.341501 .8609589 -1.56 1.00 -2.20246 -.4805424 
External conflic (t-1) .3018897 .5758022 0.52 0.34 -.2739125 .8776918 
Military in politics (t-1) -1.512925 .5570659 -2.72 0.94 -2.069991 -.9558587 
Crisis (dummy) 3.713405 1.666625 2.23 1.00 2.04678 5.380029 
Constant 42.76065 8.783252 4.87 1.00 33.9774 51.5439 
Dependent variable: Gini coefficient; pip is a posterior inclusion probability 
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Annex B: Variables definitions and sources 
 
Variables Description/Notes Source 
   
GDP per capita growth  GDP per capita growth (annual %)  
World Bank Development 
Indicators 
Gini coefficient 
Inequality estimates after the deduction of taxes and social 
contributions 
Standardized World Income 
Inequality Database (SWIID) 
Cyclically Adjusted Primary 
Balance (CAPB) 
See main text for details of variable construction. State level 
primary balance (revenues minus expenditures net of interest 
payments) as a share of state GDP 
Authors’ calculations based on 
BCEAO database. 
Inflation Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)  
World Bank Development 
Indicators 
Public investment Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP) 
World Bank Development 
Indicators 
Trade open 
Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and 
services measured as a share of gross domestic product. The 
indicator is divided by two in oder to have trade open. 
Authors’ calculations based on 
World Bank trade indicator (% 
of GDP) 
Population growth Annual population growth rate 
World Bank Development 
Indicators 
Corruption Corruption within the political system 
International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) 
External conflic 
The external conflict measure is an assessment both of the 
risk to the incumbent government from foreign action, 
ranging from non-violent external pressure (diplomatic 
pressures, withholding of aid, trade restrictions, territorial 
disputes, sanctions, etc) to violent external pressure (cross-
border conflicts to all-out war). 
International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) 
Military in politics 
The military involvement in politics, even at a peripheral 
level, is a diminution of democratic accountability. 
International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) 
Crisis (dummy) 
Dummy variable that adopts one for war years and zero for 
other years 
Authors regarding the years of 
war. 
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Abstract 
The chapter investigates the fiscal forecasts and it social effects in CEMAC and WAEMU 
countries. The objective of this chapter is threefold. First, it aims to assess the quality of fiscal 
forecasts (accuracy, rationality and unbiasedness) in these two-economics areas. Second, it tries 
to analyze the determining factors of fiscal forecast deviation for CEMAC and WAEMU 
countries. Third, it analyzes the social effects of fiscal policy shocks through its impacts on the 
growth inclusiveness. The statistical analysis of the quality of fiscal forecast shows that only 
one country produces both relatively unbiased and accurate fiscal forecasts – Benin. The test of 
inefficiency shows that both in these two economic areas, the inefficiency of fiscal forecast 
occurs in most time because the forecast deviation is proportional to the forecast itself, but also 
because the past errors are repeated in the present. Furthermore, the degree of cross-country 
heterogeneity is high in the sample. The investigation on potential determinants errors denote 
that a part of revenue forecast errors can be explained by random shocks to the economy like 
unexpected changes in the GDP growth, change, consumer price measured by inflation and the 
price volatility. Against our expectation, public debt/GDP ratio is associated with lower budget 
balance forecast error. Our study does not find evidence of the effect of election year on revenue 
forecasts. Finally, the good practice of PFM namely the publication by the government of a 
report or a chapter on fiscal risks seem relevant in reducing errors in revenue forecasting. 
Regarding the distributional effect of fiscal policy shocks, the results suggest that an error in 
revenue forecast considered as fiscal policy shocks has a detrimental effect on inclusive growth.  
 
Keywords: Fiscal Policy, revenue forecast errors, accuracy, efficiency, unbiasedness, income 
distribution 
JEL Classification Numbers: C53, E62, H68, D31, I3
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4.1. Introduction 
A budget can be viewed as an instrument through which the government hopes to achieve not 
only its objective of sound financial management and control, but also other objectives such as 
the allocation and distribution of resources stabilization, growth, etc. Preparing government 
budget forecasting involves not only predictions about the macroeconomic development but 
also the predictions about the functioning of political and institutional framework. Furthermore, 
there are changes in tax laws and structural changes in the economy that make forecast even 
more difficult. 
From a theoretical point of view, fiscal policy can generate significant externalities and risks of 
unsustainable public finances. In order to internalize these external effects and ensure stability, 
the monetary unions in West Africa (WAEMU) and Central Africa (CEMAC) adopted a 
multilateral surveillance mechanism of fiscal policies. The Pact of convergence, stability, 
growth and solidarity adopted in these two unions in 1999 aimed at consolidating public 
finances in these areas, ensuring compatibility of national fiscal policies with the common 
monetary policy and providing stable fiscal environment to the private sector. For the Pact to 
reach its goal, governments need to be able to produce reliable fiscal forecasts in the short and 
medium terms that can guide policy and programmatic decisions. Fiscal forecasting consists in 
making projections for the ongoing year and the years on the fiscal situation, based on the latest 
available information such as past, current, and projected economic conditions, or new 
measures announced by the government or voted by the Parliament. By allowing governments 
to assess their fiscal space in the years ahead, fiscal forecasting plays a major role ensuring 
fiscal discipline and planning stable and transparent fiscal policies for the medium-term. 
Existing literature identifies three kinds of errors in fiscal forecasting (see Auerbach, 1999; Leal 
et al., 2008). First, “economic” errors can occur due to projections of macroeconomic variables, 
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such as GDP, inflation and interest rates that are commonly used as underlying assumptions for 
budget projections. Second, “policy” errors due to the inaccurate projection of the impact of the 
policies pursued. They can be explained by the establishment of new, not yet announced by the 
forecast target date, or the cancellation of previously announced measures; but also by errors in 
the estimation of the effect of a measure that has been implemented. Last, “technical” errors are 
the residual forecast errors that cannot attributed to policy changes and macroeconomic 
performance. They could partly come from behavioral responses, but also to a poor model 
specification on the fiscal side. 
Some authors such as Zakaria and Ali (2010) group the sources of fiscal forecasting errors into 
two groups: (1) errors that are caused by endogenous factors, which can occur because of the 
use of incorrect settings, inter alia prices, income, and elasticities of demand and supply of 
products, etc.; (2) errors caused by exogenous factors i.e. that are outside the control of the 
government such as the availability of loans and grants, change in terms of trade, the volatility 
of oil price, the domestic political instability in the country, etc. 
The purpose of this study is to analyze fiscal forecasting errors in WEAMU and CEMAC 
countries, and to suggest policy guidance to help governments improve their fiscal forecasts. 
To achieve these goals, we first apply existing methodologies to budget data from WAEMU 
and CEMAC countries to test fiscal forecasts according to the following three aspects: accuracy, 
efficiency and unbiasedness. Second, we try to identify determinants of fiscal forecasts errors 
in the region, among economic, political, and institutional factors. Third, we analyse the 
distributive consequences of fiscal forecasts errors. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. The next section presents the data 
analysis. Section 3 briefs the economic performance, section 4 provides stylized facts about 
fiscal forecast errors in the region. Section 5 assesses the quality of fiscal forecast errors, 
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through formal tests of unbiasedness, accuracy, and rationality. Section 6 presents empirical 
evidence on the potential determinants of fiscal forecast errors. Section 7 analyses the social 
effects of fiscal forecasts errors, while the final section concludes. 
4.2. Data analysis 
Our sample covers a panel of African countries members of the Central African Economic and 
Monetary Community12 (CEMAC) and the West African Economic and Monetary Union13 
(WAEMU, also known by its French acronym, UEMOA). Available data span over the period 
from 2004 to 2015. However, budget and outturns data are available for 12 countries only for 
the period from 2010-15. The rationale for these countries’ coverage: 
There are strong similarities among CEMAC and WAEMU member States. The 12 sub 
Saharan countries covered by this study make up the CFA franc zone (see Chart 1). This zone 
comprises two monetary unions maintaining Euro-pegged currencies under the supervision of 
regional Central Banks14. CEMAC and WAEMU regions account for 14 percent of Africa’s 
population and 12 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP). These countries have in 
common official language (French with the exception of Lusophone Guinea Bissau and 
Spanish-speaking Equatorial Guinea), and similar administrative models. They share 
comparable macroeconomic patterns: mostly low-income countries depending on grants 
(WAEMU) or oil (CEMAC). 
Both regions present institutional and fiscal data consistency. The CEMAC and WAEMU 
member states share a common framework for public finance management (PFM), designed 
                                                          
12 Namely: Gabon, Cameroon, the Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, the Republic of the Congo and 
Equatorial Guinea. Very few budget data have been made available for Equatorial Guinea, reason why the 
quantitative works do not comprehensively cover this country. 
13 Namely: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo. Very few budget data have been 
made available for Guinea-Bissau, reason why the quantitative works do not comprehensively cover this country. 
14 The Central African States’ Bank (BEAC) and the Western African States’ Bank (BCEAO) 
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after a francophone tradition for budget and accounting systems. They hence present strong 
similarities in institutional arrangements for their PFM systems. Budget classifications, charts 
of accounts and budget management systems have been aligned with regional standards. 
Thereby, fiscal and real sector statistics are mostly comparable across CEMAC and WAEMU 
Countries. 
Governments across the regions heavily rely on fiscal policies to cope with volatile 
macroeconomic frameworks. Although most countries displayed resilience and sustained 
growth after the 2008 recession, they have had to cope with climate related agricultural slumps, 
political and military instability, volatile commodity prices, and a sharp decline in oil revenue. 
Since the CAF currencies are pegged to the Euro, hence desynchronized with sub-Saharan 
economic cycles, monetary policies give little leverage to weather economic booms and busts. 
Which leaves governments with crucial needs to implement sound and sustainable fiscal 
policies.  
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Chart 1: Country coverage used for the Case Study 
 
 
Source: Authors using data from WEO. 
 
The data used for this study are collected from various sources. The dataset contains IMF’s 
World Economic Outlook (WEO) data on GDP growth, inflation, debt ratio to GDP, oil price, 
the outturn of government revenue. The revenue forecasts are from National Authorities 
database of each country and are used to compute our dependent variable “revenue forecast 
error”, as the outturn minus the forecast. With the WEO data, we construct the variable 
measuring output gap as the difference between actual GDP and the potential GDP. Table A2 
in appendix presents a summary description of the variable. Several data come from the IMF’s 
fiscal affairs department (FAD) resources, including technical assistance volumetry. 
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4.3. Economic performance  
 
CEMAC: Facing Volatile Revenue and Geopolitical Instability15  
Over 2010-15, the volatility, and more lately the slump in international crude oil prices had a 
severe impact on a community where five of the six members are net oil exporters. With oil 
representing more than 81 percent of regional exports and 54 percent of fiscal revenues, most 
countries are now being forced to scale back their investment plans drastically. The fall in oil 
prices did not have a significant impact in 2014 when regional growth was driven by an increase 
in oil production and the continuation of public investment programs. Nonetheless, growth in 
2015 has slowed down mostly because of lower public investment. The instability around the 
Lake Chad region and the 2012-15 continuing civil strife in the Central African Republic (CAR) 
have triggered humanitarian crisis and severely disrupted economic activity, requiring 
extensive, and costly military operations in response. CEMAC’s main challenge is now to 
embark on an ambitious reform agenda to underpin macroeconomic stability and better support 
sustainable and inclusive growth. The regional institutions should be the cornerstones of this 
effort, but they face substantial challenges.  
 
                                                          
15 From IMF Country Report No. 15/222 “common policies of CEMAC Member Countries” 
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Table 1.1: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators for CEMAC 
CEMAC: Selected Economic and 
Financial Indicators, 2011–15 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
      Est. Proj. 
National income and prices (Annual percent change) 
 
GDP at constant prices 3.6 5.4 2.4 4.7 2.8 
 
Oil GDP -3.7 -1.3 -8.0 2.7 0.5 
 
Non Oil GDP  5.8 6.4 4.6 4.7 3.6 
  Consumer prices (period average) 2.6 2.8 2.1 2.7 2.6 
  
(percent of GDP) 
Government financial operations 
     
 
Total Revenue excluding grants 27.6 27.6 26.8 24.8 21.7 
 
Government expenditure 25.3 29.2 30.3 29.7 27.4 
 
Overall fiscal balance excluding grants 2.3 -1.6 -3.5 -4.9 -5.7 
  External public debt 12.0 13.1 15.4 17.5 22.0 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) database. 
 
WAEMU: The Need for Structural Reforms towards more Inclusive Growth16 
The region’s recent period of high growth and subdued inflation benefitted from a post-conflict 
catch-up effect in Cote d’Ivoire and from scaled-up infrastructure investment in the region. 
However, the business environment remains unattractive, competitiveness is weak, and 
structural transformation and economic diversification have been modest. Poverty, 
unemployment, and income and gender inequalities remain high. The fiscal deficit has widened 
throughout the region, largely driven by large public investment programs, albeit with a lack of 
efficiency. WAEMU is now faced with the following fiscal challenges ahead: increasing 
domestic revenue and better improving current spending to create fiscal space for development 
needs; improving public investment efficiency to boost growth and speed up development 
agenda; fiscal consolidation; and improving PFM practices. 
                                                          
16 From IMF Country Report No. 16/96 “common policies of WAEMU Member Countries” 
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Table 1.2: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators for WAEMU 
WAEMU: Selected Economic and 
Financial Indicators, 2011–16 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
        Est. Proj. 
National income and prices 
      
 
GDP at constant prices 0.8 6.7 6.0 6.3 6.3 6.3 
  Consumer prices (period average) 3.9 2.4 1.3 -0.1 1.0 1.7 
Government financial operations 
      
 
Total Revenue excluding grants 16.3 17.5 17.8 17.8 18.2 18.5 
 
Government expenditure 22.7 22.6 23.8 23.8 24.3 24.3 
 
Overall fiscal balance excluding grants -6.4 -5.1 -6.0 -6.0 -6.1 -5.8 
 
Overall fiscal balance including grants -3.9 -2.5 -3 -3.4 -4.6 -4 
  External public debt 30.9 24.6 24.7 25.2 30.4 30.3 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) database. 
 
Figure 1: Macroeconomic overview 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors calucation, using data from WEO. 
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4.4. Credibility of fiscal and macroeconomic francophone Africa: stylized fact 
The preparation, discussion and execution of budgets require forecasts for the main public 
finance aggregates, which generally draw on a broader set of macroeconomic forecasts. The 
quality of these forecasts is key for the sound management of public finances, since budgetary 
choices need to be consistent with macroeconomic constraints. Therefore, this section 
investigates over the medium term the stylized fact about the main macroeconomic indicators 
(real GDP growth and inflation) and the fiscal variables (government revenue, tax revenue and 
expenditure).  
Macroeconomic Forecasting 
The macroeconomic forecasting is essential in the budget process and it provides a basis from 
which to asses proposed policy options. Also, macroeconomic forecasts allow the consideration 
of the influence of the economic cycle on budget constraints. 
The Figure 2 bellows shows that over the period 2010-2015, some francophone Africa 
forecasters overestimated real GDP growth while others underestimate such macroeconomic 
variable. The amplitude of errors varies from one country to another. Benin and Togo are those 
that realized a small bias for underestimating GDP while Cameroon make a small error by 
overestimate GDP. Cote d’Ivoire and Mali are the countries that are too optimistic in their 
budget process.   
The graph shows that for the inflation, all the countries of the two areas overestimate their 
forecast. These errors found in the forecasts of inflation can be explained by the fact that 
inflation has remained under control below the community norm 3% in both community spaces. 
This evolution is due to lower cereal prices and good crop, but also to the fuel price decline in 
some Member States. However, falling prices could hide a decline in activity that would 
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generate less income, which would tend to compress domestic demand in particularly, therefore 
the activity. 
Figure 2: Macroeconomic Forecasting 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors, using data from WEO and from documentation of national budget Autorities. In charts below 
“errors” are deviations between forecasts and outturns as a percent of forecasts. 
 
Balance forecasting 
Forecasts for budget balances appear to be more credible than those for revenue and 
expenditure.  Figure 2.5 which combines all forecasting errors (Revenue, Expenditure and 
Balance) shows that deviations in Revenue most often offset deviations in Expenditure – that 
is deviations are often similar and of same sign. Therefore, Balance forecasts (black dots in the 
figure 3) are quite maintained within the ± 5 percent best practice with the exceptions of Niger, 
Senegal and Congo. All told average deviations for balances reach only two thirds of deviations 
for Revenue and Forecasting. We believe this may result from the possible underlying causes: 
- Some governments may purposely overestimate their year-ahead Revenue to: (i) raise 
fiscal targets and possibly step-up the efficiency of tax collection, (ii) present the 
Parliament with ambitious plans for government expenditure, and (iii) set a momentum 
for donors to meet their pledges for grants. 
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- Expenditure forecasts generally follow trends in Revenue forecasts that is under or 
overestimated to the same extent, to abide by target balances set in compliance with 
donors’ conditionalities and Parliaments’ orientations for deficits. 
- Countries rein in government spending down the road with regards to actual revenue 
collection, grants disbursement, trends in oil prices, and availability of government cash. 
 
Figure 3: Balance forecast errors over the period 2010-2015 
 
Source: Authors, using data from WEO and from documentation of national budget Autorities. 
 
Compliance with regional convergence standards 
For the sake of integration and financial stability, WAEMU and CEMAC have implemented 
similar multilateral surveillance and convergence mechanisms. In this context, the member 
countries have committed to meet fiscal targets presented in Table 1.3. When designing budgets 
and monitoring budget execution, the member countries must therefore abide by these fiscal 
targets. Over the period all countries have met public debt criteria, half have largely met their 
balance target, none succeeded in levying taxes to the required amount. 
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Table 1.3: Compliance with convergence standards. 
Number of WAEMU Countries Violating Convergence Criteria 2011-15 
WAEMU = 8 Member-states  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 
First-order Criteria 
     
  
Overall Balance / GDP ( ≤- 3 percent) 4 2 3 4 5 
  
Total Debt / GDP (≤ 70 percent) 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Second-order Criteria 
     
  
Tax Revenue / GDP (≥ 20 percent) 8 8 8 8 8 
Number of CEMAC Countries Violating Convergence Criteria 2011-15 
CEMAC = 6 Member-states  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 
First-order Criteria 
     
  
Basic Balance / GDP ( ≥ 0) 2 3 4 5 5 
  
Total Debt / GDP (≤ 70 percent) 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Second-order Criteria 
     
    Tax Revenue / GDP (≥ 18 percent) 6 6 6 6 6 
Source: Authors, using data from WEO. 
 
Budget credibility 
The credibility of a budget is measured through four PEFA performance indicators (PI): 
- PI-1 Aggregate expenditure out-turn compared to original approved budget: this 
indicator measures the actual total expenditure compared to the originally budgeted total 
expenditure but excludes expenditure categories over which the government will have 
little control such as debt service payments, and donor funded project expenditure. 
Scores rank from “A” (best rating when deviations do not exceed 5 percent) to “D” 
(deviations exceed 15 percent).  
- PI-2 Composition of expenditure out-turn compared to original approved budget: this 
indicator measures deviation between budget and outturns broken down by main budget 
item and categories. Score ranking is similar to PI 1. 
- PI-3 Aggregate revenue out-turn compared to original approved budget: This indicator 
is similar to PI-1 for Revenue and uses the same ranking. 
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- PI-4 Stock and monitoring of expenditure payment arrears. This indicator assesses stock 
and management of expenditure obligations incurred by government, for which 
payment is overdue at the end of the fiscal year and constitutes a form of non-transparent 
financing. 
The credibility of the countries’ budgets is low, particularly in the CEMAC region.  Table 1.4 
below presents the ranking of CEMAC and WAEMU countries’ PFM performance for 
assessment undertaken during the period 2010-16. This table features largely poor performance 
across the countries with differences between the WAEMU and the CEMAC: 
- PEFA assessments have been regularly carried out in the WAEMU probably in response 
to donors’ requests. Five WAEMU countries present low performance (inferior to two 
on a scale of four), only one (Mali) shows strong performance albeit with weaknesses 
in arrear monitoring. 
- Only two CEMAC member countries have undertaken a PEFA assessment and their 
performance is low. This suggest CEMAC Member countries do not perform well in 
fiscal forecasting. 
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Table 1.4: Credibility of budgets in CEMAC and WAEMU 
PEFA Assessments 
  PI-1 PI-2 PI-3 PI-4 PI-1-4 
Fiscal 
years 
covered 
Aggregate 
expenditure  
Composition 
of 
expenditure  
Aggregate 
revenue  
Stock and 
monitoring 
of arrears 
Country 
average 
for PI-1, 
2, 3, 4 
W
A
E
M
U
 
Benin 2012-14 0 0 4 0 1.0 
Burkina Faso 2012-14 3 2.5 1 3.5 2.5 
Cote d’Ivoire 2011-13 4 2.5 3 1.5 2.8 
Guinea Bissau 2009-11 2 1.5 4 0 1.9 
Mali 2008-10 4 4 4 2.5 3.6 
Niger 2009-11 1 2.5 1 1.5 1.5 
Senegal 2008-10 3 1.5 4 3 2.9 
Togo 2013-15 2 1.5 1 1 1.4 
Average ranking for WAEMU  2.7 2.3 2.8 1.6 2.3 
C
E
M
A
C
 
C.A.R 2007-09 1 1 2 1.5 1.4 
Cameroon 
No data 
available  
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Chad N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Congo Rep. N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Eq. Guina N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Gabon 2010-12 2 0 1 0 0.8 
Average ranking for CEMAC    1.5 0.5 1.5 0.8 1.1 
Source: Authors using data from PEFA. 4 stands for best possible score ("A"), 1 for lowest score ("D"), and 0 for 
non-documented indicators ("NA", "NR" or "NU"). 
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4.5. Statistical tests on the quality of fiscal forecasts in WAEMU and CEMAC 
Countries 
In this section, we assess the quality of fiscal forecasts in WAEMU and CEMAC countries, by 
applying statistical tests to our dataset. Three aspects are tested: accuracy, rationality and 
unbiasedness. In what follows, for each tested fiscal variable, forecast error on fiscal indicator 
i for year t 𝑒𝑖𝑡is defined as the outturn (𝐴𝑖𝑡) minus the forecast (𝐹𝑖𝑡), calculated as a share of 
GDP. 
 𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 𝐹𝑖𝑡                            (1) 
𝑒𝑖𝑡 is an indicator that can be positive or negative depending on whether the forecast 
respectively underestimates or overestimates the outturn. 
The errors in this part are computed over the period 2010-2015, then six years. However, for 
some countries there is lack of data. The tax revenue errors in Burkina Faso is calculated over 
three years (2012-2014). For other countries, tax forecast errors are computed over 5 years. 
Also, for the expenditure, the errors are calculated over the period 2010-2014. 
4.5.1. Unbiasedness test  
Biases correspond to cases of systematic overestimation or underestimation. Bias is a problem 
of direction: Forecasts are typically too low (downward bias) or typically too high (upward 
bias). The unbiasedness of forecasts can be analyzed through simple descriptive, the mean error 
(ME). The ME provides an indication of the average direction of the projections. In other words, 
it allows to see in a simple manner if forecast deviations of a country are prone to overestimation 
or to underestimation of the actual value. Thereby, it is a pointer to a possible bias in the 
forecast. The country-level analysis for total revenue, tax revenue, and total expenditure 
forecast deviations are reported in the following charts. 
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Revenue forecasting: total revenue 
The graph shows that five countries performed well according to best practices. In fact, the best 
practice hypothesis is that the forecast deviation is low than 5% of outturn (both in positive 
term as well as negative term). These countries are Gabon, Togo, Benin, Mali, and Burkina 
Faso. In our sample, only three countries collected more than projected. These countries have 
a positive forecast error (Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, and Chad). Finally, we can note that bad 
forecasts often occurred in oil producers or low capacity countries. 
 
Fi gure 4: mean total revenue forecasting deviation over fiscal year 2010-2015 
 
Source: Authors calculation using data from WEO and from documentation of national budget Autorities. 
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Revenue forecasting: tax revenue 
The graph representing the ME of tax revenue allow us to see that forecasts were slightly less 
biased in six countries according to best practices. When we compared the result to those of 
total revenue, we concluded that significant mean errors on tax revenue forecasts do not 
necessarily imply large mean errors on total revenue forecasts. Here also, bad forecasts often 
linked with oil-producer or low-capacity countries.  
 
Figure 5: mean tax revenue forecasting deviation over fiscal year 2010-2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors calculation using data from WEO and from documentation of national budget Autorities. 
 
Substantial 
negative error 
Limited or positive 
error 
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Expenditure projections 
In the case of expenditure forecasts, four countries performed well against best practices. These 
countries are Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Benin, and Côte d’Ivoire. The mean deviation of 
expenditure forecasts in these countries is below the threshold of 5% in absolute term. Only 
Côte d’Ivoire overspend on average during the period of study. The under-spending or the over 
estimation of expenditure often linked with lack of government cash and low investment 
execution rates. 
 
Figure 6: mean expenditure forecasting deviation over fiscal year 2010-2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors, using data from WEO and from documentation of national budget Autorities. 
 
After analyzing the mean error of our fiscal variables, we confront the revenue forecast 
deviations and the expenditure forecast deviations. It allows us to group the countries into three 
categories. The red case contains countries that substantial overestimate revenue and 
underestimated expenditure. This situation describes to the substantial deterioration of budget 
Substantial negative 
mean error 
Limited or positive 
mean error 
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balance. The green case is the countries that have less errors in revenue and less errors on 
expenditure. Therefore, it implies less effect in budget balance. The orange case is the countries 
that have error on their budget balance, but it is rather positive. 
 
Table 2.2: degree of bias 
  
Limited or positive mean 
error 
Substantial negative mean 
error 
Limited or positive mean 
error 
Benin, Mali,  
Côte d’Ivoire 
Congo, Cameroon 
Substantial negative mean 
error 
Gabon, Chad,  
Burkina Faso, Togo, 
Senegal 
Niger 
Source : Authors classification 
 
We analyze the effect on budget balance of a potential errors on revenue and/or expenditure. 
The following graph is order according to increasing error on budget balance. First, the graph 
shows that two countries (republic of Congo and Cameroon) have potential problem. They have 
substantial mean negative errors on revenue that are not compensated by expenditure - the mean 
error on budget balance is highly negative for them. In other word, the budget balance is 
deteriorated more than what was predicted. Second, when mean errors are limited both on the 
revenue and the expenditure side, the mean error on the budget balance remains limited. Third, 
all countries with a negative bias on expenditure forecasts also tend to underestimate their 
budget balance. 
revenue 
expenditure 
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Figure 7: mean forecasting error over fiscal year 2010-2015 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors, using data from WEO and from documentation of national budget Autorities. 
 
4.5.2. Test of accuracy  
The accuracy in budgetary forecasting refer to “how closely the forecasted value of a quantity 
corresponds to its observed or actual value”. Musso and Phillips (2002) suggest two ways: the 
first one determines how close forecasts and actuals are in quantitative terms, while the second 
one refers to the capacity to forecast the direction of change in the final outcome. Accuracy is 
an issue of magnitudes: Forecast errors can be too large (in either direction) using a particular 
forecasting technique. In practice, the accuracy of forecasts can be analyzed by either by 
econometric test either through simple descriptive: mean absolute error (MAE). Thereby, this 
is an interesting option when evaluating the forecasting record of a given institution (Melander 
et al., 2007). The MAE refers to the average absolute difference between the forecast and the 
outturn. It measures the average magnitude of the errors in a set of forecasts, without 
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considering their direction (it measures the average absolute deviation of forecasted values from 
original ones). The study is a country-level analysis and covers the period 2010-2015. The chart 
below the MAE of revenue and expenditure of each country in our study. 
We order the graph by the sum of the MAE on revenue and expenditure. The analysis of the 
graph shows that while eight countries performed well in terms of unbiasedness against best 
practices either for revenue or expenditure forecasts, all but one seems to produce relative 
inaccurate forecasts. As the main finding, among countries which fared best in terms of 
unbiasedness (green), only Benin also fares relatively well in terms of accuracy.   
 
Figure 8: mean forecast absolute error over fiscal year 2010-2015 
 
Source: Authors, using data from WEO and from documentation of national budget Autorities. 
 
 
The colors reflect the unbiasedness rating 
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4.5.3. Test of rationality  
The rationality (or efficiency) refers to how much a forecast fully exploits the information 
available at the time the forecast is made. The rationality can be examined by looking at the 
extent of information available at the time the forecast was elaborated (data, policy measures) 
in order to determine whether or not the predictions are optimal with regards to this particular 
information set (Wallis, 1989). To test a rationality, a necessary condition is that the forecast 
should be an unbiased predictor of the actual (Muth, 1960). The sufficient condition is that the 
forecast error is uncorrelated with the predicted value, which implies that the correlation 
coefficient between the forecast error and predicted value should be zero. In other words, the 
sufficient condition is that the predicted error must be uncorrelated with historical information.  
We push forward our analysis to investigate the source of rationality, by applying a 
methodology developed by Jalles et al. (2015). First, we distinguish the co-movements between 
the deviation of the outcome of the forecast and the forecast itself (the 𝛽-test). In other word, 
𝛽-test allows to show if the forecast deviation is proportional to the forecast itself. The main 
idea is to know whether the forecast error is uncorrelated with the entire information set at time 
t. The forecast value F are considered as a proxy of information available at the time of forecast. 
The estimate equation is: 
𝑒𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐹𝑡 + 𝜇1𝑡,     (3) 
Where 𝑒 and 𝐹 denote forecast errors and forecast, respectively. 
Table (2.4) shows that in the case of tax revenue and total revenue (column 1 and 2), the 
coefficients of 𝛽 are different from zero in the sample. These results mean that both for the two 
fiscal variables, the forecast deviation is proportional to the forecast itself. By against the 
expenditure forecast deviation seem to not be proportionally correlated with the forecast itself 
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(column 3). The   significant value of β mean that the lack of rationality stems from the used of 
the model that have not a minimum variance. In other words, the lack of rationality could be 
due to the poorly implementation of the forecast methods (e.g. econometric forecasting 
methods).  
Table 2.4: proportionality of forecast deviation 
VARIABLES Tax revenue Revenue Expenditure 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
    
    β -0.0258*** -0.0164*** -0.00513 
 
(0.00796) (0.00341) (0.00387) 
    
Observations 84 68 81 
R-squared 0.127 0.293 0.025 
Number of country 11 11 11 
Source: Authors, using data from WEO and from documentation of national budget Autorities. 
 
The second step for rationality is to see the co-movement between the deviation of the outcome 
of the forecast in the current period and that in the previous period (the 𝜌-test). This test allows 
to see if the errors of the past are repeated in the present. Formally, we estimate 𝜌 by regressing 
the current-period forecast error on the previous period error as shown the follow expressions: 
𝑒𝑡 = 𝛾 + 𝜌𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝜇2𝑡, 
Where 𝑒 and 𝑒𝑡−1 denote forecast errors and its previous value, respectively. 
The Table (2.5) below shows that there is a correlation between the past error and the present 
errors for the three fiscal variables use in the study. Therefore, the significant value of 𝜌 implies 
that the past errors seem repeated in the present. 
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Table 2.5: persistence in time of forecast errors 
VARIABLES Tax revenue Revenue Expenditure 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
    
    ρ 0.915*** 0.560*** 0.282** 
 
(0.207) (0.147) (0.127) 
    
Observations 67 54 67 
R-squared 0.262 0.257 0.083 
Number of idcountry 11 11 11 
Source: Authors, using data from WEO and from documentation of national budget Autorities. 
 
These two results allow us to tell that the fiscal forecast seem to be inefficient in CEMAC and 
WAEMU countries. The inefficiency arises because the forecast deviation is proportional to the 
forecast itself (this is the case of tax revenue and total revenue), but also because the past errors 
are repeated in the present. 
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4.6. Determinants of fiscal forecast errors 
The analysis on efficiency of government fiscal forecasts is in most of the literature presented 
together with potential determinants of forecast errors. In our study, we focus on a particular 
aspect of budget forecasting that is revenue forecasting. Revenue forecasting is essential in 
assessing budget planning and management processes. Revenue forecasts define the budget 
envelope and form the basis for effective medium-term planning. They are necessary to achieve 
sustainable financing of government projects and programs and to avoid major unplanned and 
possibly unsustainable fiscal deficits over time. 
4.6.1. Methodology and explanatory variables 
Based on existing literature, a following baseline model is used to look for determinants of 
forecast errors: 
𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡 +
𝜔𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡     (5) 
Where 𝑒𝑖𝑡 is total revenue forecast errors, 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 and 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 are the real GDP growth 
forecast errors and inflation forecast errors respectively; 𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡−1 is the output gap for year t-1; 
𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑡−1 is the public debt stock in percent of GDP for year t-1;  𝛽𝑗 are the regression 
parameters, t and i index years and countries, respectively; 𝛿𝑡 is the time-specific trend, 𝜔𝑖 
represents country-specific effects and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 the stochastic error term for each country 𝑖 and year 
𝑡. Time-specific intercepts are included to account for time-varying omitted variables and 
stochastic shocks that are common to all countries. 
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In this first baseline model, the choice of regressors is mainly guided by political economy 
literature applied to fiscal policy (Boylan, 2008; Aidt et al., 2011; de Deus and Mendonça,  
2015). 
We use macroeconomic variables such, inflation forecast errors and GDP growth forecast errors 
that should account for part of the errors in fiscal forecasts. Errors on real GDP forecasts should 
affect budget balances through automatic stabilizers and possibly anti-cyclical fiscal policies. 
Hence, a positive relationship between budgets forecast errors and GDP forecast errors is 
expected due to the fact that a greater bias on economic growth implies greater budget balance 
forecast errors. The reason for this is that revenue projections take into account forecasts on 
economic growth. An error on inflation can also affect revenue forecast errors through various 
channels. Firstly, real tax revenues may be reduced resulting in higher budget deficits. 
Moreover, inflation leads to higher long-term interest rates implying higher debt servicing costs 
and as a consequence a worsening of the fiscal balance. Secondly, inflation may positively 
affect the government revenue by the creep of support on the income tax revenue and also 
through eroding the value of nominal government debt (Lis and Nickel, 2009). 
The output gap is the gap between actual and potential GDP and represents the control for the 
business cycle during budgetary planning stage. 
𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑡−1 expressed as percentage of GDP, allows one to see the effects of public debt 
stabilization on budget forecasts. Debt creates obligations that must be met and weakens the 
ability to offset unplanned expenditures. These effects are subject to two interpretations. On the 
one hand, positive relationship, higher public debt can be associated with higher budget balance 
forecast errors as a consequence of lack of fiscal discipline by governments; on the other hand, 
a greater public debt can be associated with lower budget balance forecast error due to the 
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possibility of creating aversion to fiscal policymakers increasing public debt (de Deus and 
Mendonça,  2015).  
Some additional economic variables can also be used as regressors, namely oil price volatility 
and raw agricultural price volatility. Oil price volatility is important in our model as most 
countries in the sample are oil producers (especially all CEMAC members, except Central 
African Rep). In these countries, the budget is heavily dependent on the oil sector (74% in 
2008)17. Hence government revenues tend to be highly volatile due to the instability of 
international prices of oil. In addition, oil price shocks tend to be persistent and the oil price 
cycles are highly unpredictable. These characteristics make fiscal management more 
challenging in such countries with very important implications for the forecast performance. 
As regards the population, larger states tend to have larger tax administration, then may have 
more resources for their revenue forecast effort. 
In addition to these economic variables, there are other political and institutional variables that 
could explain the budget forecast error in our analysis.  
According to Lewis-Beck (1990), it is common that political candidates are re-elected when the 
economy is experiencing good times and thus they are motivated to present a prosperous 
economic environment. Furthermore, for Aidt et al., 2011, when a close election race is 
expected, the politician incentive to manipulate fiscal policy for electoral goals intensifies, 
thereby increasing political budget cycle size. In the context of budget forecasting, this behavior 
biased budgets. As point Bischoff and Gohout (2010), biased tax projections can help the 
political candidate in its fight for reelection. In order to test the electoral bias, we use a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 for the year before the presidential election, and zero otherwise.   
                                                          
17 BANQUE DE FRANCE – Rapport Zone franc – 2008 : L’évolution de la situation économique et financière 
dans la zone CEMAC 
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We also look at the correlation of the errors with the corruption perception index taken from 
the WGI. Corruption may affect budget performance through its impact on tax revenue and 
public spending. In the case of revenue, corruption can alter the manner by which revenues are 
generated, for example, when part of the tax proceeds does not accrue to the government and is 
usurped. Also Ghura (1998) concluded that corruption reduces tax revenues by reducing the 
revenues from almost all taxable sources (including incomes, profits, property, capital gains,) 
We compute two dummy variables related to the government budgetary activities. First, we ask 
to know if the government published a report or a chapter on fiscal risks (see explanatory 
memorandum of the Finance Act, preamble or conditions MTBF ratings). So, the dummy takes 
one if there is publication on fiscal risk and zero if not. Second, we look at if the macroeconomic 
and budgetary forecasts are confronted with those carried out by independent agencies or the 
IMF forecasts, the WB, or the central bank. The comparison of government forecasts for other 
organizations may enable him to know discrepancies in his forecasts. In fact, the forecast 
methods used by international agencies to forecast tend to be more sophisticated. 
We also take account the intensity of technical assistance of Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD) 
in each country of our sample. The aim of these assistance is to improve the government public 
finances. These assistances take various forms that can be project of law, methods etc... 
The data is a cross-sectional time series data set, and thus pooled OLS is the simple way for 
estimating due to the fact that it does not consider non-observed effects. It is important to note 
that in our sample, forecast errors magnitude differs from one country to another. Hence it is 
possible that country effects can be relevant for explaining budget balance forecast errors. 
Therefore, the model in equation (5) is estimated employing fixed effect estimator (FE). The 
literature on panel data emphasizes that panel data sets are likely to exhibit substantial cross-
sectional dependence, which may arise due to the presence of common shocks and unobserved 
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components that become part of the error term ultimately, spatial dependent and due to 
idiosyncratic pair-wise dependence in the disturbances with no particular pattern of common 
components or spatial dependence (Baltagi, 2008). Assuming that cross-sectional dependence 
is caused by the presence of common factors, which are unobserved (and as a result, the effect 
of these components is felt through the disturbance term) but they are uncorrelated with the 
included regressors, the standard FE is consistent, although not efficient and the estimated 
standard errors are biased. Using the tests developed by Frees (1995) and Pesaran (2004), we 
found evidence for the presence of cross-sectional dependence. Also, the Breush-Pagan test and 
the Durbin Watson test showed the presence of panel heteroscedasticity and serial 
autocorrelation, as common for panel data with country-year observations. To correct these 
problems, the model (5) was estimated using the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors as 
implemented by Hoechle (2007). This estimation accounts for heteroscedasticity and cross-
sectional dependence problems. Moreover, this option allowed us to correct the auto-correlation 
of any order. Some studies using GMM methods of reasons of a possible endogeneity of certain 
variables. Here, we decline to address the issue of endogeneity due limited number of 
observations. This should not have any effect on our results. 
4.6.2. Estimation results 
In this sub-section, we turn to the econometric results. The base line results are displayed into 
Table 3. In order to assume the robustness of our results, baseline Equation (5) is estimated in 
the first time by adding others economic variables as determinants of revenue forecast errors 
(Table 4), and secondly by using the political and institutional factors (Table 5). The dependent 
variable is the revenue forecast errors as defined previously by expression (1). In the base line 
results (Table 6), all coefficients of the variables in the estimations of expression (5) are positive 
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and are highly significant at determining the revenue forecast errors. Results show that 
forecasters tend to substantially over-predict the revenue on average.  
GDP growth forecast errors is significant in determining the revenue forecast in the all sample 
estimations. Therefore, a strongly significant impact indicating that a GDP growth forecast 
errors by 1% results in an increase of revenues forecast errors by 0.2%. As regard the effect of 
inflation forecast error, the study did not found evidence from the impact of the inflation on 
determining the revenue forecast errors in the whole sample in one hand when we took only 
inflation and GDP growth forecast error as determinant of revenue forecast error (column 1 of 
Table 3), and in other hand when we control revenue forecast error by adding another important 
variables (output gap, debt, and population size). We now return to examination of the cyclical 
pattern of bias in government forecasts. The output gap allows us to see if the bias is greater in 
a recession.18 The cyclical term is indeed positive but not significant. So, our data does not 
allow us to say that the over-optimism tends to be greater in recessions. Regarding the 
coefficients of public debt/GDP, the negative and statistically significant in models show that 
greater public debt seem to be associated with less bias in revenue forecasts. 
The column (2) shows also that population size has increase the errors in revenue forecasting 
in the countries. This can be explained by the importance of informal sector in the economy. 
So, a much of the resources of this sector escapes the State, thereby distorting its forecast for 
revenue. 
 
                                                          
18 The output gap has a negative value in our database, this correspond to recessions. 
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Table 3: baseline results 
VARIABLES Dependent variable: Revenue forecast errors 
 
Driscoll-Kraay Fixed-effects estimation 
  (1) (2) 
   
GDP errors(t) 1.476*** 1.569*** 
 
(0.206) (0.311) 
Inflation errors(t) 0.435 0.223 
 
(0.312) (0.122) 
Output Gap(t-1) 
 
0.161 
  
(0.227) 
DEBT (t-1) 
 
-0.078** 
  
(0.031) 
Population size 
 
21.60*** 
  
(1.428) 
Constant 168.9*** 447.8*** 
 
(33.64) (72.58) 
   
Number of observations 61 60 
Number of groups 11 11 
 R-squared 0.521 0.499 
Time dummies YES YES 
Source: Authors estimates 
Note: Driscoll-Kraay robust t-statistics in parentheses. They are robust to very general forms of cross-sectional 
and temporal dependence. All regressions control for the determinants of revenue forecast errors identified in the 
baseline specifications. Country fixed effects, Time fixed effects, and a constant term are included in each 
regression but are not reported. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
We rerun equation (5) with taking into account another economic factor such oil price volatility 
and agricultural raw material price volatility that could make forecasting more or less accuracy 
(see Table 4). The coefficient of oil price volatility is positive and statistically positive for all 
specification in our model. As reminder, all CEMAC countries are producer of petroleum 
except Central Africa. This finding shows that oil price volatility is also an important 
determinant of revenue forecasts errors. Given the fact that most of countries of our sample are 
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dependent to agricultural product, controlling for the volatility of the price of agricultural raw 
material aims to test whether our findings are robust to economic fluctuations. We can observe 
that the coefficients associated to raw material price volatility are strongly significant. This 
means the CEMAC and WAEMU countries are most affected by the fluctuations of world price 
of raw agricultural material. In a word, in the period of high volatility of world price, CEMAC 
and WAEMU countries forecasters overestimate their revenue.  
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 Table 4: Estimation with economic variables 
Source: Authors estimates 
Note: Driscoll-Kraay robust t-statistics in parentheses. They are robust to very general forms of cross-sectional and 
temporal dependence. All regressions control for the determinants of revenue forecast errors identified in the baseline 
specifications. Country fixed effects, Time fixed effects, and a constant term are included in each regression but are not 
reported. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
VARIABLES Dependent variable: Revenue forecast errors 
  Driscoll-Kraay Fixed-effects estimation 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
GDP errors(t) 1.569*** 2.459*** 1.773** 
 
(0.311) (0.607) (0.480) 
Inflation errors(t) 0.223 0.340** 0.402* 
 
(0.122) (0.117) (0.177) 
Output Gap(t-1) 0.161 0.612*** 0.496*** 
 
(0.227) (0.054) (0.114) 
DEBT (t-1) -0.078** 0.006 -0.109* 
 
(0.031) (0.046) (0.049) 
Population size 21.60*** 16.98*** 17.68*** 
 
(1.428) (0.952) (1.754) 
Agri. Raw Mat. Price Vol (t) 
 
2.977*** 
 
  
(0.297) 
 
OIL price volatility (t) 
  
0.607** 
   
(0.241) 
Constant 447.8*** 665.5*** 544.5*** 
 
(72.58) (26.14) (61.20) 
    
Number of observations 60 55 55 
Number of groups 11 11 11 
 R-squared 0.499 0.615 0.526 
Time dummies YES YES YES 
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Now, we analyze the errors in government revenue forecast by considering political, 
institutional, and governance factors (Table 5). The estimate of the variable “Election” is not 
significant for whole sample. We cannot conclude that CEMAC and WAEMU politicians tend 
to produce overoptimistic revenue forecasts to achieve electoral goals. Regarding to the 
institutional variables, the coefficient of “Corruption” has negative and significant sign in the 
estimation (Column 3). The results show that the least corrupt countries tend to reduce errors 
in revenue forecasts. 
Concerning the good practice of PFM, the publication by the government of a report or a chapter 
on fiscal risks seem relevant in reducing errors in revenue forecasting. We found that the FAD 
technical assistance in previous year had no effect on the quality of forecasts. On the other hand, 
a thorough analysis shows that it is from the third year onwards, thus in the medium term, that 
the effects of technical assistance on the quality of income forecasts are felt. Also, our study 
did not found evidence for the comparison of the forecast to those made by independent agency  
(IMF, World Bank, and Central Bank) in the quality of revenue forecast in WAEMU and 
CEMAC countries. 
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Table 5: estimation with politic and institutional variables 
VARIABLES Dependent variable: Revenue forecast errors 
 
Driscoll-Kraay Fixed-effects estimation 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
GDP errors(t) 1.569*** 1.482*** 1.533*** 1.750*** 1.717*** 1.030** 
 
(0.311) (0.287) (0.296) (0.420) (0.400) (0.281) 
Inflation errors(t) 0.223 0.366*** 0.278*** 0.615** 0.625** 0.311 
 
(0.122) (0.095) (0.083) (0.192) (0.230) (0.402) 
Output Gap(t-1) 0.161 0.123 0.225 0.575*** 0.563*** 0.787*** 
 
(0.227) (0.209) (0.182) (0.115) (0.130) (0.106) 
DEBT (t-1) -0.078** -10.65*** -8.207*** -7.666** -7.260** 0.668 
 
(0.031) (1.303) (1.137) (2.405) (2.714) (3.335) 
Population size 21.60*** 22.63*** 23.67*** 18.80*** 17.73*** 16.78*** 
 
(1.428) (2.262) (2.602) (2.300) (2.616) (1.147) 
Election 
 
-1.206 
    
  
(2.249) 
    
Corruption 
  
-0.553** 
   
   
(0.181) 
   
Publication of Budget Risk 
   
-5.976** 
  
    
(1.988) 
  
Independent agence 
    
-0.407 
 
     
(2.325) 
 
FAD – TA (t-1) 
     
-1.049 
      
(0.947) 
Constant 447.8*** 516.2*** 501.1*** 634.4*** 627.5*** 780.2*** 
 
(72.58) (39.22) (36.61) (43.56) (47.21) (22.56) 
       
Number of observations 60 60 60 55 55 42 
Number of groups 11 11 11 11 11 11 
 R-squared 0.499 0.521 0.529 0.522 0.517 0.601 
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Source: Authors estimates 
Note: Driscoll-Kraay robust t-statistics in parentheses. They are robust to very general forms of cross-sectional and temporal 
dependence. All regressions control for the determinants of revenue forecast errors identified in the baseline specifications. 
Country fixed effects, Time fixed effects, and a constant term are included in each regression but are not reported. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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4.6.3. Robustness test 
In this section, we investigate the robustness of the results presented above. First, we include 
additional economic and institutional variables in the baseline model and estimated it with the 
same method as Driscoll-Kraay estimation. Moreover, we include the lagged value of our 
dependent variable as explanatory factor of current revenue forecast errors. Then we re-estimate 
the benchmark model by an appropriate econometric method.  
4.6.3.1. Testing for additional controls on baseline specification 
Our first attempt in this sensitivity checking consist in adding further controls in the baseline 
specification to take into account other variables likely to affect CEMAC and WAEMU 
countries government revenue forecast. These additional controls are political stability and 
absence of violence or terrorism measure perceptions and the size of government measure by 
the ratio of total revenue on GDP. First time, we add each variable individually and secondly, 
we add these two control variables together. Table 6 below details estimation results. 
In column (1 to 3), we control for the size of government. The size of government has a positive 
effect on revenue forecast errors meaning that the larger the government, the more difficult it 
seems to forecast revenue. Moreover, all the variable of our baseline model keeps these sign 
and significance showing the consistence of our finding. 
In column (4 to 6), we include political stability and absence of violence or terrorism measure 
perceptions. Here, the coefficients associated are highly significant in all specifications. 
Moreover, these coefficients remain statistically significant with the same negative effect when 
we include both size of government and political stability in the same equation (see column 7 
to 9 in Table (6). Also, all the variable of baseline model (Table 6) as the same sign and 
significance even there are change in the coefficients.   
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In a word, our hypothesis about the effect of variables in our baseline model on government 
revenue forecast errors remains in force when we use another economic and institutional 
variable. 
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Table 6: Testing for additional control variables 
VARIABLES Dependent variable: Revenue forecast errors   / Driscoll-Kraay Fixed-effects estimation 
 
Government size Politic stability Gov. size and Politic stability 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
                  
GDP errors(t) 1.115** 1.857* 1.226* 1.699*** 2.605*** 1.984*** 1.243*** 2.028** 1.440** 
 
(0.438) (0.761) (0.558) (0.281) (0.485) (0.360) (0.367) (0.664) (0.445) 
Inflation errors(t) 0.004 0.241* 0.325 0.413** 0.583** 0.720** 0.177 0.472** 0.619* 
 
(0.135) (0.107) (0.191) (0.161) (0.172) (0.287) (0.173) (0.174) (0.266) 
Output Gap(t-1) 0.139 0.561*** 0.529*** 0.173 0.672*** 0.602*** 0.151 0.620*** 0.625*** 
 
(0.146) (0.112) (0.127) (0.255) (0.0655) (0.115) (0.172) (0.138) (0.146) 
DEBT (t-1) -0.059*** -0.0112 -0.0838* -0.152*** -0.0703* -0.186*** -0.125*** -0.0809* -0.155** 
 
(0.015) (0.034) (0.036) (0.038) (0.035) (0.042) (0.023) (0.036) (0.046) 
Population size 22.70*** 18.22*** 19.14*** 20.04*** 15.30*** 15.77*** 21.30*** 16.59*** 17.33*** 
 
(1.882) (1.988) (3.097) (1.807) (0.906) (1.625) (2.348) (1.988) (3.117) 
Gov. size 178.5*** 126.1** 176.3*** 
   
173.0*** 118.8** 169.9*** 
 
(35.77) (42.13) (36.38) 
   
(37.74) (45.80) (42.16) 
Politic stability 
   
-9.749*** -10.67*** -11.90*** -8.544*** -9.902*** -10.92*** 
    
(1.931) (1.838) (2.542) (2.003) (1.402) (1.682) 
Agri. Raw Mat. Price Vol (t) 
 
2.028*** 
  
2.766*** 
  
1.887*** 
 
  
(0.409) 
  
(0.250) 
  
(0.415) 
 
OIL price volatility (t) 
  
0.033 
  
0.384 
  
-0.151 
   
(0.209) 
  
(0.256) 
  
(0.213) 
Constant 453.8*** 654.9*** 620.3*** 489.0*** 719.3*** 635.2*** 489.8*** 705.5*** 700.8*** 
 
(48.01) (48.98) (50.88) (80.64) (34.41) (52.62) (58.69) (63.82) (62.54) 
          
Number of observations 60 55 55 60 55 55 60 55 55 
Number of groups 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 
R-squared  0.594 0.659 0.621 0.526 0.651 0.569 0.614 0.689 0.657 
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Source: Authors estimates 
Note: Driscoll-Kraay robust t-statistics in parentheses. They are robust to very general forms of cross-sectional and temporal 
dependence. All regressions control for the determinants of revenue forecast errors identified in the baseline specifications. 
Country fixed effects, Time dummies, and a constant term are included in each regression but are not reported. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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4.6.3.2. Revenue forecasting errors determinant estimation: Using the bias-
corrected least-squares dummy variable (LSDV-C) estimator  
We pursue the robustness analysis by introducing on the right-hand side of the equation (5) a 
lagged value of errors with the objective of reproducing the dynamics of the errors in the 
revenue forecast. The idea is to capture the persistence of errors as we can see in the studies of 
de Deus  and Mendonça (2015), and Debrun and Kinda (2017). Therefore, this implies 
estimation of the following model: 
𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑡−1 +
𝛽6𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡     (6) 
Where 𝑒𝑖𝑡 and 𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 are the revenue forecast errors and its lag value, 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 and 
𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 are the GDP growth  forecast errors and error in consumer price index 
respectively; 𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡−1 is the output gap at the period (t-1); 𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑡−1 (GDP ratio) is the public 
debt stock at the time (t-1); 𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑡 is the population size  𝛼 and 𝛽𝑗 are the parameters, t, i and j 
index years, countries and regressors, respectively; 𝛿𝑡 is the time-specific trend, 𝜔𝑖 represents 
country-specific effects and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 the stochastic error term for each country 𝑖 and year 𝑡. The 
time-specific intercepts are included to account for time-varying omitted variables and 
stochastic shocks that are common to all countries. 
The estimation of model (6) may yield biased coefficient estimates because the lagged 
dependent variables are included. Also, with the unbalanced nature of our panel, we use for the 
regression the bias-corrected least-squares dummy variable (LSDV-C) estimator by Bruno 
(2005).  
Results displayed in Table 7 show that the efficiency of our revenue forecast error is also driven 
by the pass error confirming the results obtained in the descriptive statistic section. We find 
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evidence that the signs and the significance levels of our variables are almost unchanged for the 
two-different specification. The result did not give evidence of effect of error of GDP forecast 
on revenue forecast errors. The errors in inflation forecast become significant with the same 
positive sign. The only major change occurs in the magnitude of the coefficients. Focusing on 
the output gap, we notice that coefficients estimated by the LSDV-C are about 0.08% higher 
than those estimated by the Driscoll-Kraay estimation. However, for the population size, the 
magnitude of coefficient is somewhat small from about 5% compare to the Driscoll-Kraay 
estimation.  
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Table 7: Bias Corrected LSDV Dynamic Panel Model estimator 
VARIABLES Dependent variable: Revenue forecast errors   
  LSDV-C, one-periods LSDV-C, two periods Driscoll-Kraay FE 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
errors (t-1) 0.604*** 0.595*** 
 
 
(0.126) (0.126) 
 
GDP errors(t) 0.348 0.352 1.569*** 
 
(0.632) (0.630) (0.311) 
Inflation errors(t) 0.753** 0.747** 0.223 
 
(0.362) (0.358) (0.122) 
Output Gap(t-1) 0.008 0.006 0.161 
 
(0.509) (0.506) (0.227) 
DEBT (t-1) -0.156* -0.156* -0.078** 
 
(0.083) (0.085) (0.031) 
Population size 16.56 16.65* 21.60*** 
 
(10.08) (10.01) (1.428) 
    
Number of observations 47 47 60 
Number of groups 11 11 11 
Time dummies YES YES YES 
Source: Authors estimates 
Note: the table reports the result of estimation of the dynamic model specification (6) using the least square dummy 
variable approach (LSDV) with the proposed bias correction for dynamic panel models of Bruno (2005) explaining the 
sd of the revenue forecast errors. Country fixed effects, time dummy, and a constant term are included in each regression 
but are not reported. Biased-corrected standard errors are in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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4.7. Social effects of fiscal forecasts errors 
This section assesses the distributional effect of fiscal forecast errors in studied countries 
sample. An important aspect of distributional outcomes arising from fiscal policy changes is 
related to their implications for income distribution. As is widely recognized, income 
distribution plays a key role in political and economic stability and thus has a wider significance 
(see for example Alesina and Perotti, 1996). Accordingly, governments are tasked with the role 
of determining the desirable distribution of resources within the economy and employing an 
array of policy tools to adjust economic outcomes for their populations. We consider a fiscal 
forecast errors as a shock in fiscal policy, that is, the measurement error associated with the 
fiscal projection. Fiscal policy shocks can affect income inequality through its impact on the 
distribution of market income as well as disposable income. In fact, a shock in fiscal policy 
generally leads to a short-term reduction in output and employment, often associated with a fall 
in the share of wages. This tends to increase market income inequality, given the relatively high 
share of wages in the incomes of low-income groups (Jenkins et al., 2013). Increasing 
unemployment also tends to widen wage inequality, as unskilled wages decline relative to 
skilled wages, as employers accumulate skilled labor (Mukoyama and Sahin, 2006). The 
duration and magnitude of these effects depend on the size of the automatic stabilizers, as well 
as the response of growth and its impact on employment. While multipliers are particularly high 
during downturns (Jordà and Taylor, 2016), fiscal policy shocks can have a significant effect 
on employment. These effects can be long-lasting if a prolonged period of slow growth has 
negative effects on supply side of economy (Aghion et al., 2009). Beyond its effects on market 
incomes, fiscal policy shock also affects the level and composition of taxes and expenditures 
and therefore disposable incomes. When fiscal policy shocks are based on increasing regressive 
taxes and reductions in incremental spending, income inequality tends to increase the more. 
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Hereafter follows an econometric test of social effect of fiscal policy shocks over the years 
2004-2015 for 11 WAEMU and CEMAC countries. The test takes the following form: 
𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝐹𝐸_𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 ;   𝑖 = 1, … , N ; t = 1, … , T       (7) 
Where 𝑖 and t denote respectively the country and time period; 𝑋 is a vector of determinants 
and control variables, 𝜂𝑖 is the time-invariant country’s fixed effect; and 𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the idiosyncratic 
error term. FE_shock is our fiscal forecast errors computed as the difference between as outturn 
and forecast of government revenue.  
𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒 is the dependent variable, that captures the social effect of forecast errors and hence 
fiscal policy shocks. Our measure of inclusive growth stems from that of  Ramos et al. (2013), 
which stated that inclusive growth is both an outcome and a process: on the one hand, it ensures 
that everyone can participate in the growth process, both in terms of decision-making for 
organizing the growth progression as well as in participating in the growth itself; on the other 
hand, inclusive growth makes sure that everyone shares equitably the benefits of growth. Thus, 
inclusive growth has elements pertaining to “broad based growth, shared growth, and 
productive employment opportunities". The indicators: For participation, we use the 
employment-to-population ratio which represent the absorption rate; and for benefit sharing, 
unlike Ramos et al. (2013) that focused both on poverty and income inequality, we focus our 
analysis only on income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient. This is due to data 
constraint. Finally, as inclusive growth encompasses the pace of growth, we include the per 
capita income growth to account the growth progression. The Gini coefficients are from the 
Standardized World Income Database (SWIID) and measured the net Gini i.e. the Gini after tax 
and transfer. The employment-to-population ratio, which is the proportion of a country’s 
population that is employed, is provided by World Bank Indicator. The GDP per capita growth 
is from World Bank Indicator. 
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The inclusiveness index is constructed through a min-max normalization19 of data on income 
inequality index, the employment-to-population ratio, and the per capita income growth. Next, 
we multiply the index by 100 to have an indicator ranging from 0 to 100 scales. The lower 
values of the index imply better performances; that is, the closer to 0 the index, the more 
inclusive the country. More especially, the index will be closer to 0, the lower the Gini index, 
and the higher the employment-to-population ratio and an increase in per capita income. In 
other words, the low value indicates a high level of inclusiveness. The higher index value 
represents a worse performance in terms of inclusiveness. The index is the sample average of 
the three min-max normalizations. Intuitively, it represents the average distance of a country’s 
position regarding growth, inequality and employment to the best situations within the group 
of countries analyzed. 
The set of independent variables includes. A variable of main interest in our study is the fiscal 
policy shocks variable. We also include control variables that have been found in literature as 
determinant of inclusive growth. These variables account for the economic fluctuations (output 
gap, oil price volatility, and inflation), public total investment, agriculture value added in 
percentage of GDP, politic stability, public spending on health expressed as percentage of GDP, 
and foreign direct investment inflow as percentage of GDP. The frequency of these explanatory 
variables is in general annual. In order to control for the quality of overall governance and 
efficiency of the public sector we control for the level of corruption, government effectiveness, 
and rule of law. Bad governance with corruption increases income inequality, mostly by 
reducing economic growth Abed and Gupta (2002). We measure government effectiveness, and 
rule of law with the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), and corruption with 
                                                          
19 The min–max normalization consists of calculating the ratio between the country’s figure minus the lowest 
figure possible in the two periods, and the difference by the highest and the lowest figures possible, also 
considering the two periods. This is done for each one of the three series. 
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Transparency International institutional database. Therefore, the poor quality of these variables 
is expected to lead to increased inequality through distorts the economic and financial 
environment and affects people’s ability to earn income and achieve reasonable standards of 
living. 
The results presented in Table 8 show that the coefficient of fiscal policy shocks is positive and 
statistically significant. This suggests that an error in revenue forecast referred to as fiscal policy 
shocks has a detrimental effect on inclusive growth. A one percent increase in revenue forecast 
errors is associated with about 0.12 decrease in the growth inclusiveness in the countries used 
in our study. The positive and somewhat significant (at the 10 percent level in the estimation 
with fixed effects and robust standard errors) coefficient on oil price volatility and inflation 
imply that economic fluctuations harm the inclusiveness of growth. The estimates show a 
negative and significant effect of government spending on health on our index of inclusive 
growth. Specially, an increase of total public expenditure in general and spending on health in 
particular induces an increase in growth inclusiveness. Similar result is obtained when one 
controls for the agricultural value added. These results highlight that the well-targeted 
investment to support the disadvantaged (for example, specific investments that improve the 
productivity of the agricultural sector in developing countries, or those that improve the 
prospects for higher labor force participation of women) also helps ensure that the benefits are 
more broadly shared. In this context, the estimation suggests that an increase in agriculture 
value added of 1 percent of GDP leads to a medium-term increase in inclusive growth of about 
0.7 percentage point. Furthermore, our results on the effects of institutional variables quality 
such as government effectiveness, and rule of law are consistent with findings from literature 
with suggests that higher quality of institution variables increase inclusive growth by increasing 
growth and reducing income inequality. 
 211 
 
Table 8: Distributional effects of fiscal policy shocks 
VARIABLES Dependent variable: Inclusive growth index 
  Driscoll-Kraay Fixed-effects estimation 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Fiscal policy shocks  0.123** 0.120*** 0.129*** 0.119*** 
 
(0.034) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) 
Output Gap 0.051 0.092 0.071 0.097 
 
(0.139) (0.121) (0.134) (0.135) 
Oil price volatility  0.853** 0.826** 0.755* 0.589* 
 
(0.349) (0.321) (0.320) (0.272) 
Inflation 0.693** 0.759*** 0.733** 0.783** 
 
(0.191) (0.160) (0.214) (0.243) 
FDI inflows 0.260 0.189 0.308 0.327 
 
(0.245) (0.286) (0.254) (0.253) 
Gov. spending on health 1.088 1.106 1.426 2.505** 
 
(0.799) (0.804) (0.895) (0.992) 
Public investment -1.960** -1.884** -2.087** -2.429** 
 
(0.637) (0.656) (0.650) (0.791) 
Agric. value added -0.700*** -0.681*** -0.685*** -0.753*** 
 
(0.134) (0.135) (0.131) (0.164) 
Corruption 
 
-0.289 
  
  
(0.246) 
  
Gov. effectiv. 
  
-11.70** 
 
   
(4.767) 
 
Rule law 
   
-13.06*** 
    
(1.906) 
Constant -6.154 -7.350 -19.87 -17.53 
 
(19.41) (17.19) (24.64) (21.81) 
     
Number of observations 55 55 55 55 
Number of groups 11 11 11 11 
R-squared 0.402 0.410 0.411 0.428 
Source: Authors estimates 
Note: Driscoll-Kraay robust t-statistics in parentheses. They are robust to very general forms of cross-sectional and temporal 
dependence. The fiscal policy shocks are the errors in forecast. The dependent variable is inclusive growth index, the lower 
values of the index implies better performances. Country fixed effects, Time dummies, and a constant term are included in each 
regression but are not reported. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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4.8. Conclusion 
In this chapter, we assessed revenue forecasting in two francophone Africa areas (CEMAC and 
WAEMU) by looking at budgetary projections. Having in mind that forecasting is a complex 
task surrounded by huge uncertainty, we documented the statistical properties of forecast errors 
using data collected from national draft budgets that were made for the period 2004-2015. We 
performed a panel data analysis of the potential determinants of revenue forecasting errors as 
well as the distributional effect of fiscal policy shocks considering a wide set of economic, 
political and institutional variables.  
Our results from statistical point of view show that the quality of forecasts is worse for revenue 
in all sample. Further, the degree of cross-country heterogeneity is higher in the sample. The 
statistical analysis shows that only one country produces both relatively unbiased and accurate 
fiscal forecasts – Benin. The test of inefficiency shows that both in these two economic areas, 
the inefficiency of fiscal forecast occurs in most time because the forecast deviation is 
proportional to the forecast itself (this is the case of tax revenue and total revenue), but also 
because the past errors are repeated in the present. 
The results regarding the analysis on determinants of revenue forecasting errors confirm those 
found in the literature. In this sense, the results denote that a part of revenue forecast errors can 
be explained by random shocks to the economy. For instance, unexpected changes in the GDP 
growth, change in consumer price measured by inflation and the price volatility. Moreover, 
unlike the findings of de Deus and Mendonça (2015), our work found that output gap (economic 
cycle) in the previous year is relevant economic factor that cause a bias in the government 
revenue forecast errors. However, public debt/GDP ratio is associated with lower budget 
balance forecast error, against our expectation. According to de Deus and Mendonça (2015), 
this can be the possibility of creating aversion to fiscal policymakers. The study cannot 
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conclude that CEMAC and WAEMU politicians tend to produce overoptimistic revenue 
forecasts to achieve electoral goals. The good practice of PFM namely the publication by the 
government of a report or a chapter on fiscal risks seem relevant in reducing errors in revenue 
forecasting. Lastly, concerning institutional variables (corruption and politic stability), such as 
noted by Pina and Venes (2011), the findings indicate that they cannot be neglected in the 
analysis of fiscal forecasting error. 
Regarding the distributional effect of fiscal policy shocks, the results suggest that an error in 
revenue forecast considered as fiscal policy shocks has a detrimental effect on inclusive growth. 
These effects on employment and inequality are mitigated in a healthy economic environment 
accompanied by better institutional quality. 
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4.9. Appendices 
 
Appendix A1: countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WAEMU CEMAC 
BENIN CAMEROON 
BURKINA FASO CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 
CÔTE D'IVOIRE CHAD 
MALI CONGO, REP. 
NIGER GABON 
SENEGAL 
 
TOGO 
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Appendix A2: variables definition and data sources 
 
Variables Description Sources 
Revenue outturn Revenue outturn National Autorities documents 
Revenue forecast Revenue forecast National Autorities documents 
Real GDP growth Real GDP, current prices in national currency World Economic Outlook (WEO) 
Inflation  Average consumer prices, Percent change World Economic Outlook (WEO) 
Output Gap 
Difference between actual GDP and potential GDP, Authors 
calculations based on WEO data World Economic Outlook (WEO) 
Debt General government gross debt 9percent of GDP) World Economic Outlook (WEO) 
OIL price  Crude oil, average ($/bbl) World Economic Outlook (WEO) 
Agricultural Raw Price  Agricultural raw material, nominal($/kg) World Economic Outlook (WEO) 
Politic Stability 
Captures perception about the likelihood that the government 
will get destabilised /overthrown through unconstitutional or 
violent means 
Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(WGI)  
Government Effectiveness 
Measuring the competence of the bureaucracy and the quality 
of public service delivery 
 Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(WGI)  
Corruption Measures the perceived levels of public sector corruption  Transparency International 
Election Election Year 
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GENERAL CONCLUSION 
Achieving a pattern of income distribution that policy makers deem desirable and acceptable to 
society as a whole is one of the objectives of fiscal policy in its own right. Indeed, it promotes 
social cohesion and political stability and enables the whole of society to participate in the 
overall process of economic growth, even if the contribution of different groups of the 
population varies. But achieving an income distribution model that stimulates growth and job 
creation should also be considered an intermediate goal. For both of these reasons, it is essential 
for developing countries to carefully consider how fiscal policies influence the distribution of 
income as part of their development strategies. The role of fiscal measures as instruments for 
simultaneously stimulating economic activity and improving income distribution may be 
viewed in a different light. Indeed, the potential for using taxation and public spending to reduce 
inequality without compromising economic growth is likely to be much greater than is generally 
assumed. In the context of fiscal consolidation in many economies, tax and spending measures 
should enhance or maintain the distributive effects of fiscal policy while supporting economic 
efficiency. These measures include reducing opportunities for tax evasion and tax avoidance, 
increasing the progressivity of income taxes relative to higher income brackets, reducing 
unproductive expenditures, and means-tested programs. Improving the distributive impact of 
fiscal policy in developing economies will require improving their ability to raise tax revenues 
and spend these resources more efficiently and equitably. 
Developed economies have a much longer history of using fiscal policy to address inequality 
and promote inclusive growth than those in developing countries. Therefore, as developing 
countries explore the more active use of fiscal policy for inclusive purposes, they can learn from 
the experiences of advanced countries. Those experiences clearly suggest that fiscal policy can 
have a significant effect on inequality, which is a source of optimism about its potential to 
promote equity. Nevertheless, this optimism should be tempered by the different circumstances 
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of advanced economies compared to developing economies, as well as by the need for least 
developed countries to maintain fiscal sustainability and economic growth. 
In general way, inclusive economic growth can be thought of as encompassing income growth 
in which no socio-economic group is deprived of growth benefits. Fiscal policy is inclusive if 
it deploys instruments that promote inclusion and promotes its traditional objectives of growth 
and macroeconomic stability. Here, the non-income dimensions of inclusion are ignored, so 
that inclusive economic growth is growth with declining inequality. In addition, we are 
interested only in fiscal instruments such as taxation and public spending. 
Therefore, the objective of this thesis was to analyze the effects of fiscal policy on inclusive 
growth and to do so, we have presented four essays in which different econometric techniques 
are used to assess the growth inclusiveness effects of government fiscal policy in developing 
countries. Our analysis is divided into two parts: through Chapters 1 and 2, the first part has 
dealt with the evaluation of government tax and spending policy effects on inclusive growth in 
developing countries. The second part of this thesis has presented the analyzing of fiscal 
adjustment, fiscal forecast and inclusive development through Chapters 3 and 4. 
 
Main results 
Chapter 1 examines how public tax revenue components (value added tax, personal income 
tax, and corporate income tax) affect the inclusiveness of growth in developing countries. The 
link between tax policy and inclusive growth deserves attention, as income and consumption 
levels are the main indicators of household well-being. So, any change in tax policy necessarily 
implies a change in price structure which affects consumer preferences. This change can affect 
households indirectly through the change in production factors cost, and thereby their income. 
The inclusive growth index used refers to that developed by Anand and al. (2013), which 
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integrates both the pace and distribution of economic growth. In fact, it integrates growth and 
income distribution into a single measure. Thereby, it provides a framework to study equity and 
efficiency together.  
Using a database of 91 developing countries over the period 1990-2015, we show that, personal 
income tax (PIT) has been the best tool to affect the income distribution, leading to a more 
inclusive growth. The study discusses also the role played by institutional variables qualities in 
the implementation of tax policy. In the case of corporate income tax, the chapter provides 
evidence that this tax contributes to greater inclusive growth if and only if the countries have a 
strong institution quality like low corruption and a good bureaucratic policy. Moreover, we 
analyze the nonlinear effect of the taxation on inclusive growth. The specific objectives is a 
determination of the threshold of taxation for developing countries beyond which the 
inclusiveness of growth declines. Our result shows that there is an optimal tax beyond which, 
any increase in the personal income tax rate should have negative impact on inclusive growth. 
Regarding the VAT, the analysis of threshold effect shows that it is from a certain threshold 
that the VAT revenue positively affects inclusive growth. This highlight several problems in 
VAT such as numerous exonerations, and non-refunding of VAT credits making VAT little 
accountable.  Furthermore, the chapter tried to see whether or not there is a politico-budgetary 
cycle in the effect of taxation. The analysis shows that governments tend to reduce the income 
tax rates in electoral periods, but not necessarily the consumption tax rates. This implies that 
the income tax rates have a bigger impact on voters’ choices compared to consumption taxes. 
Finally, we examine whether the impact of tax policy on inclusive growth has been affected by 
great financial crisis that took place during the year 2008. We found the improvement in the 
effect of tax policy on inclusive growth after the financial crisis. One explanation could be 
developing countries have reformed their tax system in the sense of taxation in favor of pro-
poor growth. 
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Chapter 2 evaluates the effects of government expenditure components on both equity and 
growth, in sub-Saharan countries. Specifically, the chapter tries to analyze whether it is possible 
to design public spending in order to promote a more equitable society without sacrificing 
economic growth. The chapter is important for countries in sub-Saharan Africa at the time when 
governments face many political and economic challenges such as commodity price volatility, 
inflation, terrorism, and poor institutional quality (corruption, poor governance). Thus, the 
inclusion of the growth target could only be achieved through a quality institution and 
productive pro-poor government expenditures in the form of broad-based spending on 
education, health and infrastructure. To carry out the study, a panel-data vector autoregressive 
(panel VAR) approach is employed on annual data of 10 sub Saharan African countries over 
the period 1990-2015.  
Our findings from impulsive response function give evidence that investment in infrastructure 
(quality and stock) contributed to more inclusive growth in Sub-sub Saharan African economies 
than others government spending in long term. This effect could be observed by an increased 
in GDP per capita growth and reducing in income inequality measured by Gini index. However, 
our results do not find evidence that public spending on education and health affect both equity 
and growth in Sub-Saharan Africa countries. In fact, among other reasons, these programs are 
in many countries located in urban areas thus not directly benefiting the rural poor or even those 
in the informal settlements in urban areas. Moreover, social spending in developing countries 
often benefits the rich and middle classes more than the poor. Therefore, a higher share of social 
spending on items such as health and education will not be reflected in higher incomes for the 
poor. These results are confirmed by the variance decomposition analysis (FEVD). 
Chapter 3 explores the effects of fiscal adjustment on inclusive growth in Côte d’Ivoire over 
the period 1980-2014. Addressing such issue seems necessary as poor income distribution could 
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reduce the government's political support for implementing consolidation measures, but also 
because high levels of inequality could hurt long-term growth. In order to measure the impact 
of fiscal adjustments we use the cyclically adjusted primary balance (CAPB) as the measure of 
the government’s fiscal stance. The interest of this fiscal measure is that it isolates discretionary 
policy action from effects resulting from economic activity such as inflation or real interest rate 
changes. Contrary to Yang et al. (2015) that use a share price index as an additional variable 
determining the CAPB, we use the international price of cocoa. In fact, cocoa accounts for 15% 
of Côte d'Ivoire's GDP and more than 50% of its export earnings. When considering cocoa price 
as a business cycle factor, it would be ideal to include other types of commodity prices such as 
oil price and coffee price. But we use only the price of cocoa as a business cycle factor due to 
its particular relevance to tax revenues, and we believe this index is representative of the other 
commodity price movement. Therefore, a period of fiscal adjustment corresponds to a year in 
which the cyclically adjusted primary balance (CAPB) improves by at least 1 per cent of GDP. 
The estimation of the inclusiveness effects of fiscal consolidation in Côte d’Ivoire is made using 
the Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) method developed by Magnus, Powell, and Prüfer 
(2010).  
Our results show that fiscal consolidations are followed by an improved in growth performance, 
but also income gap decreases after periods of fiscal adjustments in Côte d’Ivoire. In other 
words, there is no trade-off between growth and income inequality when implementing fiscal 
consolidations in Côte d’Ivoire. This conclusion contrasts to the results of several papers that 
analyze the impact of fiscal consolidations on inequality at the national level. Our findings also 
suggest that tax-based fiscal consolidations seem to increase economic growth. However, the 
results did not find evidence to the expansionary effect of spending-based fiscal adjustment. 
These results could be explained by the fact that in developing countries, tax based-adjustment 
are generally a base-broadening measures. Therefore, this will contribute to strong tax revenue 
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collections and play an important role in achieving higher, sustainable economic growth. 
Moreover, we find that tax revenue increases in Côte d’Ivoire were not associated with 
increases in inequality. Interestingly, when fiscal consolidation is achieved via revenue side, 
income inequality seems to be reduced further. In addition, reductions in primary expenditures 
do not seem to reduce the income gap. 
The last chapter investigate the fiscal forecasts and it social effects in CEMAC and WAEMU 
countries. The objective of this chapter is threefold. First, it aims to assess the quality of fiscal 
forecasts (accuracy, rationality and unbiasedness) in these two-economics areas. Second, it tries 
to analyze the determining factors of fiscal forecast deviation for CEMAC and WAEMU 
countries. Third, it analyzes the social effects of fiscal policy shocks through its impacts on the 
growth inclusiveness. Having in mind that forecasting is a complex task surrounded by huge 
uncertainty, we documented the statistical properties of forecast errors using data collected from 
national draft budgets that were made for the period 2004-2015. Three aspects are tested: 
accuracy, rationality and unbiasedness. Assuming the presence of cross-sectional dependence 
in our model, that could be caused by the common factors which are unobserved, we resort to 
a Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors estimation method in order to have the unbiasedness 
estimators. 
The statistical analysis of the quality of fiscal forecast shows that only one country produces 
both relatively unbiased and accurate fiscal forecasts – Benin. The test of inefficiency shows 
that both in these two economic areas, the inefficiency of fiscal forecast occurs in most time 
because the forecast deviation is proportional to the forecast itself, but also because the past 
errors are repeated in the present. Furthermore, the degree of cross-country heterogeneity is 
high in the sample. The investigation on potential determinants errors denote that a part of 
revenue forecast errors can be explained by random shocks to the economy like unexpected 
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changes in the GDP growth, change, consumer price measured by inflation and the price 
volatility. Against our expectation, public debt/GDP ratio is associated with lower budget 
balance forecast error. Our study does not find evidence of the effect of election year on revenue 
forecasts. Finally, the good practice of PFM namely the publication by the government of a 
report or a chapter on fiscal risks seem relevant in reducing errors in revenue forecasting. 
Regarding the distributional effect of fiscal policy shocks, the results suggest that an error in 
revenue forecast considered as fiscal policy shocks has a detrimental effect on inclusive growth. 
These effects on employment and inequality are mitigated in a healthy economic environment 
accompanied by better institutional quality. 
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Recommendations 
Overall, our analysis in Part 1 has shown that fiscal policy especially tax and expenditure policy 
play a critical role in the inclusive growth and its effect depends on the quality of countries 
institutions. The main recommendation from the Chapter 1 goes to the least developed 
countries, which must rely on indirect taxation for achieve their goal of redistribution and 
poverty reduction. These countries should adopt inclusive growth strategies in a healthy 
institutional environment that focus on the effective management of revenues from indirect 
taxes including VAT given the dominance thereof in their tax system. In addition, Chapter 2 
also showed that the composition of government spending affects the inclusiveness of growth 
especially in sub-Saharan African countries, but the effect is greater in the case of investment 
in infrastructure than other kinds of public spending. The main recommendation for sub-
Saharan countries is to consider temporary and well-targeted programs to help those being left 
out by the growth process. Furthermore, Governments of sub-Saharan African countries should 
direct their policies strategies on increasing productive public expenditure on health, education, 
and infrastructure. 
The results obtained in Part 2 of this thesis suggest that restoring public finances is a prerequisite 
for sustainable and inclusive economic growth, and this require credible medium-term fiscal 
adjustment strategies as well as a credible budgetary projection. Chapter 3 shows that in the 
case study of Côte d’Ivoire there is no trade-off between growth and income inequality in a 
period of fiscal adjustment. Furthermore, tax-based fiscal consolidations seem to play a major 
role in inclusive economic growth than spending-based fiscal adjustment. Here, the main 
recommendation is to implement tax reforms that enhance the efficiency and fairness of the tax 
system, mainly by broadening the tax-base through a reduction of tax exemptions with 
combating opportunities for tax avoidance and evasion. 
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Moreover, as we have shown in Chapter 4, the quality of fiscal forecasts is not good. The 
inefficiency of fiscal forecast occurs in most time because the forecast deviation is proportional 
to the forecast itself, but also because the past errors are repeated in the present. Furthermore, 
a part of revenue forecast errors can be explained by random shocks to the economy. Therefore, 
these errors in revenue forecast considered as fiscal policy shocks has a detrimental effect on 
inclusive growth. For these countries, we recommend the good practice of PFM namely the 
publication by the government of a report or a chapter on fiscal risks, and a comparison of 
government forecasts with those of independent agencies. In addition, the forecasting body 
should include outside experts in order to widen the economic knowledge available to the 
forecasting body and can improve how well a forecast is trusted. 
Limitations and possible extensions 
With respect to redistribution, this work focuses only on income equity. Therefore one of the 
areas of research, and that we did not explore in this thesis, is to incorporate gender equity into 
inclusive growth: Achieving greater gender equity is an important aspect of fostering greater 
inclusiveness of growth, including enhancing human capabilities. In other word, it is to show 
evidence on the direct links between fiscal policy and gender equality. The idea is to provide 
evidence on how women and men are affected by fiscal policy in different ways and how fiscal 
policy can contribute to advance gender equality. 
Next, the notion of inclusive growth is very broad and can be perceived differently across 
countries. Each country can focus on a pillar of its choice according to its economic and social 
agenda. In such a situation, there may be heterogeneity. Then a possible extension of this work 
would be to estimate our model with a heterogeneous panel or estimate country by country. 
Finally, further study could consider the “non- tax revenue” obtained by the government from 
sources other than tax. Revenue from this source can offert geater space for developing 
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countries public finance and are also less sensitive to commodity price fluctuations for resource-
rich countries. 
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